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Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authors of the 
report drawing on glossaries and other resources available 
on the websites of the following organizations, networks 
and projects: Center for International Forestry Research, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Non-State 
Actor Zone for Climate Action, United Nations Environment 
Programme, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and World Resources Institute.
Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to 
moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. 
In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects. 
Additionality: A criterion sometimes applied to projects 
aimed at reducing GHG emissions. It stipulates that the 
emission reductions accomplished by the project must not 
have happened anyway had the project not taken place. 
Afforestation: Planting of new forests on lands that 
historically have not contained forests.
Agriculture, forestry and other land use: AFOLU plays a 
central role for food security and sustainable development. 
The main mitigation options within AFOLU involve one or 
more of three strategies: prevention of emissions to the 
atmosphere by conserving existing carbon pools in soils or 
vegetation or by reducing emissions of methane and nitrous 
oxide; sequestration—increasing the size of existing carbon 
pools and thereby extracting carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from 
the atmosphere; and substitution—substituting biological 
products for fossil fuels or energy-intensive products, 
thereby reducing CO
2
 emissions. Demand-side measures 
(for example, reducing losses and wastes of food, changes in 
human diet, or changes in wood consumption) may also play 
a role. FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use)—also referred to 
as LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry)—is the 
subset of AFOLU emissions and removals of GHGs resulting 
from direct human-induced land use, land-use change, and 
forestry activities excluding agricultural emissions.
Annex I Parties: The industrialized countries listed in Annex 
I to the Convention, which committed to returning their 
GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as per Article 
4.2(a) and (b). They have also accepted emission targets 
for the period 2008-12 as per Article 3 and Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol. They include the 24 original OECD members, 
the European Union, and 14 countries with economies in 
transition (Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Slovenia 
joined Annex I at COP 3, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
replaced Czechoslovakia). See also Non-Annex I Parties.
Annex II Parties: The countries listed in Annex II to the 
Convention which have a special obligation to provide 
financial resources and facilitate technology transfer to 
developing countries. Annex II Parties include the 24 original 
OECD members plus the European Union. 
Baseline/reference: The state against which change is 
measured. In the context of transformation pathways, the 
term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are based 
on the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures 
will be implemented beyond those that are already in force 
and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline 
scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, 
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to 
highlight the level of emissions that would occur without 
further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then 
compared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed 
to meet different goals for GHG emissions, atmospheric 
concentrations or temperature change. The term ‘baseline 
scenario’ is used interchangeably with ‘reference scenario’ 
and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of the literature the term 
is also synonymous with the term ‘business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario’, although the term ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour 
because the idea of ‘business-as-usual’ in century-long 
socioeconomic projections is hard to fathom. 
Biomass: The total mass of living organisms in a given 
area or volume, including products, by-products, and 
waste of biological origin (plants or animal matter) and 
excluding material embedded in geological formations and 
transformed to fossil fuels or peat. 
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Biomass plus carbon capture and storage (BioCCS or BECCS): 
Use of energy produced from biomass where the combustion 
gases are then captured and stored underground or used, for 
example, in industrial processes. It excludes gases generated 
through, for example, a fermentation process (as opposed 
to combustion). 
Black carbon: The substance formed through the incomplete 
combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass, which is 
emitted in both anthropogenic and naturally occurring soot. 
It consists of pure carbon in several linked forms. Black carbon 
warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphere and 
by reducing albedo – the ability to reflect sunlight – when 
deposited on snow and ice. 
Bottom-up model: In the context of this assessment, a model 
that represents a system by looking at its detailed underlying 
parts. Compared to so-called top-down models, which focus 
on economic interlinkages, bottom-up models of energy use 
and emissions can provide greater resolution with regards to 
sectors or mitigation technologies. 
Business-as-usual: A scenario that describes future GHG 
emission levels in the absence of additional mitigation 
efforts and policies (with respect to an agreed set). In 
the 2014 EGR (page 5, para 2), BAU scenarios were based 
on an extrapolation of current economic, social and 
technological trends. They only took into account climate 
policies implemented up to around 2005-10 (that is, more 
recent country pledges and policies were not considered) 
and therefore served as a reference point for what would 
happen to emissions if planned climate mitigation policies 
were not implemented. See Baseline/reference.
Bunker fuels: A term used to refer to fuels consumed for 
international marine and air transport. 
Cancun pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted their 
existing plans for controlling GHG emissions to the Climate 
Change Secretariat and these proposals were formally 
acknowledged under the UNFCCC. Developed countries 
presented their plans in the shape of economy-wide targets 
to reduce emissions, mainly up to 2020, while developing 
countries proposed ways to limit their growth of emissions 
in the shape of plans of action. 
Carbon credits: An entitlement allocated by a government 
to a legal entity (company or other type of emitter) to emit a 
specified amount of a substance. These entitlements, which 
may be transferrable and tradable, can be used to reduce 
emissions of GHGs (by giving them a monetary value) or can 
be used for accounting of emissions.
Carbon dioxide emission budget: For a given temperature 
rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C long-term limit, the 
corresponding carbon budget reflects the total amount of 
carbon emissions that can be emitted to stay within that 
limit. Stated differently, a carbon budget is the area under 
a GHG emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about 
limits on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain 
level of global mean surface temperature rise. 
Carbon dioxide equivalent: A way to place emissions of 
various radiative forcing agents on a common footing by 
accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a given 
mixture and amount of GHGs, the amount of carbon dioxide 
that would have the same global warming ability, when 
measured over a specified time period. For the purpose of 
this report, GHG emissions (unless otherwise specified) are 
the sum of the basket of GHG listed in Annex A to the Kyoto 
Protocol, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents assuming 
a 100-year global warming potential. 
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of carbon dioxide 
released per unit of another variable such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), output energy use or transport. 
Carbon market: A popular (but misleading) term for a 
trading system through which countries may buy or sell units 
of GHG emissions in an effort to meet their national limits 
on emissions, either under the Kyoto Protocol or under 
other agreements, such as that among member states of 
the European Union. The term comes from the fact that CO2 
is the predominant GHG, and other gases are measured in 
units called ‘CO
2 
equivalents’. 
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO
2
 or 
CO
2
-equivalent emissions. This may refer to the rate of a 
carbon tax or the price of emission permits. In many models 
that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, 
carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the level of 
effort in mitigation policies. 
Carbon sequestration: The process of removing carbon from 
the atmosphere and depositing it in a reservoir. 
Carbon sink: A pool (reservoir) that removes carbon from 
the active part of the carbon cycle.
Carbon stock: The quantity of carbon contained in a carbon 
pool. 
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately 
emitted as carbon dioxide, a carbon tax is equivalent to an 
emission tax on CO
2 
emissions. 
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social 
welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty 
and depend on, among others, local circumstances and 
implementation practices. Co-benefits are often referred to 
as ancillary benefits. 
Conditional INDCs: INDCs proposed by some countries that 
are contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as the 
ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, 
ambitious action from other countries, realization of finance 
and technical support, or other factors. 
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Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the 
Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention’s progress. 
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on 
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic 
trends and current policy approaches including policies at 
least through 2012. Estimates may be based on either official 
data or independent analysis.
Decarbonization: The process by which countries or other 
entities aim to achieve a low-carbon economy, or by which 
individuals aim to reduce their carbon consumption. 
Deforestation: The direct human-induced conversion of 
forested land to non-forested land (Marrakesh Accords). The 
conversion of forest to another land use or the long-term 
reduction of the tree canopy cover below the minimum 10 
per cent threshold. 
Degradation (forest): Changes within the forest that negatively 
affect the structure or function of the forest stand or site, and 
thereby lower its capacity to supply products and services. 
Delayed-action scenarios: See Later-action scenarios.
Double counting: In the context of this assessment, double 
counting refers to a situation in which the same emission 
reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ pledges. 
Emissions gap: The difference between the GHG emission 
levels consistent with having a likely chance (>66 per cent) 
of limiting the mean global temperature rise to below 2°C 
or 1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the GHG 
emission levels consistent with the global effect of the 
INDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020. 
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual GHG emissions 
over time. 
Forest: Land spanning more than 0.5 ha with trees higher 
than 5 m and a canopy cover of more than 10 per cent, 
or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ. It does not 
include land that is predominantly under agricultural or 
urban land use.
Forest landscape restoration: A process which aims to 
regain ecological integrity and enhance human wellbeing in 
deforested or degraded forest landscapes to meet present 
and future needs and accommodate multiple uses over time. 
Global warming potential: An index representing the 
combined effect of the differing times GHGs remain in the 
atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing 
outgoing infrared radiation. 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs): The atmospheric gases 
responsible for causing global warming and climatic change. 
The major GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO
2
), methane (CH
4
) 
and nitrous oxide (N
2
O). Less prevalent, but very powerful, 
GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
). 
Grid parity: This occurs when an alternative energy source 
can generate power at a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) 
that is less than or equal to the price of purchasing power 
from the electricity grid. 
Gross domestic product (GDP): The sum of gross value 
added, at purchasers’ prices, by all resident and non-resident 
producers in the economy, plus any taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of products in a country or 
geographic region for a given period, normally one year. GDP 
is calculated without deducting for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
‘Hot air’: Refers to the concern that some governments will 
be able to meet their targets for GHG emissions under any 
formal agreement with minimal effort and could then flood 
the market with emission credits, reducing the incentive for 
other countries to cut their own domestic emissions. 
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek to combine 
knowledge from multiple disciplines in the form of equations 
and/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmental 
problems. As such, they describe the full chain of climate 
change, from production of GHGs to atmospheric responses. 
This necessarily includes relevant links and feedbacks between 
socio-economic and biophysical processes. 
Intended nationally determined contribution (INDC): 
Submissions by Parties which identify actions each national 
government intends to take under the future UNFCCC climate 
agreement, due to be negotiated in Paris in December 2015. 
INDCs are, in effect, the basis of post-2020 global emission 
reduction commitments that will be included in the future 
climate agreement. 
International cooperative initiatives (ICIs): Initiatives outside 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change aimed at reducing emissions of climate forcers by, 
for example, promoting actions that are less GHG intensive, 
compared to prevailing alternatives. Cooperative initiatives 
also involve national and sub-national partners (they are 
often referred to as, simply, ‘cooperative initiatives’). 
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on its 
own, and requiring separate ratification by governments, 
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among 
other things, sets binding targets for the reduction of GHG 
emissions by industrialized countries. 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A GHG 
inventory sector that covers emissions and removals of 
GHGs resulting from direct human-induced land use, 
land-use change and forestry activities. 
Later-action scenarios: Climate change mitigation scenarios 
in which emission levels in the near term, typically up to 
2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the corresponding 
least-cost scenarios. 
Leakage: That portion of cuts in GHG emissions by developed 
countries – countries trying to meet mandatory limits under 
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the Kyoto Protocol – that may reappear in other countries 
not bound by such limits. For example, multinational 
corporations may shift factories from developed to 
developing countries to escape restrictions on emissions.
Least-cost scenarios: Climate change mitigation scenarios 
assuming that emission reductions start immediately after 
the model base year, and are distributed optimally over time, 
sectors and regions, such that aggregate costs of reaching 
the climate target are minimized. 
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 per cent chance. 
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities of 
meeting temperature limits. 
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a 
standard even though participants would be better off with 
an alternative. 
Medium chance: A likelihood of 50–66 per cent chance. 
Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits. 
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a human 
intervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks of 
GHGs. Examples include using fossil fuels more efficiently 
for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching 
to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of 
buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’ to remove 
greater amounts of CO
2
 from the atmosphere. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/concept 
that potentially supports greater transparency in the climate 
change regime. 
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international treaty that 
was designed to reduce the production and consumption 
of ozone-depleting substances in order to reduce their 
abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the 
Earth’s ozone layer. 
Mosaic restoration: This integrates trees into mixed-use 
landscapes, such as agricultural lands and settlements, where 
trees can support people through improved water quality, 
increased soil fertility, and other ecosystem services. This 
type of restoration is more likely in deforested or degraded 
forest landscapes with moderate population density 
(10-100 people/km2). 
Net negative emissions: A situation of net negative 
emissions is achieved when, as a result of human activities, 
more GHGs are sequestered or stored than are released into 
the atmosphere. 
No-policy scenario: See Baseline/reference.
Non-Annex I Parties: The countries that have ratified or 
acceded to the UNFCCC that are not included in Annex I of 
the Convention. 
Non-state actor: In the context of climate action, ‘non-state 
actor’ includes companies, cities, subnational regions and 
investors. More broadly, non-state actors have been defined 
as entities that participate or act in international relations. 
They are organizations with sufficient power to influence 
and cause a change even though they do not belong to any 
state institution. 
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO
2
-equivalent emissions 
that is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for 
emissions occurring elsewhere.
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organization 
such as the EU) that agrees to be bound by a treaty and for 
which the treaty has entered into force. 
Pledge case: This case identifies the maximum level of GHG 
emissions that each country or Party could emit in 2020 and 
still meet its pledge – without considering the use of offsets. 
Readiness: REDD+ country actions – including capacity building, 
policy design, consultation and consensus building, and testing 
and evaluation of a REDD+ national strategy – that are taken 
prior to the comprehensive implementation of REDD+. 
REDD+: Reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries.
Reference scenario: See Baseline/reference.
Reforestation: Planting of forests on lands that have 
previously contained forests but that have been converted 
to some other use.
Rehabilitation (forest): Restoration of the capacity of 
degraded forest land to deliver forest products and services. 
Forest rehabilitation re-establishes the original productivity 
of the forest and some, but not necessarily all, of the plant 
and animal species thought to be originally present at a site.
Restoration forest: Restoration of a degraded forest to 
its original state – that is, to re-establish the presumed 
structure, productivity and species diversity of the forest 
originally present at a site.
Results-based payments: Payments for fully measured, 
reported and verified emission reductions (or removals), 
also conditional upon the country having a national 
strategy/action plan for REDD+, a national forest monitoring 
system, national forest reference emission level and/or 
forest reference level, a safeguard information system and 
a summary of information on how safeguards have been 
addressed and respected. 
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold based 
on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initial 
socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving 
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or 
other climate change-related variables.
Sink: Any process, activity or mechanism which removes 
a GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG from the 
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atmosphere. Forests and other vegetation are considered 
sinks because they remove CO
2
 through photosynthesis. 
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases 
a GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG or aerosol into 
the atmosphere. 
Sustainable development: Development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
Technology transfer: A broad set of processes covering the 
flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating 
and adapting to climate change among different stakeholders. 
Temperature overshoot: An emission pathway that 
temporarily exceeds target temperature limits (2°C or 1.5°C) 
before falling below the limits again by 2100 with a given 
percentage chance.
Tipping point: A level of change in system properties beyond 
which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not 
return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change 
are abated. For the climate system, it refers to a critical 
threshold when global or regional climate changes from one 
stable state to another stable state. The tipping point event 
may be irreversible. 
Top-down model: A model that applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and/or optimization techniques 
to aggregate economic variables. Using historical data 
on consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-
down models assess demand and emissions for goods and 
services from main sectors, such as energy conversion, 
transportation, buildings, agriculture and industry. 
Transient climate response: Measure of the temperature 
rise that occurs at the time of a doubling of carbon dioxide 
concentration in the atmosphere. 
Transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions: 
Measure of temperature rise per unit of cumulative 
carbon emissions. 
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
can result from a lack of information or from disagreement 
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many 
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously 
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of 
human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented 
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density 
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting 
the judgement of a team of experts). 
Unconditional INDCs: INDCs proposed by countries without 
conditions attached. 
Wide-scale restoration: Aims to restore closed forests 
to the landscape. This type of restoration is more likely in 
deforested or degraded landscapes with low population 
density (<10 people/km2) that are also areas where closed 
forests formerly dominated the landscape. 
2020 pledge: See Cancun pledge. 
20th–80th percentile range: Results that fall within the 20–80 
per cent range of the frequency distribution of results in 
this assessment. 
xii The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – Acronyms
Acronyms
AFOLU agriculture, forestry and other land use
AR5 fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
BAU business as usual
BC black carbon
BECCS biomass plus carbon capture and storage (or 
BioCCS)
BELC Business Environmental Leadership Council
BRT Bus Rapid Transit
cAIT Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
cAT Climate Action Tracker
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
cCR carbonn Climate Registry
CCS carbon capture and storage
cdKn Climate and Development Knowledge 
Network
cdM Clean Development Mechanism
cdp Carbon Disclosure Project (now ‘CDP’)
CER certified emission reduction
cFc  chlorofluorocarbon
CH
4  
methane
CISL Cambridge Institute for Sustainability 
Leadership
co2 carbon dioxide
co2e carbon dioxide equivalent
CoM Covenant of Mayors
cop Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CRF common reporting format (of the UNFCCC)
C-ROADS Climate Rapid Overview and Decision 
Support
CSI Cement Sustainability Initiative
CSP concentrating solar power
deA Danish Energy Agency
EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research
eeA European Environment Agency
EHCC Earth Hour City Challenge 
ERI Energy Research Institute
ER-PIN Emission Reductions Program Idea Note  
(in FCPF)
ERU  emission reduction unit
EU-ETS European Union Emissions Trading System
FAo Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations
FcpF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FF&I fossil fuels and industry
FIA Federation Internationale de l’Automobile
FLR forest landscape restoration
FS-UNEP Frankfurt School - UNEP Collaborating 
Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy 
Finance
GDP gross domestic product
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GFEI Global Fuel Economy Initiative
GHG greenhouse gas
GLOBIOM global biosphere management model
GPC Global Protocol for Community-scale GHG 
Emissions
Gt gigatonne
GWP global warming potential
G4M global forest model
HFC hydrofluorocarbon
IAM integrated assessment model
IcAo  International Civil Aviation Organization
IcI international cooperative initiative
IcLeI International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives
ICRAF World Agroforestry Centre (formerly 
International Centre for Research in 
Agroforestry)
IDDRI Institut du Developpement Durables et des 
Relations Internationales
IeA International Energy Agency
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis
IIMA Indian Institute of Management, 
Ahmedabad
IMo International Maritime Organization
Indc Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution
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Inpe National Institute for Space Research
Ipcc Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPPU industrial processes and product use (IPCC 
sector)
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
IUCN International Union for Conservation of 
Nature
JRC Joint Research Centre (European 
Commission)
LIMITS Low climate IMpact scenarios and the 
Implications of required Tight emission 
control Strategies
LSE London School of Economics and Political 
Science
LULUCF land use, land-use change and forestry
McpA Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement 
(USA)
MRV monitoring, reporting and verification
Mtco2e million metric tons of CO2 equivalent 
nAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
nAp National Adaptation Plan
nAZcA Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
NCSC National Center for Climate Strategy and 
International Cooperation
nF
3
 nitrogen trifluoride
NGO non-governmental organization
NIES National Institute for Environmental Studies
nydF New York Declaration on Forests
n2o nitrous oxide
oc organic carbon
ODS ozone-depleting substances
oecd Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
opIc Overseas Private Investment Corporation
pAM policies and measures
pFc perfluorocarbon
pIK Potsdam Institute for Climate Change 
Research
PRIMAP potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for 
probabilistic Assessment of emission paths
pv photovoltaic
REALU reducing emissions from all land uses
REDD+ Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation Plus in developing 
countries (includes sustainable management 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks)
SBT science-based targets
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SE4ALL Sustainable Energy for All
SEAP Sustainable Energy Action Plan
SF
6
 sulphur hexafluoride
SIDS small island developing states
SLCF short-lived climate forcers
SOC soil organic carbon
TCR transient climate response
UCL University College London
UCLG United Cities and Local Governments
ULCOS ultra-low CO
2
 steelmaking
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP-DTU UNEP-Technical University of Denmark
UNEP-WCMC UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNORCID United Nations Office for REDD+ 
Coordination in Indonesia
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development
WHRC Woods Hole Research Center
WMccc World Mayors Council on Climate Change
WRI World Resources Institute 
WWF World Wildlife Fund
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Foreword
Following the historic signing of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, this sixth edition of the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report comes as world leaders start gathering 
in Paris to establish a new agreement on climate change.
The report offers an independent assessment of the 
mitigation contributions from the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC) committed to by 1 October 
2015, by the 146 countries that account for around 90 per 
cent of global emissions. It compares the 2030 emission 
levels that would result from these commitments with what 
science tells us would keep average temperature increases 
on track to stay below 2°C by the end of the century; it 
provides data for an aspirational target of keeping that 
increase below 1.5°C; and it evaluates the INDCs in relation 
to progress on the 2020 pledges made in Cancun.
The INDCs demonstrate a significant increase in ambition 
and their successful delivery could reduce emissions by 
around 25 per cent compared to the level expected from 
current policies and pledges. However, this would still put 
long-term temperatures on track for an increase and lead to 
serious climate impact, so more action is required.
Therefore, the Emissions Gap Report also explores how 
available financial, technical and capacity building solutions 
can be scaled up, or even accelerated, to close the gap 
between the expected and required levels of emissions. This 
includes detailed assessments that look beyond the INDCs to 
identify the further gains being identified by the International 
Cooperative Initiatives and by Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).
With many new emission reduction initiatives also generating 
substantial economic, social and environmental benefits, 
the INDC preparation process in most countries encouraged 
greater exploration of the links between development and 
climate. This is an important first step in a possible transition 
towards more low carbon economies.
The Emissions Gap Report makes it very clear that while 
reaching a meaningful global agreement in Paris is essential, 
it is not the end of the climate change story: it is a stepping 
stone on a much longer journey that requires us to stay 
alert to the science and remain dynamic in our response. 
The world has already tripled the expected performance 
on scaling up clean energy and been able to start reversing 
damage to the ozone layer. 
I firmly believe that if we act on the findings of this report, 
there is nothing to stop us closing the emissions gap and 
creating a more inclusive and sustainable future for both the 
developed and the developing world.
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Executive Summary
The year 2015 has the potential to become a turning point 
in global efforts to transform the prevailing social and 
economic development paradigm into a more sustainable 
one.
The global community reached agreement in September 
2015 on a set of 17 sustainable development goals to be 
achieved by 2030, including climate change. Countries will 
meet again at the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of the 
Parties (COP 21) in Paris with the aim of establishing a 
new global agreement on climate change, hereafter the 
‘Paris Agreement’, with the ambition of limiting changes in 
global temperatures to below 2°C or 1.5°C warming in 2100 
compared to pre-industrial levels. The Paris Agreement will 
also aim to establish a framework to provide technological 
and financial support for developing countries to accelerate 
the transition towards low carbon and climate resilient 
development paths.
The architecture of a new climate agreement has many 
facets with an array of issues under negotiation that have 
become significantly more complex since the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change entered into force in 1994. 
The core structure of the Paris Agreement will comprise the 
“Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” (INDCs) 
as well as the process by which implementation of the 
agreement will proceed over time to advance the objectives 
of the UNFCCC. In addition, a number of key decisions will be 
required covering issues like adaptation, finance, technology, 
and capacity building. 
1. What is covered in the 2015 Emissions 
Gap Report?
This sixth UNEP Emissions Gap Report provides a scientific 
assessment of the mitigation contributions from the 
submitted INDCs. As in the previous reports, it then 
compares the resulting emission levels in 2030 with what 
science tells us is required to be on track towards the agreed 
target of a global average temperature increase below 2°C 
by 2100. The Report also provides data for the aspirational 
target of keeping the temperature increase below 1.5°C. 
In addition, the Report presents selected areas where 
enhanced action can be taken, accelerated and scaled up to 
close the emissions gap. 
The 2015 Emissions Gap Report addresses the following 
key questions:
• What are the latest estimates of 2025 and 2030 total 
global emissions levels consistent with the goal of 
holding the global average temperature rise below 
2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100?
• What is the progress on implementation of the 
Cancun pledges for the period to 2020?
• Will the combined INDC commitments for 2030 (if 
fully implemented) be sufficient to stay within the 
range consistent with the 2°C temperature goal?
• What are possible contributions in selected key 
areas, where action can be accelerated to enhance 
the ambition of national pledges both in the period 
before and after the expected entry into force in 
2020 of the Paris Agreement? This year the detailed 
assessment is on possible mitigation contributions 
from International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs) and 
enhanced forest-related mitigation activities with a 
focus on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+).
By 1 October 2015, a total of 119 INDCs had been submitted 
to the UNFCCC. Fifteen INDCs included only mitigation, while 
most included both adaptation and mitigation components. 
The report only presents qualitative information about the 
adaptation component of the INDCs submitted. 
The report has been prepared by an international team of 
leading scientists assessing all available information, including 
that reviewed by the IPCC in its fifth assessment report, 
as well as more recent scientific studies. The assessment 
production process has been transparent and participatory. 
The assessment methodology and preliminary findings were 
made available to governments and stakeholders concerned 
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during relevant international fora as well as on the UNEP 
Live website. The governments of the countries with specific 
mention in the report have been invited to comment on the 
assessment findings.
2. What are current emissions and what 
emission levels in 2030 are consistent 
with the 2°C and the 1.5°C targets?
Over the past decades global GHG emissions have been 
increasing steadily, with small variations around a longer-
term trend. 
The most recent global emission estimates1 are available for 
the year 2014. In that year, total global Kyoto-GHG emissions2 
amounted to about 52.7 GtCO
2
e (range: 47.9-57.5). Global 
carbon-dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from fossil-fuel and industry 
were estimated at 35.5 GtCO
2
 for 2014 (range: 32.5-38.5). 
Staying below 2°C temperature rise implies that CO2 
emissions are reduced to net zero by 2060-2075.
The IPCC in its fifth assessment report concluded that to 
limit global warming to below 2°C, the remaining cumulative 
CO
2
 emissions – the so-called carbon budget – are in the 
order of 1 000 GtCO
2
. This remaining budget can be utilized 
in different ways, but given the most recent assessment of 
current trends, net global carbon emissions will eventually 
need to be reduced to zero between 2060 and 20753. For 
a detailed discussion of the carbon budget, see the 2014 
Emissions Gap Report.
____________________
1 Data for 2014 are available from EDGAR and PRIMAP, see Chapter 2.
2 The six greenhouse gases covered by the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol — carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur 
hexafluoride. Here aggregated with 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.
3 Based on the final released IPCC AR5 scenarios database data.
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Figure ES1: Historical greenhouse (GHG) emissions and projections until 2050
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The 2015 Report presents an updated set of possible 
pathways to stay within this budget, and also includes an 
updated assessment of the pathways and requirements to 
stay within the more ambitious 1.5°C temperature goal.
The median emission level in 2030 in scenarios that have 
a >66 per cent chance of keeping temperature increase to 
below 2°C by the end of the century is 42 GtCO2e (range: 
31-44). The similar level for a 1.5°C pathway is 39 GtCO2e
4. 
The trajectories for the two target levels are similar in many 
aspects, but earlier and much stronger action is necessary 
for the 1.5°C target to be kept.
As reflected in last year’s report, the focus for the gap 
assessment has shifted from 2020 to 2030, reflecting that 
the underlying scenarios assume emission levels that are 
consistent with the Cancun pledges until 2020. Least-cost 
enhanced emission reduction pathways are only assumed 
from 2020. Earlier analysis assumed the world would move 
onto a least-cost pathway by 2010. Current trends indicate 
that this will not be the case, and accordingly the new set of 
scenarios from the IPCC, which are referenced in this report, 
include only those that assume least-cost pathways starting 
from 2020. 
3. What are the implications of the 
scenarios that are consistent with the 
temperature goals?
The scenarios used in this Report as reference for meeting 
the 2°C and 1.5°C goals are all characterized by modest 
emissions reductions compared to current policies until 
20205 that are in line with the ambition of Cancun pledges. 
This implies a need for deep and stringent emission 
reductions over later decades. Enhanced action before 
2020 that would bring emission levels below the projected 
2020 Cancun pledge level would ease the challenge and 
reduce overall cost of transitioning to least-cost pathways 
after 2020. It should be noted that in order to move to such 
pathways after 2020, the necessary policies and investment 
will need to be prepared well in advance.
The assessment of the pathways and target levels point at three 
key issues that have also been raised in previous gap reports:
• All scenarios analyzing 2°C pathways that follow 
the Cancun pledges until 2020 and with a least-cost 
starting point in 2020, require strong reductions after 
2020. They also rely on so-called ‘negative emission 
technologies’ such as bioenergy combined with 
carbon capture and storage 
• For scenarios analyzing the 1.5°C target, the reduction 
rates will need to be steeper
• The feasibility of large scale deployment of negative 
emission technologies is still a contentious issue. 
 
Enhanced early action (such as moving below the 2020 
pledges) is associated with the following economic and 
technological advantages:
• Softening the requirement for very steep emission 
reductions over the medium term
• Facilitating mitigation in the medium to long term 
by reducing lock-in of carbon and energy intensive 
infrastructure in the energy system and society as a 
whole
• Encouraging near-term learning and development of 
technologies that will be essential in the long term
• Providing early policy signals which are needed for 
action later in the coming decades
• Reducing the overall costs and economic challenges 
in terms of, for example, upscaling of energy 
investments, during the transitional period
• Reducing the dependence on unproven technologies 
and increase the options society can choose from 
in terms of means to achieve stringent emission 
reductions in the long term.
Delaying stringent mitigation efforts until 2030 (in other 
words, not following a least-cost reduction trajectory after 
2020) would with high confidence make the transition 
to longer-term emissions levels in line with the 2°C goal 
significantly more difficult. A significant number of models 
are not able to produce 2°C scenarios consistent with 
global emission levels in 2030 above 55 GtCO
2
e, while other 
scenarios which delay enhanced mitigation action until after 
2030 would imply massive cost increases coupled with a 
need for unprecedented political action. 
4. Are G20 countries making progress on the 
implementation of 2020 pledges?
Among the G20 there are thirteen countries with pledges 
for 2020 (counting the EU members France, Germany, Italy 
and UK as one) and three countries without pledges. Six 
of these are assessed as being on track to meet pledges 
or extremely close, four are not, and three cannot be 
assessed, because there is insufficient evidence. 
Pledges are self-determined. A country being on track does 
not necessarily mean that it undertakes more stringent 
action on mitigation than a country that is not on track – it 
depends on the ambition of the pledge. 
The report presents an assessment of progress by G20 countries 
on the national pledges presented in the context of the Cancun 
agreement, and referred to here as the Cancun pledges. 
The assessment compares projected 2020 emissions under 
three cases:
• Pledge case – projecting the maximum amount of 
emissions for 2020 compatible with the pledge
• Current policy trajectory – official national estimate
• Current policy trajectory – independent analysis.
Despite progress towards implementing policies in line with 
pledges, it is evident that work remains to be done to bring 
all G20 countries into pledge attainment. 
4 As there are fewer than 10 scenarios available for the 1.5°C pathways, the 
20th to 80th percentile range is not provided. However, the minimum and 
maximum values are 37 GtCO
2
e and 40 GtCO
2
e respectively.
5 Global emissions in 2020 under various pledge cases are estimated to be 
about 52-54 GtCO
2
e. The least-cost 2020 scenarios used here have global 
emissions close to this range (49-56 GtCO
2
e).
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5. What is the emissions gap in 2025 and 
2030 assuming full implementation of the 
INDCs?
The emissions gap between what the full implementation 
of the unconditional INDCs contribute and the least-cost 
emission level for a pathway to stay below 2°C, is estimated 
to be 14 GtCO2e (range: 12-17) in 2030 and 7 GtCO2e (range: 
5-10) in 2025. When conditional INDCs are included as fully 
implemented, the emissions gap in 2030 is estimated to be 
12 GtCO2e (range: 10-15) and 5 GtCO2e (range: 4-8) in 2025.
If countries that have not yet submitted an INDC were to 
reduce their emissions at the same percentage below current 
policy trajectories as those that have already submitted, the 
projected global emissions would be further reduced, and 
the gap  narrowed, by a further 0.5 GtCO
2
e in 2025 and 
1 GtCO
2
e in 2030.  
Full implementation of unconditional INDC results in 
emission level estimates in 2030 that are most consistent 
with scenarios that limit global average temperature 
increase to below 3.5°C until 2100 with a greater than 
66 per cent chance. INDC estimates do, however, come 
with uncertainty ranges. When taking this into account 
the 3.5°C value could decrease to 3°C or increase towards 
4°C for the low and high unconditional INDC estimates, 
respectively. When including the full implementation of 
conditional INDCs, the emissions level estimates become 
most consistent with long-term scenarios that limit global 
average temperature increase to <3-3.5°C by the end of the 
century with a greater than 66 per cent chance.
These numbers essentially tell two stories. Firstly the INDCs 
do present a real increase in the ambition level compared to 
a projection of current policies; all global modelling groups 
that have been assessed reached this conclusion. Secondly 
the submitted contributions are far from enough and the 
emissions gap in both 2025 and 2030 will be very significant. 
The Report presents an assessment of the 119 INDCs submitted 
by 1 October 2015, covering 146 countries and   85-88 per 
cent of global GHG emissions in 2012. A final update of the 
assessment including later submissions will    be presented on 
the UNEP Live website before the start of COP 21. 
In the absence of agreed formats for reporting on mitigation 
contributions, including on the units in which those might be 
expressed, Parties have chosen a wide variety of forms and 
contributions: for example, targets used include:
• Economy-wide absolute reduction from historical 
base year emissions
• Emissions reduction relative to a baseline projection 
for the emissions associated with energy consumption
• Trajectory target for specific sectors or gases
• Specifying a peaking year
• Emissions intensity of GDP
• A fixed level target.
This has increased the analytical challenge of ensuring 
consistency when comparing and aggregating different 
mitigation contributions. The assessment builds on a 
combination of global and country-specific modelling studies 
from independent research teams, and official country-
specific data sources. 
The global emission levels in 2030 consistent with having a 
likely chance (>66 per cent) of staying below the 2°C goal 
in 2100, following a least-cost pathway from 2020 with only 
modest improvement of the GHG intensity until then, is 
42 GtCO
2
e (range: 31-44). In 2025 this level is 48 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 46-50). 
In comparison, global GHG emissions, based on assessment 
of the INDCs submitted by 1 October 2015, are for 
the unconditional INDCs projected to be at 54 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 53-58) in 2025, and 56 GtCO
2
e (range: 54-59) 
in 2030. If conditional INDCs are included, the global 
emissions projection is 53 GtCO
2
e (range: 52-56) in 2025 
and 54 GtCO
2
e (range: 52-57) in 2030. The emission levels 
resulting from submitted INDCs are 4 to 6 GtCO
2
e lower 
than the current policy trajectory in 2030 of 60 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 58-62). They are 9 to 11 GtCO
2
e lower than the 
baseline of 65 GtCO
2
e (range: 60-70), which is based on IPCC 
AR5 scenarios and assumes no additional climate policies 
are put in place after 2010.
6. Can the INDC process become a 
foundation for enhancing ambition? 
It is clear from the assessment of the mitigation 
contributions from the INDCs that much more needs to be 
done. This round of INDCs should therefore be considered 
as the first step in building foundations for a successful 
global climate agreement. The social and political effects 
of the INDCs and the processes undertaken at national 
level transcend the aggregate effect they are estimated 
to have on total global GHG emission levels in 2025 and 
2030. The preparation of the INDCs has in many countries 
incentivized exploration of linkages between development 
and climate, as well as development of new national 
climate polices, and can be seen as an important step in a 
transition towards low carbon economies.
The Paris Agreement can support these national transitions 
and provide the framework for mobilization of the enhanced 
mitigation effort that is required to align national efforts with 
the global mitigation ambition indicated by the 2°C pathways. 
Establishing a robust, effective and transparent follow-up 
and review framework as part of the Paris Agreement will be 
critical in this context. 
The INDCs and options for enhanced mitigation action must 
be seen in the broader context of economic growth and 
sustainable development. The Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) recently adopted in New York by Heads of State 
of all member states of the United Nations explicitly recognise 
the interdependence between the achievement of climate, 
development and sustainability goals and recommends 
prioritizing coherence, co-benefits, and complementarity 
between the SDGs and a climate change agreement under 
the UNFCCC.
The SDG Goal 13 “Take urgent action to combat climate 
change and its impacts” specifically acknowledges that the 
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Figure ES2: The emissions gap
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for 
negotiating the global response to climate change, and the 
targets associated with the goal are clearly aligned with the 
ambitions in the INDCs.
7. What are some of the options for closing 
the gap?
A number of recent global studies conclude that there is 
a significant potential to reduce global emissions in 2030 
– beyond the reductions resulting from implementation 
of the INDCs. If this potential is fully exploited, it could 
bring global emissions to a level very close to bridge the 
emissions gap in 2030. Furthermore, the studies suggest 
that this can be done by relying on proven technologies 
and policies.
A number of recent studies and reports, including by 
the IPCC and leading international research institutions, 
identifies a significant emissions reduction potential by 
2030. Acknowledging that the methodologies, assumptions, 
scope and coverage of measures considered vary across the 
assessed studies, they all show that tapping into unused 
emission reduction potential could narrow the emissions 
gap in 2030 considerably. Taken together, they indicate 
that global greenhouse gas emissions could be further 
reduced by between 5 to 12 GtCO
2
e/yr (range: 3-13) relative 
to the emissions level resulting from implementation of 
the unconditional INDCs, and between 5 to 10 GtCO
2
e/yr 
(range: 1-11) relative to the emissions level associated with 
implementation of the conditional INDCs. These reductions 
could contribute to the reductions needed to bridge the 
emissions gap in 2030, which as previously stated is estimated 
at 14 GtCO
2
e (range: 12-17) for the unconditional INDC case 
and at 12 GtCO
2
e (range: 10-15), if both unconditional and 
conditional INDCs are implemented. 
There is considerable uncertainty associated with 
the possibilities for achieving the emission reduction 
opportunities put forward in some of these studies. At the 
same time, the studies assessed do not cover all relevant 
measures, thematic areas and sectors. In other words the 
total technical and economic emission reduction potential 
in 2030 could be larger than indicated in the studies 
assessed. In comparison the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the IPCC indicated a total emission reduction potential in 
2030 of 23 GtCO
2
e (range: 16-31). No update of the total 
emission reduction potential in 2030 was provided in the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, but sectoral updates in 
this report indicate emission reduction potentials in 2030 of 
the same order of magnitude. 
The assessed recent studies emphasize the key importance 
of enhanced energy efficiency with a particular emphasis 
on industry, buildings and transport, and expanded use 
of renewable energy technologies for power production 
combined with increased efficiency of fossil fuel-based 
power production will all be critical for achievement of the 
desired large-scale emission reductions. Other key sectors 
for enhanced mitigation action emphasized in the studies 
include forestry, agriculture and waste.
These are all sectors that have been assessed in earlier UNEP 
Emissions Gap Reports and where significant opportunities 
for bridging the gap have been highlighted through 
possibilities for replication, acceleration and scaling up 
proven good practices and policies. 
8. How can International Cooperative 
Initiatives contribute to implementation 
of INDCs and enhance ambitions?
The impact of actions by International Cooperative 
Initiatives can potentially be significant. Preliminary 
assessments indicate a contribution in the range of 
2.5 to 4 GtCO2e in 2020, if fully implemented.  Part of this 
contribution falls within the Cancun pledges while the 
additional contribution may be in the range of 0.75 to 
2 GtCO2e in 2020. 
Significant attention has been put on mitigation actions by 
ICIs including actors other than Parties to the UNFCCC. 
ICIs include a wide variety of activities, which makes 
consistent and thorough assessment difficult.  Nevertheless, 
an effort has been made to assess all available information 
and organize it under a simple catalogue of actions 
categorized by type of constituent engaged.  This catalogue 
serves to focus on those ICIs that have the most impact 
potential and by disentangling the various initiatives the 
overlap and double-counting risks with the national pledges 
can be minimized.
The report examines initiatives in three broad categories:
• Cities and regions 
• Companies
• Sectors
A few examples below illustrate the wide span of ICIs:
• C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group – is a network 
of the world’s megacities committed to taking 
action that reduces global GHG emissions. It has 75 
affiliated cities (as of July 2015) and a total of 80 total 
participants
• The Compact of Mayors - is an agreement by three city 
networks to undertake a transparent and supportive 
approach to reduce city-level emissions, and to 
reduce vulnerability from, and enhance resilience to, 
climate change, in a consistent and complementary 
manner to national level climate protection efforts. It 
builds on ongoing city-level efforts
• Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) - is an alliance of 
25 leading companies in the global cement industry 
created under the auspices of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
Participants commit to developing a climate change 
mitigation strategy, setting reduction targets for CO
2
 
and reporting annually on their progress. 
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A number of new studies have examined the major 
initiatives and this report presents an assessment of these 
studies and their estimates of the emission reduction 
potential for each category of initiative.  The studies list a 
number of challenges related to the analyzed ICIs including 
elements of overlap between initiatives and comparability 
of transparent monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
of results. It is therefore difficult to assess whether all the 
international initiatives actually deliver on promises, as most 
initiatives propose only voluntary commitments and hence 
make it difficult for accountability and compliance to be 
enforced and sometimes lack robust Monitoring, Reporting 
and Verification (MRV). 
Many initiatives can, however, play important roles to 
advance climate action, as they: 
• Encourage or facilitate emission reductions at the city 
and regional level, via knowledge sharing, capacity 
building and technical support for project planning 
and implementation
• Identify partnerships and support local communities 
to become climate resilient
• Represent common city-level interests to influence 
policymakers at other levels
• Help implement climate plans and low-carbon and 
climate-resilient economic development projects 
• Achieve transparency and accountability by 
encouraging best practice in GHG emission reporting
• Help overcome financial barriers and attract investors 
and accelerate additional capital flows into cities for 
low carbon projects.
The studies compare the emissions reduction potential for 
the different categories of initiatives compared to a current 
trajectory baseline (noting that studies are not necessarily 
using same baseline approaches). Even if uncertainties are 
quite large, it is interesting that results are quite comparable 
at the aggregate level, even if the assessment of the different 
groups of initiatives varies significantly. 
The assessment notes that the impact of non-state climate 
commitments can be significant, most likely in the range 
between 2.5 and 4 GtCO
2
e in 2020 (taking into account 
that not all initiatives are included in all assessments). 
These numbers include an estimate of overlaps between 
the various initiatives, in terms of actual actions, sectors, 
greenhouse gases and regions. 
It is harder to estimate the overlap between these non-
state initiatives and government emission reduction pledges 
for 2020. The recent studies examined in this assessment 
suggest that the overlap ranges between 33 and 70 per 
cent, resulting in possible additional net contributions of the 
order of 0.75 to 2 GtCO
2
e in 2020. 
Even if ICIs are not necessarily additional to national 2020 
pledges, they can be an important component of actually 
implementing these and at the same time facilitate or 
even drive increased national ambition. Only one study 
extrapolates the potential reductions to 2030, so it is not 
possible to present numbers here, but the study indicates 
that the mitigation contribution from existing ICIs would be 
substantial.
Figure ES3: National statements of intention to undertake forest-related mitigation activities
Speciﬁes activities for forest-related emission reductions (ER)
Speciﬁes activities for enhancement of forest carbon stocks (EN)
Speciﬁes activities for both forest-related ER and EN
Includes forests in scope but does not specify forest-related activities
No national statement of intention to undertake forest-related
mitigation activities in the sources consulted
Note: The boundaries and names shown and designations used on this map do not imply oﬃcial 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The map shows forest-related mitigation aims expressed 
in one or more of the following: INDCs submitted to UNFCCC until 1 October 2015; NAMAs submitted to 
UNFCCC by June 2013 for non-Annex countries and to the Copenhagen Accord for Annex 1 countries; ER-PINs 
submitted to the FCPF Carbon Fund; bilateral agreements for results-based payments; Bonn Challenge 
commitments; Initiative 20x20 commitments; endorsement of the New York Declaration on Forests.
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6  Individual countries classified according to the actions specified in the documents reviewed.
9. What is the potential for greater forest-
related mitigation, in particular through 
REDD+?
Forest-related mitigation activities in both developing and 
developed countries are attracting significant political 
attention, both in the negotiation process over the last 
years and in many of the submitted INDCs. Special focus 
is on policies and actions under REDD+ as the theoretical 
potential of forest-related mitigation activities in 
developing countries is estimated to be up to 9 GtCO2 in 
2030. The realization of this theoretical potential will be 
constrained by economic and land-use factors.
A rapid review6 has been undertaken of forestry related 
mitigation actions in the submitted INDCs and these are 
together with other types of national engagement in forestry 
related mitigation illustrated in the global map below. 
The map clearly shows that many countries see potential 
mitigation opportunities in the forestry sector. 
A special focus in the assessment has been devoted to the set of 
policy approaches and actions known as REDD+ as one option 
for facilitating cost-effective contributions to climate change 
mitigation, in developing countries. REDD+ (as defined under 
the UNFCCC) includes – reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of 
forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
REDD+ has seen marked progress under the UNFCCC 
negotiations over the last ten years, as a policy tool to 
reduce forest related emissions, including on measurement, 
safeguards and eligibility for results-based finance. In order 
for developing countries to access results-based finance 
for REDD+ emissions reductions or enhanced removals of 
carbon from the atmosphere, they need to have in place:
• A national strategy or action plan
• A national forest monitoring system
• A safeguards information system and a summary of 
information on how the REDD+ safeguards have been 
addressed and respected
• A forest reference emissions level or forest reference 
level
• Fully measured, reported and verified results, in 
terms of emission reductions/enhanced removals.
These requirements place some constraints on the 
potential for REDD+ implementation in the short term, for 
example the speed at which policies can be put in place 
and governance improvements can be implemented. The 
availability of finance, whether domestic or international, 
to cover the upfront costs of REDD+ measures will also be 
a determining factor. Results-based finance, by its nature, 
will be released only after success has been achieved. Many 
developing countries have expressed their interest in large-
scale forest-related actions, both in their INDCs and a range 
of other statements. 
The theoretical emissions reduction potential has been 
assessed for Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean and is broadly in the range 2.7-3.3 GtCO
2
 in 2030 
for each region. However, the realization of this theoretical 
potential will be significantly constrained by economic and 
land-use factors.
1The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – Scoping the 2015 report
Scoping the 2015 report
Chapter 1
of the intended nationally determined contributions” 
(UNFCCC, 2014).
The architecture of a new climate agreement has many 
facets relating to mitigation and adaptation, and the array 
of issues under negotiation has become significantly more 
complex since the Convention was established. The Paris 
Agreement will also aim to establish a framework to enhance 
capacity building and provide technological and financial 
support for developing countries to accelerate the transition 
towards low carbon and climate resilient development 
paths. A number of key decisions related to these issues will 
be required, while the core structure of the agreement will 
be based on the INDCs.
1.2 Key questions
Subsequent to COP 15, UNEP has produced an annual 
Emissions Gap Report presenting an up-to-date assessment 
of how actions, pledges and commitments by countries affect 
the global GHG emissions trend and how this compares to 
emissions trajectories consistent with the goal of keeping 
temperatures below 1.5°C or 2°C by 2100. The difference has 
become known as the emissions gap, calculated for specific 
target years.
This year, UNEP was requested by a number of countries to 
undertake an independent scientific assessment of the INDC 
submissions to inform the political process. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat has undertaken the formal compilation for 
COP 21. 
The 2015 UNEP Emissions Gap Report asks four principal 
questions:
i) What are the latest estimates of 2025 and 2030 total 
global emissions levels consistent with the goal of 
holding the global average temperature rise below 
2oC or 1.5oC above pre-industrial levels by 2100?
ii) What is the progress on implementation of the 
Cancun pledges for the period to 2020?
iii) Will the combined INDC commitments for 2030 
1.1 Moving towards a new international 
climate change agreement
The year 2015 has the potential to become a turning point 
in global efforts to transform the prevailing economic 
development paradigm into a more sustainable one.
All UN member countries reached agreement in September 
2015 on a set of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) to 
be achieved by 2030. The main political instrument to address 
SDG 13 - “Take urgent action to combat climate change and 
its impacts” - is the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Countries will meet again at 
the UNFCCC 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris 
with the aim of establishing a new international climate 
change agreement, hereafter the ‘Paris Agreement’, with the 
ambition of limiting changes in global temperatures to below 
2oC or 1.5°C warming in 2100 compared to pre-industrial 
levels. The decision “[…] to adopt a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties” originated at COP 17 
in Durban (Decision 1/CP.17) and has been confirmed most 
recently at COP 20 in Lima (Decision 1/CP.20) (UNFCCC, 2014). 
As the foundation for a new agreement, and reiterating 
decisions of COP 19 in Warsaw, the ‘Lima Call for Climate 
Action’ requested each Party “[…] to communicate to the 
secretariat its intended nationally determined contribution 
[INDC] towards achieving the objective of the Convention 
as set out in its Article 2” (UNFCCC, 1992)1 ensuring that 
these are submitted “[…] well in advance of the twenty-first 
session of the Conference of the Parties […] in a manner 
that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding 
1 Article 2 states “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related 
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such 
a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner” (UNFCCC, 1992).
Lead authors: John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Paul Burgon (independent consultant)
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(if fully implemented) be sufficient to stay within the 
range consistent with the 2oC temperature goal?
iv) What are possible contributions in selected key 
areas, where action can be accelerated to enhance 
the ambition of national pledges both in the period 
before and after the expected entry into force in 
2020 of the Paris Agreement? This year the detailed 
assessment is on possible mitigation contributions 
from International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs) and 
enhanced forest-related mitigation activities with a 
focus on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+).
1.3 Aim of the report and assessment 
principles
This is the sixth UNEP Emissions Gap Report and while the 
focus of the assessment has gradually shifted from initially 
examining the emissions gap in 2020 to focusing on 2030, 
the scientific basis has remained firmly based on the best 
available analysis worldwide. 
The objective of the report remains the same, which is to 
assess the global progress towards the emissions reductions 
required to be on track towards the agreed target of limiting 
global average temperature increase to below 2°C by the 
end of the century compared to pre-industrial levels. In 
parallel, the report assesses the possible actions to be taken 
to achieve the necessary reductions and how these can be 
accelerated and scaled up to close the gap between the 
target and actual emissions trends – a constant feature of 
this series of reports.
1.4 INDC Assessment process
The INDC assessment team’s approach has been to assess 
the impacts of the INDCs on future global GHG emissions. 
Global GHG emissions in 2025 and 2030 are compared 
under four scenarios – the baseline scenario (assuming 
no additional climate policies since 2010), the current 
policy trajectory scenario (includes currently adopted and 
implemented policies), the INDC scenario (how global 
GHG emissions might evolve with full implementation of 
the INDCs) and the 2°C scenario (representing an idealized 
global scenario consistent with limiting warming to below 
2°C by 2100, keeping the option open to strengthen the 
global temperature target to 1.5°C). Each scenario is a 
composite in the sense that it draws on multiple individual 
scenarios from the published literature. The emissions gap is 
estimated as the difference between the INDC scenario and 
the 2°C scenario.
The approach to the assessment is characterized by the 
following principles:
i) For nationally-generated data, assessment is based 
on the figures directly available in the officially 
submitted INDCs
ii) For independently-generated data, assessment is 
based on peer-reviewed published analyses (or on 
related outputs) by independent modelling groups/
analysts based on the analysis of the information 
available in the INDCs
iii) Participation of a balanced team of experts in the 
INDC assessment (by gender, professional and 
sectoral background, institutional affiliation and 
geographical location).
In the process of preparing the Report and the INDC 
assessment, experts have frequently debated differences in 
understanding of assumptions (such as forms of mitigation 
contribution, conditional versus unconditional INDCs, use 
of international market mechanisms and treatment of 
the land use sector). By scrutinising assumptions (used 
by governments, independent modelling groups and 
international bodies), the team has been able to resolve 
many inconsistencies which, in turn, has led to increased 
confidence in the accuracy and validity of results.
1.5 Organization of the report 
The report comprises six chapters – this first one scoping the 
outline, with subsequent ones falling under two main parts 
of the report. 
part I comprises Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
importance of enhanced pre-2020 mitigation action. It starts 
by presenting recent estimates for global emission levels 
and assesses pathways consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C 
temperature goals, based on the latest available literature. 
It then explains why enhanced early action matters and 
outlines the implications of not enhancing action, followed 
by a review of progress with current 2020 pledges. Chapter 3 
assesses the 119 INDCs, covering 146 countries, submitted 
by 1 October 2015, with a specific focus on the extent to 
which the INDCs in aggregate contribute to a reduction in 
global GHG emissions consistent with limiting average global 
temperature increase to below 2°C in 2100 with >66 per cent 
chance. The chapter quantifies an emissions gap – the gap 
in 2025 and 2030 between future emission levels with the 
INDCs fully implemented and the emission levels consistent 
with the temperature goals of 1.5°C and 2°C in 2100. 
PART II explores some of the opportunities for narrowing and 
potentially bridging the estimated emissions gap in 2030. 
It starts with an overview of key issues and potentials for 
reducing GHG emissions by 2030, based on an assessment 
of a number of recent studies. This is followed by two focal 
chapters. Chapter 5 assesses the possible contribution to 
global mitigation efforts by key International Cooperative 
Initiatives (ICIs) led by actors other than the Parties to the 
UNFCCC. Finally, Chapter 6 reviews a range of forest-related 
mitigation activities and identifies the technical potential for 
both CO
2
 emissions reductions and sequestration from these 
activities in developing countries, and with a special focus 
on REDD+. 
As in previous editions, this year’s Report has been put 
together by an international team of top scientists. This year 
42 scientists from 24 scientific groups in 18 countries have 
contributed to the report.
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The importance of pre-2020 action
Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter first discusses recent global emission levels 
and trends, and reviews where global emissions would be 
heading in the absence of additional deliberate climate 
policies. It then presents assessment of global emission 
pathways that would keep global warming to below 
respectively 1.5°C or 2°C in 2100. This is followed by an 
elaboration of why enhanced early action matters and a 
discussion of the implications of not increasing short-term 
climate mitigation efforts. 
Achievement of the Cancun 2020 pledges will be important 
for the transition to least-cost mitigation pathways from 
2020. Section 2.3 therefore takes a closer look at progress 
towards achieving the 2020 pledges. The focus is on the 
Parties that are members of the G20, as these economies 
collectively generate around three quarters of global GHG 
emissions. However, it remains critical that all countries 
advance as far as possible towards achieving – and ideally 
exceeding – their Cancun pledges.
2.2 Global emission pathways and the 
importance of enhanced action
2.2.1 Recent trends and baselines 
Over the past decades, global GHG emissions have 
increased steadily with small variations around a 
longer term trend. Moreover, during the first decade 
of the 21st century, emissions increased at a faster rate 
(2.2 per cent/yr) than during the last three decades of 
the 20th century (1.3 per cent/yr) (IPCC, 2014a). After the 
recovery from the economic crisis (with a 3.5 per cent 
increase in 2010-2011), the emissions growth slowed to 
1.8 per cent on average over the subsequent two years1. The 
most recent global emission estimates2 are for the year 2014. 
In that year, total global Kyoto-GHG emissions3 amounted 
to about 52.7 GtCO
2
e/yr (range: 47.9-57.54, Figure 2.1). 
Global carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from fossil fuels and 
industry alone were estimated at 35.5 GtCO
2
/yr5 for 2014 
(range: 32.5-38.56). 
In the absence of any further mitigation action compared to 
these trends, GHG emission projections are set to increase 
significantly over the 21st century. These projections are 
influenced by many factors. For example, economic and 
population growth will generally result in an increase in 
emissions, while energy intensity improvements in the 
global economy and reductions of carbon intensity in energy 
production will generally result in a decrease in emissions. 
These factors have characterized the last three decades of 
the 20th century. During the first decade of the 21st century, 
however, carbon intensity increased again, thus further 
contributing to rising global emissions. 
1 Based on EC-JRC/PBL. EDGAR version 4.3. http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, 
2015 update (forthcoming).
2 Data for this year is available from EDGAR and PRIMAP.
 Sources: EC-JRC/PBL. EDGAR version 4.3. http://e gar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, 
2015 update (forthcoming), PRIMAP4 baseline: PIK-Potsdam. https://www.
pik-potsdam.de/research/climate-impacts-and-vulnerabilities/research/rd2-
flagship-projects/primap/emissions-module 
3 Here aggregated with 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) of the 
IPCC Second Assessment Report.
4 90 per cent confidence interval, based on the uncertainty range assessed in 
IPCC AR5 Working Group III. 
5 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015, http://www.
bp.com/statisticalreview 
6 95 per cent uncertainty range, based on Andres et al. (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and projections until 2050
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Left hand panel: Historical GHG from CAIT* (dashed line), PRIMAP** (solid line), and EDGAR*** (dotted line) – all excluding biomass-burning emissions. The solid 
line surrounded by the brown-shaded area shows the EDGAR estimates when including large-scale biomass burning emission estimates as in IPCC AR5 WG3****, 
and their overall 90% uncertainty range. Projections are drawn from the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database and show baselines (grey) and scenarios limiting warming to 
below 2°C by 2100 with at least a likely (>66%) chance (blue). The 2°C scenarios start from 2020 levels and assume a global least-cost pathway afterwards. Data 
for these pathways can be found in Table 2.1 under label “2°C (>66% in 2100)”, along with other temperature target definitions. For each subset the median (solid 
line), the 20-80% range (dark) and the min-max range (lighter) of Kyoto-GHG emissions are shown. 
Right hand panel: Estimated global temperature increase in 2100 of both scenario subsets. The climate uncertainty represents the 90% range of carbon-cycle and 
climate response uncertainty, as used in the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment. Kyoto-GHG emissions are aggregated using 100-year Global Warming Potentials reported 
in the IPCC Second Assessment Report. 
SOURCES:
* CAIT: World Resource Institute (WRI). http://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/cait-historical-emissions-data-countries-us-states-unfccc
** PRIMAP4 baseline: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). https://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/climate-impacts-and-vulnerabilities/research/
rd2-flagship-projects/primap/emissions-module
*** EDGAR: European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)/ Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). Emission Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research (EDGAR) version 4.3. http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, 2015 update (forthcoming), (Olivier and Janssens-Maenhout, 2012).
**** based on updates of van der Werf et al. (2010).
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with >66 per cent chance, the timing is of the order of one 
or more decades later, more specifically around 2070 (range: 
2060-2075)12.
Achieving global net zero CO
2
 emissions is a geophysical 
requirement. It follows directly from the fact that to limit 
warming to any level, total net CO
2
 emissions need to 
be capped, and from the fact that, up to the present day, 
global CO
2 
emissions are still rising13. In theory, a small set 
of scenarios is able to limit warming to below 2°C14 without 
achieving net negative emissions by 2100 (UNEP, 2014). 
However, these scenarios all start stringent, global mitigation 
before 2020 (see also Section 2.2.3), which is no longer 
considered realistic. Without exception, all 1.5°C scenarios 
available in the literature reach net negative CO
2
 emissions 
by mid-century, even with stringent mitigation action having 
started in 2010. 
In most scenarios, global net zero and negative emissions 
are achieved by the use of so-called negative emission 
technologies that offset any residual positive emissions. 
Such negative emissions might be achieved on a large scale, 
for example, by massive afforestation or by combining bio-
energy with capture and storage of CO
2
. Bio-energy combined 
with capture and geological storage of CO
2
 has been studied 
increasingly over the past decade, but uncertainties about 
its large-scale deployment remain (see Annex A for details). 
Compared to 2°C pathways, significantly fewer studies have 
explored pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (Clarke et 
al., 2014). Findings for the very stringent 1.5°C limit are 
therefore less robust. However, one scientific review of 1.5°C 
scenarios (Rogelj et al., 2015a) found that such scenarios 
are in many aspects similar to 2°C-consistent scenarios, but 
that they are characterized by faster emissions reductions 
in the near term (in 2020 and 2030). Compared to 2°C, the 
rapid and profound decarbonization of the energy system 
in 1.5°C scenarios is driven by earlier reductions in the 
power sector, important efforts to limit energy demand in 
the industry, buildings, and transport sector; and no delays 
in global mitigation action beyond 2020. This more rapid 
transformation translates into significantly higher costs. For 
example, carbon prices are about two or three times higher 
in 1.5°C scenarios than in scenarios that keep warming to 
below 2°C with >66 per cent chance (Rogelj et al., 2015a).
2.2.3 Why enhanced early action matters
Enhanced early action facilitates the transition to the 
stringent, long-term emission reductions required for 
limiting warming to below 1.5°C and 2°C. It would enable 
countries i) to overachieve their current pledges by 2020, 
12 These numbers differ from the ones presented in the 2014 Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2014, Table 2.1), where the median year and range of annual 
net global CO
2
 emissions including LULUCF becoming zero was indicated 
as 2065 (range: 2055-2070). The reason is that this year the final IPCC AR5 
Scenario Database data are used, whereas the estimate last year was based 
on a preliminary release of the IPCC AR5 scenarios database data. In addition, 
this year the estimate is corrected for sampling bias by removing scenarios 
that do not represent a variation at the global level, but only represent a 
variation in the regional burden sharing scheme. See Annex A, available 
online, for technical details.
13 See Rogelj et al. (2015b) for a detailed discussion.
14 Both with a >66 per cent or >50 per cent chance, based on the IPCC AR5 
Scenario Database.
A projection of GHG emissions and their driving factors in 
the absence of dedicated climate policies is often referred to 
as a ‘baseline’. In the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Clarke 
et al., 2014), baselines are defined as “not to include climate 
policy after 2010”7. In such baselines, GHG emissions are 
expected to increase to about 70-90 GtCO
2
e/yr in 20508, and 
in most cases global warming would exceed 4°C by the end 
of the century, as indicated in Figure 2.1. 
2.2.2 Pathways towards 1.5°C and 2°C
In 2014, the UNEP Emissions Gap Report described how 
global temperature levels are linked to so-called carbon 
dioxide emission budgets, and how these budgets, in line 
with holding warming to below 2°C, can be spread over time 
(UNEP, 2014). While these budgets remain useful and valid 
benchmarks, this year’s analysis uses emission scenario data 
compiled for the IPCC AR59 to further explore the timing 
of reaching global net zero emissions and the evolution 
of annual GHG emissions over time. Data from a recent 
scientific study that described pathways that limit warming 
to below 1.5°C by 2100 were also included10. 
Pathway characteristics for both 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios are 
provided in Table 2.1. These show pathways with limited 
action until 2020 and global least-cost mitigation afterwards. 
These are in line with current policy trajectories (see Section 
2.3 and Chapter 3), which suggest that the global community 
did not enhance its mitigation action from 2010 aligned 
with long-term least-cost 1.5°C or 2°C pathways from 2010 
onward (UNEP, 2014). Therefore, the scenarios used in this 
year’s report assume global emissions in 2020 that are 
roughly in line with the Cancun pledges for 2020 (that is, 49-
56 GtCO
2
e in 2020 as indicated in Table 2.1). Furthermore, 
the pathways shown allow temperatures to ‘overshoot’ 
– that is, to temporarily exceed the 2°C limit before falling 
below it again by 210011. These pathways do not represent 
the only possibilities of limiting warming to below 1.5°C and 
2°C. Some level of flexibility is available for emissions falling 
outside the range. However, this flexibility is not infinite and 
enhanced pre-2020 action matters (as further discussed in 
section 2.2.3).
As Table 2.1 shows all scenarios are characterized by net 
negative global total GHG emissions by 2100. Looking 
specifically at CO
2
 emissions that play a dominant role in 
determining long-term warming as described in Box 2.1, 
1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent scenarios reach net zero CO
2
 
emissions globally between 2045 and 2075 (Table 2.1). 
Scenarios in line with 1.5°C reach net zero CO
2
 emissions 
around 2050. In scenarios that keep warming to below 2°C 
7 They may or may not include Kyoto Protocol commitments until 2012.
8 Scenario-based ranges in this chapter refer to the 20th to 80th percentile 
range, unless stated otherwise. 
9 In particular, the emission scenarios available in the IPCC AR5 Scenario Data-
base were used. Temperature projections for the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database 
were computed with a probabilistic version of MAGICC. (Meinshausen et al., 
2009; Meinshausen et al., 2011).
10 Rogelj et al. (2015a). These 1.5°C scenarios temporarily exceed the 1.5°C 
limit during the 21st century in order to fall below it again with >50 per cent 
chance in 2100. This is sometimes referred to as a temperature overshoot. 
Insufficient data are available for assessing pathways that return warming to 
below 1.5°C by 2100 with >66 per cent chance. 
11 Pathways for 2°C scenarios that do not allow overshooting (that is, where 
temperatures stay below 2°C during the 21st century) are shown in the 
technical Annex A to Chapter 2, available online.
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Box 2.1: The global carbon dioxide (CO2) budget, non-CO2 GHGs and the link to global warming
Limiting warming to any desired level requires a cap on total, cumulative anthropogenic CO
2
 emissions. Working 
Group I of the IPCC (IPCC, 2013) showed that global mean temperature increases are almost directly proportional to 
cumulative carbon dioxide emissions since the pre-industrial period. This leads to the important conclusion that there 
is a maximum amount of carbon dioxide emissions, or a CO
2 
budget, that can be discharged to the atmosphere over 
time if society wishes to stay within a 2°C or other global warming limit. The IPCC indicated that to limit warming to 
below 2°C with a ‘likely chance’ (that is >66% chance) by the end of the century, about 1 000 GtCO
2 
of CO
2
 emissions 
remained ‘in the budget’ from 2011 onward* (IPCC, 2014b; Knutti and Rogelj, 2015). To keep CO
2
 emissions within such 
a budget allowance, annual global CO
2
 emissions have to become zero at some point during the 21st century. This is a 
geophysical requirement that applies regardless of the budget level chosen. For non-CO
2
 GHGs with a shorter lifetime 
in the atmosphere, such as methane, the levels of emissions that are emitted per year are more important than the 
cumulative amount**. Reducing their annual emissions is also important to limit global mean temperature increase to 
low levels. Table 2.1 indicates the year of global annual emissions becoming net zero for each of the pathways considered.
* This number is accompanied by an uncertainty range, which depends on the concurrent mitigation of non-CO
2
 GHGs.
** This is approximately true, as for non-CO
2
 GHGs that stay in the atmosphere for quite a while (for example, N
2
O has an atmospheric lifetime of 121 years) there 
is also a more limited cumulative effect. See, for example, Smith et al. (2012).
Limiting warming in 2100 (allowing for overshoot)
1.5°C (>50% in 2100)
Pathways limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with >50% chance  
Limited action until 2020 and least-cost mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 6; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2 
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for: 
Kyoto-GHGs: (2060-2080); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): (2045-2050); CO
2
 from energy and industry: (2045-2055)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO2e/yr]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 56 47 39 8 -5
range and spread** 53(-/-)56 46(-/-)48 37(-/-)40 4(-/-)14 -5(-/-)-3
2°C (>66% in 2100)
Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with >66% chance  
Limited action until 2020 and least-cost mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 10; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 4 
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto-GHGs: 2085 (2080-2090); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): 2070 (2060-2075); CO
2
 from energy and industry: 2070 (2060-2075)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO2e/yr]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 52 48 42 23 -3
range and spread** 49(49/53)55 44(46/50)53 29(31/44)44 17(18/27)29 -11(-9/-1)0
2°C (50-66% in 2100)
Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with 50-66% chance  
Limited action until 2020 and least-cost mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 4; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2 
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto-GHGs: (2095-2095); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): (2065-2070); CO
2
 emissions from energy and industry: (2070-2080)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO2e/yr]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 53 50 47 28 -1
range and spread** 50(-/-)55 49(-/-)51 46(-/-)48 27(-/-)29 -2(-/-)-1
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Explanation of format: ‘median (20th percentile – 80th percentile)’ – for example, ‘2085 (2080-2090)’; no median is provided if fewer than 
10 scenarios are available ‘(minimum–maximum)’ – for example, ‘(2060-2080)’.
* Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/yr .
** Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/yr. Explanation of format: ‘minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value’ – for example, ‘44(46/50)53’. No 
percentiles are provided if fewer than 10 scenarios are available – for example, ‘46(-/-)48’.
Table 2.1: Overview of pathway characteristics of 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios based on a re-analysis of the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database and a 
recent study on 1.5°C scenarios15. 
All scenarios have prescribed 2020 emissions consistent with the GHG pledges made by Parties in Cancun in 2010, and hence do not 
represent least-cost emission levels until then. All available scenarios with limited action until 2020 rely on net negative CO
2
 emissions 
from energy and industry during the 21st century. Most scenarios with such specifications were contributed to the IPCC AR5 Scenario 
Database by the LIMITS intercomparison project16. Note that this table provides data for limiting warming below 1.5°C and 2°C in 2100. 
Further information is provided in the Tables of Annex A (available online)
15 See Rogelj et al. (2015a).
16 See Kriegler et al. (2013).
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and ii) to transition towards a pathway in line with a least-
cost trajectory after 2020. By making the shift in emissions 
less abrupt, enhanced pre-2020 and pre-2030 action 
reduces the so-called transitional challenges (see below). 
Furthermore, to keep the door open for limiting warming to 
below 1.5°C by 2100, enhanced early action seems essential. 
Previous reports (UNEP, 2012, 2013, 2014) provided detailed 
discussion of the trade-offs between early and late action. 
Three main areas of importance with respect to enhanced 
early action were highlighted in particular:1516
1. Economics and technology, where enhanced early 
action will:
• mediate the requirement for very steep emission 
reductions in the medium term 
• facilitate mitigation in the medium to long term 
by reducing lock-in of carbon and energy intensive 
infrastructure in the energy system and society as 
a whole
• spur near-term learning and development of 
technologies that will be essential in the long term
• provide early policy signals which are needed for 
action in the following decades
• reduce the overall costs and economic challenges 
during the transitional period, for example, in 
terms of upscaling of energy investments
• reduce the dependence on unproven technologies 
such as negative emissions technologies17 and 
increase the options society can choose from to 
achieve stringent emission reductions.
2. Climate outcomes: Enhanced early action will reduce 
climate risks, for example, by influencing the rate of 
temperature increase (Schaeffer et al., 2013; Ricke 
and Caldeira, 2014).
3. Co-benefits: Enhanced early action will enable the 
realisation of near-term co-benefits of climate change 
mitigation, such as improved public health as a result 
of lower air pollution, improved energy security, and 
reduced crop yield losses18.
The issue of lock-in is very important in a number of ways. 
Even with enhanced early action, it is projected that carbon 
intensive infrastructure, such as unabated coal-fired power 
plants, will have to be shut down before the end of their 
lifetime in some stringent mitigation scenarios, and delay 
exacerbates this (Rogelj et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, delay also locks in energy intensive practices. 
Limiting energy demand is critical to keep stringent mitigation 
targets within reach (Clarke et al., 2014). Furthermore, the 
transition to a low energy-demand society is also inhibited 
by delays of action, as more energy intensive infrastructure 
continues to be built up. Infrastructure lock-in makes the 
transition to a low-carbon path harder.
15 
16 
17 Enhanced early action is important in reducing dependence on negative 
emissions in the long term for achieving stringent climate targets like 2°C. 
However, there are no scenarios available that return warming to below 1.5°C 
by 2100, without the use of bio-energy combined with capture and geological 
storage of CO
2
.
18 Note that the IPCC AR5 also identified adverse side-effects of climate change 
mitigation, which will have to be considered simultaneously. 
Enhanced early action is thus important. As described 
above, overachievement of the 2020 pledges will improve 
the chances for the stringent emission reductions that are 
required post-2020 ( Rogelj et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2014). 
2.3 Progress towards the 2020 pledges: a 
closer look at major economies
Section 2.2 underlined the importance of pre-2020 mitigation 
action to achieving consistency with the below 2°C by 2100 
scenarios. It is critical that all countries, and particularly 
the highest-emitting economies, advance as far as possible 
towards achieving – and ideally exceeding – their Cancun 
pledges. This section takes a closer look at progress towards 
achieving these 2020 pledges, focusing on the parties that 
are members of the G2019. These economies collectively 
generate around three quarters of global GHG emissions20.
2.3.1  Assessment of G20 countries’ 2020 
emissions under three cases
The section compares current emissions trajectories of 
G20 members with the trajectories associated with the 
achievement of these parties’ 2020 pledges. It should be read 
with three important caveats in mind. First, not all pledges 
demand the same level of effort to achieve. In other words, 
a country currently on track to achieve its pledge has not 
necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate emissions than 
a country not yet on track21. Secondly, these projections are 
subject to the uncertainty associated with macroeconomic 
trends, such as changes in gross domestic product (GDP), 
as well as the impact of policies. Thirdly, the emission 
trajectories analysed here do not quantify the potential 
impact of using offsets to achieve pledges. If offsets are 
traded internationally, and are counted towards the pledges 
of both buying and selling parties, the global impact of the 
pledges will be weakened. Most countries have not clarified 
their intentions concerning use of offsets to meet their 2020 
pledges. Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and 
the United States have explicitly not excluded the possibility; 
others have not formally commented (CAIT WRI, 2015).
Table 2.2 compares 2020 emissions under three cases: 
a pledge case, based on official data; a current policy 
trajectory case, based on official data; and a current policy 
trajectory case, based on independent analysis. These cases 
are described in Box 2.2.
19 The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the EU. In 
our analysis, the EU including all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) 
is considered as a single Party, and EU Member States are not considered 
individually. In general, evaluating the pledges of other countries is limited by 
a lack of data.
20 In 2012, these parties accounted for 77 per cent of global emissions excluding 
LULUCF and 75 per cent of global GHG emissions including LULUCF (CAIT WRI, 
2015).
21 See Appendix 2.D of the 2013 UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2013) for 
further discussion of this issue.
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Box 2.2: Assumptions of analysis of progress towards pledges
For each country or Party, Table 2.2 compares estimates for 2020 emissions under three cases:
1. Pledge case (official data): identifies the maximum level of GHG emissions that each country or Party could emit 
in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering the use of offsets. If a pledge is presented as a range (Brazil, 
China and India), the less ambitious end of the range is adopted as the official pledge estimate. If a country has both 
a conditional and unconditional pledge (Indonesia), only the unconditional pledge is used. If a country has only a 
conditional pledge (Mexico, South Africa), the conditional pledge is used. For countries whose pledges are framed 
relative to a baseline scenario, it is assumed that baselines are not adjusted in the future. For countries whose 
pledges are framed as GHG intensity targets, economic growth consistent with official projections is assumed22. 
Where available, the 2020 emission level described by the country or Party as the pledge level is used; alternatively, 
these levels are calculated working from official base-year or baseline data. 
2. Current policy trajectory case (official data): identifies official estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected 
economic trends and current policy approaches, including policies at least through 2012.
3. Current policy trajectory case (independent analysis): similarly identifies estimates of 2020 emissions considering 
the best current estimates of projected economic trends and current policy approaches, but is based on independent 
analysis rather than official data. Figures are drawn from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2015) and den Elzen et al. 
(2015) for all countries, as well as other, country-specific sources where noted. Current policy trajectory (independent 
analysis) supplements the official sources described in point two by providing data that aim for consistency across 
countries and political independence.
Projections only consider a limited subset of sectors and gases, for example, CO
2 
emissions from fossil fuels are omitted, 
as they cannot be compared to projections and targets that include the full set of GHGs across the entire economy.
22 For China, GDP is assumed to reach 61.6 trillion yuan in 2020, consistent with China’s National Communication (People’s Republic of China, 2012). For India, GDP is 
assumed to reach 120.41 trillion rupees (’06–‘07 rupee value) in 2020, consistent with the average of the scenarios presented in Planning Commission Government 
of India (2014).
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Table 2.2: 22Emissions in 2020 under pledge case and current policy trajectory cases for G20 countries (MtCO
2
e)2324252627
Parties 2020 Pledge Case
(based on official 
data)
Current Policy 
Trajectory
(based on official data)
Current Policy Trajectory
(based on independent 
estimates) 24
Mitigation pledge and current policy 
trajectory details
Australia 530a 
(DoE, 2015)
655a 
(DoE, 2015)
575-580b (CAT, 2015)
650-665a (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Base year pledge
Current Policy Trajectory (official data) 
excludes impacts of Emissions Reduction 
Fund (ERF) (see discussion below)
Brazil 2 070a 
(Brazilian 
Government, 2010)
N/A 1 750-2 075a (CAT, 2015)
1 470-1 520a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge 
Canada 610a 
(Environment Canada, 
2014)
730a 
(Environment Canada, 
2014)
745b (CAT, 2015)
720-760b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Base year pledge
China* 14 500a 
(People’s Republic of 
China, 2012)
N/A 12 200-12 600a (CAT, 2015)
12 535-13 420a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Intensity pledge
2020 Pledge Case assumes 40% reduction 
in GHG intensity and 2020 GDP of People’s 
Republic of China (2012), adjusted for 
non-CO
2
 projections from CAT (2015). The 
high end of this range is based in part on 
China’s Second National Communication 
(People’s Republic of China, 2012), which 
considers policies only through 2010, and 
is therefore likely to be higher than actual 
2020 emissions
European 
Union
4 500b 
(EEA, 2014a)
4 230b 
(EEA, 2015)
4 115-4 375b (CAT, 2015)
4 105-4 370b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Base year pledge
Current Policy Trajectory (official data) does 
not fully reflect all policies adopted past 
mid-2012
India* 3 815b 
(Planning Commission 
Government of India 
2011, 2014)
N/A 3 500-3 600b (CAT, 2015)
3 535-3 960a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Intensity pledge
2020 Pledge Case assumes 20% reduction 
in GHG intensity per Planning Commission 
Government of India (2011), 2020 GDP 
per Planning Commission Government of 
India (2014), and exclusion of the emissions 
from agriculture and LULUCF per Planning 
Commission Government of India (2011) 
Indonesia 1 335a 
(BAPPENAS, 2015)
2 185a 
(Ministry of 
Environment 
Indonesia, 2010)
N/A 2 540a (CAT, 2015)
1 910-1 950a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
2020 Pledge Case of 1 335a is calculated 
based on the baseline from BAPPENAS 
(2015)25
2020 Pledge Case of 2 185a is calculated 
based on the baseline from Ministry of 
Environment Indonesia (2010)
Japan 1 300b 
(UNFCCC, 2014)
1 320b 
(UNFCCC, 2014)
1 230-1 330b (CAT, 2015)
1 135-1 330b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
1 350-1 400b (Kuramochi, 
2014)
Base year pledge
Mexico 555a 
(Mexico, 2015)
670a 
(NCCS, 2013)
830a 
(Government of Mexico, 
2012; SEMARNAT, 2013)
785-800a (CAT, 2015)
770-810a (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
2020 Pledge Case of 555a is calculated from 
INDC (Mexico, 2015) baseline26 of 792
Current Policy Trajectory (official data) is 
based on Government of Mexico (2012), 
adjusted per SEMARNAT (2013)
22 
23 Figures do not consider the possible purchase or sale of offsets. Figures including LULUCF indicated with a, excluding LULUCF indicated with b.
24 References to den Elzen et al. (2015) in this column represent PBL estimates based on the method of den Elzen et al. (2015). Some numbers presented here have 
been updated per latest estimates available from http://infographics.pbl.nl/indc/.
25 The INDC baseline is based on a revised national inventory that shows significantly lower 2010 emissions than those shown in the National Communication and 
assumed by other studies cited here. See http://ranradgrk.bappenas.go.id/rangrk/beranda/92-bahasa/informasi-sektoral/193-hasil-indc for a comparison of 2010 
emissions.
26 The INDC baseline is based on a new methodology with global warming potentials (GWPs) from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report; it is therefore not comparable to 
any other sources cited here. All other sources use GWPs from the IPCC 2nd Assessment Report; the NCCS (2013) also uses a previous methodology.
27 
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Parties 2020 Pledge Case
(based on official 
data)
Current Policy 
Trajectory
(based on official data)
Current Policy Trajectory
(based on independent 
estimates) 24
Mitigation pledge and current policy 
trajectory details
Republic of 
Korea
550a
(Republic of Korea, 
2015) 
545a 
(Republic of Korea, 
2014)
N/A 745-755b (CAT, 2015)
585-620b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
2020 Pledge Case of 550a is calculated from 
INDC (Republic of Korea, 2015) baseline of 783
Russian 
Federation
2 515b 
(Government of 
Russia, 2014)
2 410b  
(Government of Russia, 
2014)
2 600b (CAT, 2015)
2 295-2 375b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Base year pledge
2020 Pledge Case reflects 25% reduction 
calculated based on national inventory data 
(Government of Russia, 2014)
South 
Africa
585a 
(Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 
2011a, 2011b)
N/A 730b (CAT, 2015)
560-885b (PBL, 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
United 
States of 
America
5 145a 
(Biennial Report, 
2013)
5 920a 
(Biennial Report, 2013)
6 360-6 600b (CAT, 2015)
5 445-6 170a (den Elzen et al., 
2015)27
Base year pledge
Current Policy Trajectory (official data) is 
from the ‘with measures’ scenario in the 
Biennial Report (2013). The USA considers 
that it has moved onto the ‘with additional 
measures’ trajectory, with a range of  
4 893-5 591 MtCO
2
e for 2020
No 2020 pledge
Argentina No pledge No pledge 380-480b (CAT, 2015)
saudi 
Arabia
No pledge No pledge 645b (CAT, 2015)
Turkey No pledge No pledge 655b (CAT, 2015)
485-690b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Notes: 
aFigures including LULUCF
bFigures excluding LULUCF
*China and India have GHG intensity targets based on the ratio of GHG emissions to GDP. For consistency, we have converted these to absolute emission numbers based 
on the official documentation cited above, but a determination of whether each country has achieved its pledge should be based on intensity rather than absolute 
emissions.
Estimates are rounded to the nearest 5 MtCO
2
e.
27 A suite of additional studies (Rhodium Group, 2014; Belenky, 2015; Hausker et al., 2015) finds that US emissions in 2020 could range from 5 087-5 844 MtCO
2
e incl. 
LULUCF if the Administration implements further regulations consistent with its Climate Action Plan.
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2.3.2 Progress of G20 countries
Based on this analysis, three of the parties considered here 
– China, the EU28, and India – are on track to meet their 
pledges without purchasing offsets according to all available 
analyses. Three more – Brazil, Japan, and Russia – are on 
track according to most estimates and are within one per 
cent, one per cent, and three per cent of the pledge level, 
respectively, according to all estimates.
China’s and India’s pledges are framed in terms of GHG 
intensity reductions from 2005 levels, and several sources 
indicate that both countries are currently on track to achieve 
them. Studies indicate that China, which pledged a reduction 
of 40-45 per cent in emissions intensity, is on track to achieve 
a reduction of at least 42 per cent (IEA, 2014a, 2014b; CAT, 
2015; PBL, 2015; Sha et al., 2015). For India, Garg et al. (2014) 
show that by 2012, India had already reduced intensity by 17 
per cent out of a pledged reduction of 20–25 per cent by 2020, 
and the CAT (2015) and PBL (2015) show India on track for a 
36 per cent or 28 per cent reduction by 2020, respectively28.
Japan announced an adjustment to its pledge in November 
2013 from a 25 per cent reduction on 1990 levels to a 
3.8 per cent reduction on 2005 levels (similar to an increase 
of about 3.1 per cent on 1990 levels). While this adjustment 
makes it much easier for Japan to achieve its pledge, current 
official projections still place Japan’s 2020 emissions slightly 
above its pledge threshold (UNFCCC, 2014). Independent 
projections differ slightly – CAT (2015) shows Japan on track 
to meet its revised pledge, whereas den Elzen et al. (2015) 
estimates a range in 2020 from slightly below to slightly 
above the pledge level. Japan’s actual trajectory, however, 
will depend significantly on the respective roles of nuclear 
power and coal-fired power to meet future needs29.
Canada and Mexico are likely to require further action or 
purchased offsets, or both in order to meet their pledges, 
according to government and independent estimates. 
Mexico’s 2020 pledge is conditional on the provision of 
adequate financial and technological support from developed 
countries as part of a global agreement (Mexico, 2015).
According to independent analysis, the Republic of Korea 
will also require further action to meet its pledge, but 
this cannot be verified based on publicly available official 
projections. Independent estimates of 2020 emissions range 
from well below to well above the pledge level (CAT, 2015; 
den Elzen et al., 2015). 
In the cases of Australia30 and the USA, government and 
independent analyses reach differing conclusions regarding 
each country’s progress towards its pledge. In the case 
of Australia, the government projects 2020 emissions of 
approximately 655 MtCO
2
e, not including the impact of the 
Emission Reduction Fund (ERF). The Australian government 
states that it is “on track” to meet its target of 533 MtCO
2
e, 
and that the ERF has contracted projects expected to deliver 
28 Calculated for China based on an assumed GDP growth rate of 8.5 per cent 
(PBL, 2015) and 7.0 per cent (CAT, 2015), and for India based on an assumed 
GDP growth rate of 7.5 per cent (PBL, 2015) and 6.4 per cent (CAT, 2015).
29 A study commissioned by Japan’s Ministry of Environment (MOE, 2015) pro-
jected that by 2030, the share of renewable energy in the electricity sector 
could reach around 25-30 per cent in a ‘medium deployment’ case and 30-35 
per cent in a ‘high deployment’ case.
30 See CCA (2014) for further discussion.
abatement of 47 MtCO
2
e (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2015). Prior to the initial auction, CCA (2014) reviewed 
studies of the potential of the ERF and concluded, “In short, 
these studies suggest that the ERF’s contribution to reducing 
emissions is likely to fall some way short of what is required 
to meet Australia’s minimum 2020 target”. Independent 
analyses (CAT, 2015; PBL 2015) project emissions above the 
pledge level. 
The USA contends that the ‘with additional measures’ 
scenario from a 2014 addendum to its biennial report 
now represents its current policy trajectory. This trajectory 
shows the United States on track to achieve its pledge. 
Independent analyses, by contrast, find that further action 
is still necessary (see, for example, Rhodium Group, 2014; 
Belenky, 2015; CAT, 2015; Hausker et al., 2015; PBL, 2015). 
Insufficient information is currently available to determine 
whether Indonesia and South Africa are on track to meet their 
pledges. In the case of Indonesia, independent projections 
span a wide range, and official projections reflecting current 
policies are unavailable. In the case of South Africa, official 
projections to 2020 do not reflect recently adopted and 
implemented policies, and independent estimates vary 
widely, from well below the pledge level to well above it. 
South Africa’s pledge is conditional.
Finally, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not proposed 
GHG reduction pledges for 2020 (as of 1 October 2015, 
Argentina and Turkey had submitted post-2020 pledges to 
the UNFCCC as part of their Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions).
Despite progress towards implementing policies in line 
with pledges, work remains to be done to bring all G20 
countries into pledge attainment. Additionally, better data 
are necessary to adequately track this progress in some 
countries. Ensuring continued progress towards 2020 
pledges will reduce the mitigation burden associated with 
achieving the post-2020 pledges put forward in the INDCs.
This section has examined the extent to which G20 countries 
are proceeding towards the minimum level of their 2020 
pledges, in light of the importance of pre-2020 GHG 
reductions for achieving consistency with 2°C scenarios, 
with implications beyond 2020. As described earlier in this 
chapter, this report does not address the global emissions 
gap in 2020, so the cumulative impact of the progress 
towards 2020 pledges is not calculated. UNEP (2014) found 
that emissions under the global current policy trajectory 
– taking into account progress by the G20 countries – 
roughly aligned with the higher-emissions end of the range 
associated with meeting the unconditional pledges.
It is important to recognise that these pledge levels do not 
align with the least-cost pathways to limit warming with 
stringent mitigation action starting in 2010 (UNEP, 2014). 
Ideally, all countries with 2020 pledges will recognise the 
need to exceed their undertakings while countries without 
2020 pledges will strengthen their own mitigation ambition 
with appropriate polices and measures. This would allow 
a transition towards a pathway in line with a least-cost 
trajectory after 2020, with the associated economic, 
technology, societal co-benefits, and climate outcome 
benefits highlighted in section 2.2. 
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The emissions gap in 2025 and 2030
Chapter 3
Box 3.1: INDCs in the Warsaw (2013) and Lima (2014) decisions under the UNFCCC
The Warsaw decision 1/CP19 (UNFCCC, 2013) introduced the concept of INDCs as follows:
• All Parties are invited to initiate or intensify preparations for their INDCs, without prejudice to the legal nature of the 
contributions
• All Parties are invited to communicate their INDCs well in advance of COP 21 “[…] (by the first quarter of 2015 by 
those Parties ready to do so) in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended 
contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions”.
The Lima decision 1/CP20 (UNFCCC, 2014) reiterated the points agreed in Warsaw, and also:
• Agreed that each Party’s intended nationally determined contribution towards achieving the objective of the 
Convention as set out in its Article 2 will represent a progression beyond the current undertaking of that Party
• Invited all Parties to consider communicating their undertakings in adaptation planning or consider including an 
adaptation component in their INDCs
• Agreed that the information to be provided by Parties may include, as appropriate, inter alia, quantifiable information 
on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope 
and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and 
accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how the Party considers 
that its INDC is fair and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving 
the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 (UNFCCC, 1992).
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Niklas 
Höhne (NewClimate Institute), Harald Winkler (University of Cape Town), Roberto Schaeffer (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro), Fu 
Sha (National Center for Climate Strategy and International Cooperation), Amit Garg (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad)
Contributing authors: Guy Cunliffe (University of Cape Town), Hanna Fekete (NewClimate Institute), Mengpin Ge (World Resources 
Institute), Giacomo Grassi (Joint Research Centre, European Commission), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency), Joeri Rogelj (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), Sebastian Sterl (NewClimate Institute), Eveline Vasquez 
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
3.1 Introduction
The Lima Call for Climate Action, adopted by Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in December 2014, noted the gap between Parties’ 
mitigation pledges for 2020 and the emission pathways 
consistent with limiting the increase in global average 
temperature to below 2°C or 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2014). It 
reiterated the invitation issued by the 2013 Warsaw decision 
for Parties to communicate their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) towards achieving the 
objective of the Convention (UNFCCC, 2013) (see Box 3.1). 
This chapter explores the INDCs submitted by 1 October 
2015 (UNFCCC, 2015a), with a specific focus on the extent 
to which the INDCs in aggregate are in accordance with 
the long-term objective of the Convention, which is “[…] to 
achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The 
chapter quantifies an ‘emissions gap’ – the gap between 
future emissions under full implementation of the INDCs 
and under the pathways consistent with limiting warming 
to below 2°C in 2100 – for the years 2025 and 2030. The 
Chapter first presents qualitative information about the 
13The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – The emissions gap in 2025 and 2030
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INDCs submitted, concerning – for example, the treatment 
of adaptation, equity, and various GHG accounting issues. It 
then quantifies future global GHG emission pathways with 
full implementation of INDCs out to 2030, and compares 
them to the pathways for limiting warming to below 2°C that 
were described in Chapter 2.2. INDCs that countries intend 
to achieve unconditionally, as well as INDCs that are subject 
to conditions (such as the provision of international climate 
finance), are evaluated separately. A final update of the 
assessment including later submissions will be presented on 
the UNEP Live website before the start of COP 21.
3.2 Broad characteristics of submitted INDCs 
By 1 October 2015, a total of 119 INDCs, covering 
146 countries and 85-88 per cent of global GHG emissions in 
2012 (JRC/PBL, 2012; WRI, 2015), had been submitted to the 
UNFCCC1,2. Every INDC includes a mitigation component and 
just over 85 per cent cover both mitigation and adaptation. 
Fifteen INDCs cover mitigation only.
Mitigation INDCs were submitted by countries from all 
regions (see Figure 3.1), and the 10 largest emitters had all 
submitted their INDCs by 1 October. These are, in descending 
order of emission levels, China, the USA, EU, India, Russia, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Canada and Mexico. The review of 
the INDCs submitted by 1 October 2015 identified broad 
mitigation-related groupings as follows:
Coverage: 38 INDCs explicitly state that they are economy-
wide. Many of these cover 100 per cent of national GHG 
emissions, while another specifies 98.5 per cent coverage.
Sectors: 50 INDCs include all major IPCC sector categories 
(energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, 
waste, and Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF)), while 61 INDCs are sector-specific. Eight INDCs 
do not explicitly state which sectors are covered. 
Nitrogen trifluoride: 19 INDCs cover nitrogen trifluoride 
(NF
3
, also a Kyoto gas from 2013 onward) in addition to all 
Kyoto GHGs of the first commitment period. With respect to 
NF
3
, two countries (Gabon and Republic of Congo) indicate 
the gas is to be included in future.
Selective GHGs: 50 INDCs cover only CO
2
, N
2
O and CH
4
 (and 
another INDC includes SF
6
 in addition to these). Eleven 
INDCs include only CO
2
 emissions, while two (Mauritius  and 
Mexico), besides first-commitment-period Kyoto Protocol 
gases, also include Short Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF)3.
100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP): The common 
metric of 100-year GWP values is indicated in some, but not 
1 This total of 119 recognizes that the EU submitted collectively as 1 INDC. 
Counting the 28 EU member states separately, the country total covered by 
the INDCs is 146.
2 Covering all sectors including land use, land-use change and forestry (LU-
LUCF), and all six Kyoto gases of the first commitment period [carbon dioxide 
(CO
2
), methane (CH
4
), nitrous oxide (N
2
O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), per-
fluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
)]. 
3 Mexico’s unconditional INDC is equivalent to a reduction of 51 per cent of 
black carbon (BC); with conditional reductions extending up to 70 per cent of 
BC emissions, both below BAU by 2030. Mauritius does not provide further 
information about their SLCF emissions.
all, INDCs, referring to different IPCC Assessment Reports 
(ARs). GWP values used in INDCs are not all the same. 38 INDCs 
indicate the use of 100-year GWP values from the IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (AR2), while 29 INDCs use values from the 
IPCC AR4. Mexico, Brazil and Ecuador use 100-year GWP values 
from the IPCC AR5. Brazil further indicated 100-year Global 
Temperature Potential (GTP) values from the IPCC AR5.
3.2.1 Forms of mitigation contributions 
Figure 3.1 illustrates that Parties’ mitigation contributions 
take several forms. Below, the various forms of targets 
included by Parties in their INDCs are summarized.
Base year target: 32 INDCs report on an absolute reduction 
from historical base year emissions. The base year chosen 
varies, with 1990, 2005 and 2010 being the most common. 
Most Parties chose 2030 as the target year for their INDCs. 
However, 11 countries chose 2025.
Baseline scenario target: The form of emissions reduction 
relative to a baseline projection has been chosen in 63 INDCs, 
mainly for countries located in South and Central America, 
Africa and South Asia. Two countries using a baseline 
scenario target are Guyana and Mozambique. They quantify 
the MtCO
2
e they intend to reduce, but do not specify relative 
baseline emissions projections. 
Trajectory target: South Africa has a trajectory target stating 
the emission range in 2025 and 2030 and adds an emission 
range in absolute Mt to its trajectory target. Specifying 
a peaking year is part of China’s and Singapore’s INDCs. 
In these cases, the timing of the maximum CO
2
 emissions 
has been communicated, but not the level, while adding 
intensity targets. 
Intensity target: China also specifies the carbon intensity 
of GDP, indicating percentages by which CO
2
 emissions 
per unit of GDP will be reduced by 2030, compared to the 
2005 intensity. Singapore adopts the same approach, but 
for all GHG emissions, giving an emission intensity of GDP. 
A further four countries (Chile, India, Tunisia and Uruguay) 
indicate reductions in emission intensity of GDP as the main 
form of their mitigation INDC. 
Fixed level target: Seven countries put forward a fixed level 
target; that is, they specify the MtCO
2
e that they intend not to 
exceed in a given year (Armenia, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Israel and Sierra Leone). Kenya’s INDC, though 
framed as percentage emission reduction relative to a baseline 
projection, adds the Mt in the same sentence; the calculation of 
absolute emissions in 2030 is simple multiplication. 
Actions and non-GHG metrics only: Six countries (Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Myanmar, Rwanda and Swaziland) 
include only actions and another four countries only non-GHG 
metrics (Cape Verde, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Vanuatu). 
Additional non-GHG metrics: Some INDCs include additional 
non-GHG metrics, for example, in the form of a target for 
non-fossil-fuel primary energy share, in the case of China, 
and a reduction from baseline projections of Short Lived 
Climate Pollutants, in the case of Mexico. 
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Renewable energy (RE) target: 42 INDCs include quantified 
renewable energy (RE) targets as a form of non-GHG metric 
or actions consistent with their GHG target, in addition to 
other forms. For example, Brazil targets 45 per cent of 
renewables in its energy mix by 2030, including expanding 
the use of renewable energy sources other than hydropower 
to between 28-33 per cent and increasing the share of 
renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply 
to at least 23 per cent. Furthermore, eight INDCs (Cape 
Verde, Gabon, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa and Vanuatu) made RE targets part of their 
headline mitigation contribution. As an example, Gabon’s RE 
target is expressed as 80 per cent of electricity supply from 
hydropower by 2025, and as a summary component of its 
mitigation INDC in addition to an emission reduction target, 
while Samoa’s contribution is a “[…] 100% renewable energy 
target for electricity generation through to the year 2025”. 
From the above review, it is evident that, in the absence 
of agreed forms of mitigation contribution and the units in 
which those might be expressed, countries have selected 
a wide variety of forms. Over 50 per cent of the mitigation 
INDCs have taken the form of emission reduction relative to a 
baseline projection. Within single forms, different units have 
been chosen; forms are not mutually exclusive; and several 
countries have chosen more than one form of mitigation 
contribution. This has increased the analytical challenge of 
comparing INDC elements and ensuring consistency when 
aggregating the different contributions.
3.2.2 Treatment of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use 
The vast majority of INDCs includes the land-use sector or 
a component of it. Only a few countries (including Albania, 
Andorra, Djibouti, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Republic of 
Macedonia and Trinidad and Tobago) explicitly exclude it. 
Some countries (for example, Republic of Korea) indicate 
that a decision on whether to include LULUCF will be made 
later. Few countries explicitly include a separate forest goal 
(for example, Benin, China and India).
Most Parties referring to LULUCF include it (or at least the 
forest component of it) as any other sector within the INDC. 
In some cases it is not clear if LULUCF is included in the base 
year. Among those Parties referring to LULUCF accounting 
rules (most developed or Annex I country Parties), in 
several cases there is some uncertainty on which rule will 
be applied. Canada, United States and Australia intend to 
use a net-net approach4. Japan and Switzerland declare 
the use of an equivalent methodology to those under the 
Kyoto Protocol. New Zealand will confirm details of the 
accounting approach prior to or upon ratification of the Paris 
Agreement. The EU indicates that policy on how to include 
LULUCF will be established as soon as technical conditions 
4 Net-net is a term used to describe a method for LULUCF accounting under the 
Kyoto Protocol, where credits and debits are obtained by comparing the ac-
counting period to the base year. However, under the Kyoto Protocol, LULUCF 
forestry activities were often without reference to the base year, or were with 
reference to a projected reference level. If an INDC explicitly includes LULUCF 
in the base year, then net-net is assumed to be treating LULUCF is the same 
way as any other GHG inventory sector. It is also possible for countries to use 
a net-net accounting approach where the base year does not include LULUCF, 
but the LULUCF contribution is added or subtracted from total national emis-
sions in the target year.
allow. In addition, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, 
United States and Canada declared also that emissions from 
natural disturbances may or will be excluded, consistent 
with available IPCC guidance.
Almost all developing countries have mitigation actions both 
in agriculture and LULUCF. In many cases, LULUCF represents 
the most relevant current source of emissions and the main 
area for future mitigation. Often REDD+ is mentioned, but 
sometimes the relationship between INDC and REDD+ is not 
fully clear.
Several developing countries include specific LULUCF 
information within the unconditional and the conditional 
targets (for example the expected LULUCF mitigation and the 
related cost of implementation).
In terms of methodology for estimating GHG emissions and 
removals, the IPCC 2006 Guidelines are mentioned as the 
primary guidance by most countries (including all developed 
country Parties). The 2003 Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF 
is mentioned by few countries (for example, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Peru, Jordan and Benin). Some countries also refer to the 1996 
IPCC guidelines (for example, Argentina, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Macedonia and Republic of Korea). 
3.2.3 Adaptation components in INDCs and 
undertakings in adaptation planning
The Lima decision invited all Parties to consider including 
an adaptation component in their INDCs or to consider 
communicating their undertakings in adaptation planning. 
Components on adaptation have been included in just over 
85 per cent of INDCs submitted by 1 October (102/119). 
Of these, three (Australia, Israel and Monaco) indicate in 
their INDCs that they are working to build their adaptation 
strategies during 2015, while Brazil´s INDC states that it is 
“[…] working on the design of new public policies, through 
its National Adaptation Plan (NAP), in its final elaboration 
phase”, and Macedonia’s INDC states that “[…] climate 
change adaptation shall be the subject of more detailed 
analysis in the future” (UNFCCC, 2015a). 
Four undertakings in adaptation planning were submitted or 
referred to in the INDCs submitted to the UNFCCC. Undertakings 
in adaptation planning were submitted by both the EU and the 
USA. These are available on the UNFCCC website (UNFCCC, 
2015b) as distinct from the INDC portal (UNFCCC, 2015a). 
Furthermore, New Zealand and Norway refer in their INDCs 
(UNFCCC, 2015a) to undertakings in adaptation planning by 
referring to chapters in their national communications.
3.2.4 Specifying support required or offered 
Several countries have stated requirements for support for 
their INDCs in the form of finance, technology transfer, and 
investment in capacity building, and through international 
support or the use of international market mechanisms or both.
Conditional versus unconditional INDCs: 42 INDCs have both 
unconditional and conditional components to their GHG 
emission reduction targets while 39 include only conditional 
contributions. 37 INDCs do not make a clear distinction between 
conditional and unconditional provisions in their INDCs. 
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Use of international market mechanisms: 22 INDCs 
indicate they will mainly achieve their emission reductions 
domestically, although only seven of these specifically 
state international market mechanisms will not be used. 
An explicit intention to use these mechanisms is stated 
by 11 countries, while 20 INDCs express support for their 
use and a further 23 are considering their potential use. 
Norway and Iceland indicate in their INDCs that they will 
likely continue their participation in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS). Liechtenstein’s INDC indicates “[…] 
supplemental emission reductions abroad”, while Albania, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Montenegro and Rwanda intend to “[…] sell 
carbon credits”. In formulating their mitigation INDCs, four 
countries (Ghana, Guyana, Japan and New Zealand) have 
assumed that international mechanisms will be used. 
Requests for international support, including finance: 91 
countries have indicated requirements for international 
support, with 71 INDCs quantifying these requirements 
in monetary terms. Examples include India’s INDC, which 
notes that “[…] a preliminary estimate suggests that at least 
US$2.5 trillion will be required […]” as a total cost, for 
its intended contributions, and Morocco’s INDC, which 
communicates that meeting its target will require 
US$45 billion of investment, of which US$35 billion is 
conditional on international support (UNFCCC, 2015a). 
Ethiopia notes that “[…] full implementation of Ethiopia’s 
INDC requires support in the form of finance, capacity building 
and technology transfer”, and estimates that implementing 
its Green Economy Strategy requires expenditure which 
exceeds US$150 billion (UNFCCC, 2015a). Another example 
comes from Kenya’s INDC, which states that “Kenya will 
require support in form of finance, investment, technology 
development, and capacity building”, estimating that “[…] 
over US$40 billion is required for mitigation and adaptation 
actions across sectors up to 2030”. For further detail on 
these examples, see UNFCCC (2015a). 
Offers of international support (including finance): No 
Annex II country has specified finance, technology or 
capacity-building support that might be offered or provided 
in the future. China has offered support for other developing 
countries, “[…] including the small island developing 
countries, the least developed countries and African 
countries”, and plans to establish the “Fund for South-
South Cooperation on Climate Change”. Finally, the Republic 
of Belarus stated that it has supported, and will support, 
developing nations, mainly in the area of awareness-raising, 
education, capacity building, and in the area of research and 
development relating to climate change issues. For further 
detail on these examples, see UNFCCC (2015a). 
3.2.5 How countries address equity, ambition 
and Article 2 of the Convention
The Lima decision invited information on fairness and 
ambition, and how the INDC contributes towards achieving 
the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 
(UNFCCC, 1992).
In relation to the objective of the Convention, 52 of the 
INDCs make reference to Article 2 (verbatim or indirectly), 
while 62 INDCs refer to the 2°C goal; 36 INDCs make no 
reference to either Article 2 or 2°C. 
Most INDCs have addressed equity (or fairness) and ambition 
in some way. However, 80 INDCs do not offer specific metrics 
to support their claims to relative fairness in relation to 
their INDCs, instead providing only general statements or 
reference to principles. A further 31 INDCs draw on analyses 
conducted by modelling teams or experts from within the 
country. Only eight INDCs – Andorra, Brazil, Macedonia, 
Monaco, Norway, Republic of Moldova, South Africa and 
Switzerland – refer to external, independent analyses. 
On equity, a range of arguments and indicators is referred 
to in the INDCs. The most common indicator chosen is per 
capita emission levels, described in 57 INDCs. Specifically, 
68 INDCs refer to their countries representing a small share 
of global emissions. Additionally nine INDCs (Andorra, 
Armenia, Bangladesh, EU, Japan, Jordan, Monaco, Norway 
and Switzerland) reference ranges in IPCC reports for 
consistency with 2°C. 
Further details are available in Annex B of this report (avail-
able online), presenting a summary of key characteristics of 
all INDCs submitted by 1 October 2015 in table form. 
3.3  Methodology for quantifying the effect of 
INDCs on global GHG emissions
3.3.1 Overview of scenarios
To assess the impact of the INDCs on future global GHG 
emissions, global GHG emissions in 2025 and 2030 are 
compared under four scenarios. Each scenario is composite. 
It draws on multiple individual scenarios from the published 
literature in line with the characteristics described below.
• The baseline scenario assumes that no additional 
climate policies have been put in place since 2010 
(see also Chapter 2). It is sourced from the scenario 
database that accompanied the Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (Clarke et al., 2014). 
• The current policy trajectory scenario takes into 
account currently adopted and implemented policies. 
It is based on (i) the current policies scenarios from 
three5 out of the eight global INDC analyses6 that 
provide such current policy trajectory scenarios, 
(ii) official country-specific data sources, and (iii) 
independent country-specific data sources, as 
detailed in Table 3.1. 
5 These three groups with current policy scenarios are: (i) the Climate Action 
Tracker by Climate Analytics, NewClimate Institute, Ecofys and Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research–PIK (CAT, 2015); (ii) International En-
ergy Agency (IEA, 2014); and iii) PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2015). The groups from LSE and DEA (see footnote 
6) also have current policies scenarios that are calibrated at the IEA current 
policies scenario.
6 These eight global groups with INDC scenarios are: (i) the Climate Action 
Tracker by Climate Analytics, NewClimate Institute, Ecofys and PIK (CAT, 
2015); (ii) PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, 2015) 
(iii) International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014, 2015); (iv) London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science (LSE) (Boyd et al., 2015); (v) Climate and Energy 
College / University of Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2015); (vi) Danish 
Energy Agency (DEA, 2015); (vii) Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 
2015); and (viii) NIES (Masui, 2015).
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Reference Geographic coverage Sector 
and gas 
coverage
Scenario coverage
Global INDC analyses
Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2015; Gütschow et al., 2015) Global All Current policy trajectory, INDC
Climate and Energy College / University of Melbourne 
dataset (Meinshausen, 2015) 
Global All INDC
Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 2015) Global All INDC
Danish Energy Agency (DEA, 2015) Global All INDC
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
(Boyd et al., 2015)
Global All INDC
International Energy Agency - World Energy Outlook (IEA, 
2014; IEA, 2015)
Global CO
2
 from 
energy usea 
Current policy trajectory, INDC
National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) (Masui, 
2015)
Global All INDC
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (den 
Elzen et al., 2015; PBL, 2015) 
Global All Current policy trajectory, INDC
Official country-specific data sources
Australian Government (2015) Australia All Current policy trajectory
Biennial Report/Biennial Update Report (UNFCCC National 
Reports, 2015) a
Brazil, Japan, Norway, 
Korea, Republic of, 
Russia and Switzerland
Varies Current policy trajectory
Department of Environmental Affairs (2014) South Africa All Current policy trajectory, INDC
EEA (2014) EU All Current policy trajectory
Government of Canada (2014) Canada All Current policy trajectory
INDCs (UNFCCC, 2015a) Brazil, Japan, Korea, 
Republic of, Mexico, 
Morocco, South Africa 
and the USA
Varies INDC
National Climate Change Strategy (2013) Mexico All Current policy trajectory
National Communications (UNFCCC National Reports, 2015) Indonesia, USA Varies INDC
Independent country-specific data sources
Centre for Policy Research (Dubash et al., 2015) india CO
2
Current policy trajectory
Climate Advisers (Belenky, 2015) United states All Current policy trajectory, INDC
Energy Research Institute Low carbon scenarios (based on 
Jiang et al., 2013)
China CO
2
b Current policy trajectory, INDC
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (Garg et al., 
2014)
india All Current policy trajectory
Institut du Développement Durables et des Relations 
Internationales (IDDRI, 2015)
Japan All INDC
National Center for Climate Strategy and International 
Cooperation (Sha et al., 2015) 
China CO
2
b INDC
World Resources Institute (Kuramochi, 2014) Japan All INDC
World Resources Institute (Hausker et al., 2015) United states All Current policy trajectory, INDC
a Augmented with US Environmental Protection Agency (2012), JRC/PBL (2012) and den Elzen et al. (2015) to produce economy-wide figures. 
b Augmented with Tavoni et al. (2015) and Government of China (2012) to produce economy-wide figures.
Table 3.1: Overview of INDC studies included in the assessment by type of source (in alphabetical order)
• The INDC scenario portrays how global GHG emissions 
might evolve with full implementation of INDCs. It 
is sourced from (i) the official estimates included in 
the INDCs (UNFCCC, 2015a), (ii) calculations based 
on the INDCs and on other documents submitted 
by countries to the UNFCCC (such as national GHG 
inventories, national communications, biennial 
reports, and biennial update reports), (iii) estimates 
published in country-specific studies, and (iv) eight 
global analyses, described further below. 
• The 2°C scenario represents an idealized global 
scenario consistent with limiting warming to below 
2°C, keeping the option open to strengthen the global 
temperature target to 1.5°C. It comprises the subset 
of scenarios from the IPCC AR5 scenario database 
that (i) have a greater than 66 per cent chance 
of keeping global temperature increase to below 
2°C in 2100 compared pre-industrial levels, (ii) are 
consistent with full implementation of 2020 pledges 
that are anchored in the Cancun Agreements, and 
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(iii) distribute emission reductions across regions, 
gases and sectors after 2020 in such a way that 
that global mitigation costs of necessary reductions 
are minimized. 
3.3.2 Methodology for current policy trajectory 
and INDC scenarios
While the baseline and 2OC scenarios are drawn entirely from 
the IPCC AR5 database and have not been adjusted, the data 
sources and methodologies for the current policy trajectory 
and INDC scenarios are more complex, as indicated above 
and in Table 3.1. The methodology in the assessment of these 
scenarios is therefore described in more detail in the following.
As mentioned, the current policy trajectory scenario draws 
from the current policy scenarios of three of the eight global 
analyses, in addition to current policy scenarios from official 
and independent country-specific sources. Where no data 
are available from official or independent country-specific 
sources, the assessment uses the median current policy 
scenario estimate from the three global studies.
Current policy trajectory scenarios assume that no additional 
mitigation action is taken beyond current policies – even 
if it results in 2020 pledges not being achieved or being 
overachieved. Current policy trajectories reflect all adopted 
and implemented policies, which for the purpose of this 
report are defined as legislative decisions, executive orders, 
or their equivalent. This implies that publicly announced 
plans or strategies alone would not qualify, while individual 
executive orders to implement such plans or strategies 
would qualify. Ultimately, however, these definitions 
may be interpreted differently in the different underlying 
studies. This assessment is bound by the definitions that the 
individual research groups use. 
The INDC scenario draws on individual INDC scenarios 
from the same eight global analyses. It furthermore draws 
on official and independent country-specific sources, as 
indicated in Table 3.1. These are converted to two global 
estimates in the same manner as for the current policy 
trajectory scenario. Finally, it considers five additional 
scenarios that are created by combining emission growth 
rates of the non-INDC countries from five modelling groups 
(Tavoni et al., 2015)7 with the median emission values for 
INDC-countries taken from the INDC scenarios of the eight 
global INDC analyses, and the two additional analyses based 
on the aggregated official and independent country-specific 
data sources8. The resulting composite INDC scenario 
comprises the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile 
global estimates for 2025 and 2030 from all of these sources.
7 The Low climate IMpact scenarios and the Implications of required Tight 
emission control Strategies (LIMITS) study modelled reference scenarios con-
sistent with achieving the Cancun pledges, assuming constant climate poli-
cies thereafter. The LIMITS modelling groups are: Energy Research Centre of 
the Netherlands (ECN), Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL), and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK).
8 These five scenarios represent the sum of the median value for 2025 and 
2030 emissions for countries with INDCs from the ten INDC analyses (eight 
global studies, one official and one national global estimate) and estimated 
values for future emissions in non-INDC countries. The latter are calculated 
by applying the 2010-2030 emission growth rates from each of the five LIM-
ITS studies to the median 2010 emissions of the non-INDC countries from 
the ten INDC analyses. This results in five additional global INDC scenarios 
considered in the composite INDC scenario.
3.3.3 Unconditional and conditional INDC cases
As discussed in section 3.2, some countries place conditions 
on all or part of their INDCs. Consequently, two cases are 
explored in this assessment: unconditional INDCs and 
conditional INDCs. In the unconditional INDC case, Parties 
with INDCs are assumed to implement targets without 
conditions only. Parties that solely have a conditional 
target, or have not submitted an INDC, are assumed to 
follow a current policy trajectory. In the conditional INDC 
case all Parties with INDCs are assumed to implement their 
conditional targets. Parties that only have an unconditional 
target are assumed to implement that target, and Parties 
with no INDCs are assumed to follow a current policy 
trajectory, or if that is not available, a baseline scenario. In 
both the unconditional and the conditional INDC cases, it is 
assumed that for any traded international offsets, each unit 
is counted towards the INDC of a single country only – either 
the buyer or the seller.
The studies from which the current policy trajectory scenario 
and the INDC scenario are drawn differ in a number of 
respects, such as: conditional versus unconditional INDCs; 
assumptions regarding non-covered sectors and gases; 
treatment of LULUCF and surplus emission units; and different 
bases for calculating Global Warming Potentials (GWPs).
The methodological differences between the groups cannot 
be fully harmonized, which leads to some uncertainty as 
indicated in the results presented in Section 3.4, where the 
implications of the differences between studies are also 
further explored. 
3.4  The effect of INDCs on global GHG 
emissions
This section presents the findings regarding the aggregate 
effect on global total GHG emissions of full implementation 
of the INDCs in 2025 and 2030, compared to the emissions 
implied by baseline, current policy trajectory and 2°C 
scenarios. The results are shown in Figure 3.2, with details 
on medians and ranges provided in Table 3.2. It should 
be noted that the baseline emission projection is about 
2.5 GtCO
2
e lower in 2030 compared to the projection in last 
year’s Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2014). The reason is that 
this year baseline emission projections are not harmonized 
to the global GHG emissions of 49.5 GtCO
2
e in 2010.
Taken together, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 show that full 
implementation of the unconditional INDCs will reduce 
global GHG emissions in 2025 by 7 GtCO
2
e (range: 3-8) 
relative to the baseline, and by 3 GtCO
2
e (range: 0-4) relative 
to the current policy trajectory. This leaves a gap in 2025 
of 7 GtCO
2
e (range: 5-10) between the unconditional INDC 
scenario and the 2 oC scenario. 
In 2030, the reduction from the unconditional INDCs is 
9 GtCO
2
e (range: 6-11) relative to the baseline and 4 GtCO
2
e 
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Figure 3.2: Global greenhouse gas emissions under diﬀ erent scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030
2010 2020
Baseline
2030
2°C range
70
60
50
40
30
Current policy trajectory
IN
DC
 ca
se
 co
nd
.
IN
DC
 ca
se
 u
nc
on
d.
consistent with 2°C:
42 GtCO2e (range 31-44)
global temperature increase to below 2°C
by 2100 with > 66% chance
Remaining
gap to stay
within 2°C
limit
Cond.
INDC
case
INDC case
14
GtCO2e
IN
DC
 ca
se
 co
nd
.
12
GtCO2e
An
nu
al
 G
lo
ba
l T
ot
al
 G
re
en
ho
us
e 
G
as
 E
m
iss
io
ns
 (G
tC
O
2e
)
Sources: 
Baseline and 2°C ranges:  20th to 80th
INDC case: 10th to 90th
oﬃ  cial and  independent country-speciﬁ c sources
Figure 3.2: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions  
gap in 2030
20 The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – The emissions gap in 2025 and 2030
Table 3.2: Global total GHG emissions, emission reductions and distance to the 20C range in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios 
(median and range)
2025 emissions gap assessment estimates
Scenario Global total 
emissions 
(range)
Emission reduction 
compared to baseline 
(range)
Emission reduction 
compared to current policy 
trajectory (range)
Remaining emission 
reduction to stay within 20C 
limit (range)
GtCO2e GtCO2e GtCO2e GtCO2e
Baseline 61 (57-64) n/a n/a 13 (9-17)
Current policy trajectory 57 (55-58) 4 (3-6) n/a 9 (7-10)
Unconditional INDCs 54 (53-58) 7 (3-8) 3 (0-4) 7 (5-10)
Conditional INDCs a 53 (52-56) 8 (5-9) 4 (1-5) 5 (4-8)
20C pathways 48 (46-50) 13 (11-15) 9 (7-11) 0 (0)
2030 emissions gap assessment estimates
Scenario Global total 
emissions (range)
Emission reduction 
compared to baseline 
(range)
Emission reduction compared 
to current policy trajectory 
(range)
Remaining emission reduction 
to stay within 20C limit (range)
GtCO2e GtCO2e GtCO2e GtCO2e
Baseline 65 (60-70) n/a n/a 23 (18-28)
Current policy trajectory 60 (58-62) 5 (3-7) n/a 18 (16-20)
Unconditional INDCs 56 (54-59) 9 (6-11) 4 (1-6) 14 (12-17)
Conditional INDCs a 54 (52-57) 11 (8-13) 6 (3-8) 12 (10-15)
20C pathways 42 (31-44) 23 (21-34) 18 (16-29) 0 (0)
a Assumes full implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs.
(range: 1-6) relative to the current policy scenario, leaving a 
gap of 14 GtCO
2
e (range: 12-17) between the INDC scenario 
and the 2oC scenario (See Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2) 9.
In comparison, if countries were to also fully implement the 
conditional INDCs, global GHG emissions in 2025 would be 
reduced by 8 GtCO
2
e (range: 5-9) relative to the baseline, 
and by 4 GtCO
2
e (range: 1-5) relative to the current policy 
trajectory. This leaves a gap in 2025 of 5 GtCO
2
e (range: 4-8) 
between the combined implementation of unconditional 
and conditional INDCs and the 20C scenario. 
In 2030, the emission reduction from the combined 
implementation of unconditional and conditional INDCs is 11 
GtCO
2
e (range: 8-13) relative to the baseline, and 6 GtCO
2
e 
(range: 3-8) relative to the current policy scenario, leaving a 
gap of 12 GtCO
2
e (range: 10-15) between the INDC scenario 
and the 2oC scenario in 2030.
Excluding the potential impact of surplus emission units 
(for countries where achieving the INDC generates higher 
emissions than their current policy trajectory), would further 
reduce this gap by 0.5 GtCO
2
e (range: 0-1) by 2030, to a final 
level of 12 GtCO
2
e (range: 9-15). 
If countries that have not yet submitted an INDC were to 
reduce their emissions by the same average percentage 
below current trajectories as those that have already 
9 UNEP (2014) estimated a 2030 emissions gap of about 14–17 GtCO
2
e, based 
on the extrapolation of the four pledge cases in 2020 (52–54 GtCO
2
e). This 
study, however, estimates 2020 emissions at 54-55 GtCO
2
e. Therefore, the 
lower end of the previous gap estimate (14 GtCO
2
e) is no longer relevant, and 
the gap assessed in this report under the INDC scenario is more appropriately 
compared with the higher end of the previous gap estimate (17 GtCO
2
e). 
submitted their INDCs (as of 1 October 2015), the gap for the 
full implementation of both unconditional and conditional 
INDCs could be narrowed by an additional 0.5 GtCO
2
e in 
2025 and 1 GtCO
2
e in 2030, to 11 GtCO
2
e10. 
3.4.1 Temperature implications of the emission 
levels resulting from the INDCs
The temperature implications of the emission levels implied 
by the INDCs are illustrated in Figure 3.3, which compares 
the emission levels estimated for the unconditional 
and conditional INDCs with emission pathways over the 
21st century11,12.
10 Countries covering 85 per cent of global emissions reduce emissions for the 
conditional INDCs about 6 GtCO
2
e below the current trajectories in 2030. The 
remaining 15 per cent are assumed to reduce emissions by about 1 GtCO
2
e 
((6 )/85×15=1.05).
11 Based on Rogelj et al. (2011) to warrant a sufficient coverage of scenarios 
in the range of interest. These scenarios assume a constant level of climate 
mitigation from 2000 or 2005 and until 2100. 
12 Note that the scenarios underlying Figure 3.3 assume a constant level of miti-
gation ambition over the 21st century, from 2000 or 2005 onward. This is dif-
ferent from what is assumed for the 2°C – consistent scenarios in Chapter 2, 
where scenarios achieve the Cancun pledges in 2020 and then start a global 
mitigation path towards 2°C. As a result, the 2030 emission levels in line with 
limiting warming to below 2°C with greater than 66 per cent chance in Figure 
3.3 are lower than the levels reported in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.3  Greenhouse gas emissions levels in the year 2030 from long-term scenarios
 that assume a constant level of climate acti on over ti me starti ng before 2010, 
 compared to the esti mated conditi onal and unconditi onal INDC emission levels for 2030. 
 Scenarios are grouped based on the level of warming they avoid during the 21st century with at least 66% chance, 
 and show median (black line), 15-85th percenti le range (dark coloured boxes), and the minimum maximum range 
 (lighter shaded boxes). The 10-90th percenti le range for the INDC cases is shown.
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Figure 3.3: G eenho se gas emissions levels in the year 2030 from long-t rm scenarios that 
assume a constant level of climate action over time starting before 2010, co pared to the 
estimated conditional and unconditional INDC emission levels for 2030
Scenarios are grouped based on the level of warming they avoid during the 21st century with at least 66% chance, and show median (black line), 15-85th percentile range 
(dark coloured boxes), and the minimum maximum range (ligher shaded boxes). The 10-90th percentile range for the INDC cases is shown.
The Figure illustrates that compared to the levels of 4°C and 
above that would be expected under baseline projections (see 
also Chapter 2) current policies and full implementation of the 
INDCs would reduce the long-term temperature projections. 
More specifically, Figure 3.3 illustrates that full implementation 
of unconditional INDC results in estimated 2030 emission 
levels that are most consistent with scenarios that limit global 
average temperature increase to below 3.5°C by the end of the 
century 2100 with >66 per cent chance. 
Figure 3.3 furthermore illustrates that a move from 
implementation of the unconditional to combined 
implementation of both conditional and unconditional 
INDCs would have an effect on long-term temperature 
projections. Combined implementation of unconditional 
and conditional INDCs, results in projections becoming more 
consistent with long-term scenarios that limit global average 
temperature increase to below 3°C by the end of the century 
with a greater than 66 per cent chance13. 
There is significant overlap between the ranges of the 
unconditional and conditional INDC emission levels, as well 
as between the scenario bins. Taking uncertainty ranges into 
account, the 3.5°C value for implementation of unconditional 
INDCs could decrease to 3°C or increase towards 4°C for the 
low and high unconditional INDC estimates respectively. 
When including the full implementation also of conditional 
INDCs, the emission level estimates taking uncertainty ranges 
13 Given the uncertainties in both projections and climate response, the reso-
lution of the bins is limited and therefore the above-mentioned estimates 
are to be interpreted as indications of the broad order of magnitude of the 
expected avoided warming.
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Figure 3.4: Global greenhouse gas emissions as implied by submitted INDCs (original data from 
different modelling groups, including LULUCF)
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Subsequent to the finalization of this gap assessment, the IEA has updated their unconditional INDC emission estimate for 2030 to 52 GtCO
2
e. This is approximately 
2 GtCO
2
e lower than the estimate shown in the figure and based on IEA (2015).
into account become most consistent with long-term scenarios 
that limit global average temperature increase to below 3-3.5°C 
by the end of the century with >66 per cent chance.
3.4.2 Overview of differences between studies 
and their implications
A number of methodological factors can contribute to 
differences in findings between studies. To illustrate the range 
of estimates from the studies considered for this assessment, 
Figure 3.4 provides an overview of historical emissions (2010), 
current policy trajectories (2020, 2025, and 2030), Cancun 
pledges (2020), and unconditional and conditional INDCs 
(2025 and 2030) by the different studies considered. 
The figure illustrates that differences can be significant. 
However, it is noteworthy that, amongst all the global 
modelling and country-specific scenarios, there is unanimity 
that full INDC implementation would indeed reduce global 
emission levels in 2025 and 2030 relative to the current 
policy trajectory. 
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The main factors that contribute to the discrepancies and 
consequently the approximate ranges in the 2030 emission 
estimates are described below. Where possible, the 
uncertainty that each discrepancy implies for 2030 global 
emissions, is also indicated.
• Non-covered sectors and countries: There is often a 
significant range in the emission estimates for sectors 
not included under INDC pledges, such as emissions 
from international aviation and maritime transport 
(bunkers) and for countries which have not submitted 
an INDC. For example, the uncertainty range across 
the model groups for the emission projections from 
international bunker emissions are 1.7 GtCO
2
e (range: 
1.3-2.1), which is consistent with the uncertainty 
ranges of the projections from international shipping 
and aviation organisations (ICAO, 2013; IMO, 2014). 
The results from different studies will vary, since 
some have explored the impact of mitigation policies 
of only a subset of countries.
• Uncertainties surrounding the emission projections 
of the countries with INDCs: Modelling groups 
have used different assumptions regarding the 
implementation of INDCs. Many INDCs put forward 
absolute GHG emission goals, which can be 
represented easily. There are also many INDCs that 
referenced a business-as-usual emission projection. 
However, for most INDCs an estimate of target-year 
or target-period emissions is given. The quantification 
of these INDCs is not surrounded with moderate 
uncertainties (see Section 3.5). The few countries 
putting forward GDP emission intensity targets 
(measured as the improvement in emissions per unit 
of GDP), did not provide target-year GDP estimates 
or indicate the data source for GDP absolute level, 
BAU, or reference level if given. The quantification of 
these INDCs with intensity targets poses additional 
uncertainties.
• Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): 
LULUCF plays a relevant role in the mitigation 
target of most INDCs. Quantification of the LULUCF 
contribution depends on the availability of adequate 
official information from each country on: (i) the 
modality of inclusion of LULUCF in the INDC (for 
example, LULUCF treated as any other sector or 
through special accounting rules); (ii) historical 
data and projections (for example, from INDC, GHG 
inventories, National Communications, Biennial 
Update Reports). Using information available in 32 
INDCs14 and based entirely on countries’ information, 
the unconditional LULUCF mitigation contribution is 
estimated at around 1.6 GtCO
2
 (of which 0.5 GtCO
2
 
comes from Annex I countries). In addition 0.3 GtCO
2
 
is explicitly indicated as conditional (from non-
Annex I countries). Taking into account uncertainties 
due to accounting rules of ±0.3 GtCO
2
 for Annex I 
countries, and due to countries’ projections, the total 
range of LULUCF contribution ranges from negative 
14 11 Annex I Parties and 21 non-Annex I Parties accounting for about 41 per 
cent of global GHG emissions in 2012.
contributions of 0.1 GtCO
2
 to positive contributions 
of 4.3 GtCO
2
. This range does not consider possible 
future natural disturbances in Annex I countries 
explicitly, the impact of which is assumed to be 
excluded according to UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol 
provisions. Another source of uncertainty for Annex 
I countries is the modality of inclusion of LULUCF in 
the base year, whose impact on GHG allowances is 
estimated as ±0.2 GtCO
2
15. For non-Annex I countries, 
uncertainty stems from the range of country 
projections available and from the availability of 
adequate support to achieve the conditional targets. 
• Impact of harmonization of global 2010 emissions (no 
impact on emissions gap): The median estimate of all 
model teams shows global emissions of 47.5 GtCO
2
e 
in 2010, which is lower than the independent 
global emission estimates of the IPCC AR5 of about 
49.5 GtCO
2
e (range: 45-54). In Chapter 2, the global 
emission pathways consistent with meeting the 
below 2°C target also have global emissions with 
a median estimate of 47.5 GtCO
2
e by 2010, so the 
discrepancy between the historical emissions and 
the emission projections resulting from the INDCs of 
the model teams has not been corrected. If we were 
to resolve the discrepancy in historical emissions 
(that is, harmonization), this would also increase the 
emission projections resulting from the INDCs by 
about 2 GtCO
2
e (under a constant harmonization) or 
about 1 GtCO
2
e (under a decreasing harmonization, 
towards zero by 2050, for example). However, as the 
global emission pathways consistent with meeting 
the 2°C target also need to be harmonized, and thus 
would increase by the same amount, harmonization 
has no impact on the global emissions gap.
• Conditional versus unconditional INDCs: Some studies 
report separate figures for conditional and unconditional 
INDCs, while others combine this aspect with other 
uncertainties in a maximum/minimum range or leave 
out the conditional targets completely.
• Surplus emission units: For countries where the 
emission level resulting from the INDC is higher than 
the current policy trajectory, some studies use the 
current policies trajectory as the value for the INDC 
emission level, implying that they do not allow the 
use of surplus emissions, whereas the other studies 
assume INDC emission levels. 
• Global Warming Potential: About 25 per cent of all 
countries have submitted their INDC based on GWP 
from the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Many 
of the models, however, still work based on GWP 
from the Second IPCC Assessment Report. It is not 
always possible to convert from one GWP to another 
in the context of a particular study without making 
assumptions that may differ by modelling group.
• Differences between data sources for historic data 
and projections: Assumptions differ on baselines and 
reference years.
15 Here, natural disturbances are taken into account, if they are explicitly men-
tioned in the INDC, because if LULUCF is included in the base year natural 
disturbances are expected to be excluded in the base year.
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Figure 3.5  Greenhouse gas emissions for G20 countries with INDCs 
 submitt ed by 1 October for historic emissions (1990, 2010), 
 current policy trajectory emissions (2020, 2025, 2030), and INDC emissions (2025, 2030)
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Figure 3.5: Greenhouse gas emissions for G20 countries with INDCs submitted by 1 October for 
historic emissions (1990, 2010), current policy trajectory emissions (2020, 2025, 2030), and INDC 
emissions (2025, 2030)
3.5 INDCs of G20 countries
This section presents additional findings concerning the 
emissions of some of the highest-emitting countries – 
namely 13 of the G20 countries (counting the EU as one) 
that had submitted their INDCs by 1 October 2015. Their 
emission levels and INDCs have the largest impact on the 
aggregate, global findings of this assessment. 
Cross-cutting information regarding national emissions, 
emissions per GDP and emissions per capita for these 
countries is summarized in Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6, and 
Figure 3.7 respectively. The figures present this cross-
cutting information for historic emissions (for 1990 and 
2010), current policy trajectories (for 2020, 2025, and 
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Figure 3.6  Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of real GDP (US$2005) of G20 countries 
 with INDCs submitt ed by 1 October for historic emissions (1990, 2010), 
 current policy trajectory emissions (2020, 2025, 2030), and INDC emissions (2025, 2030)
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Figure 3.6: Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of real GDP (US$ 2005) G20 countries with INDCs 
submitted by 1 October for historic emissions (1990, 2010), current policy trajectory emissions 
(2020, 2025, 2030), and INDC emissions (2025, 2030)
2030)16, Cancun pledges (for 2020)17, and unconditional and 
conditional (in the case of India, Indonesia and Mexico) INDC 
cases (for 2030, noting that for USA, the 2025 unconditional 
INDC is shown).
By comparing the current policy trajectory scenarios and 
the INDC scenarios, the figures indicate whether or not a 
16 The current trajectories draw only from those studies that explicitly account 
for currently adopted and implemented policies. These include Climate Ac-
tion Tracker, IEA adjusted, and PBL and relevant country-specific studies 
where available. 
17 The estimates for 2020 pledges are based on the UNEP 2014 report (UNEP, 
2014) and as these estimates are based on a different set of model studies 
from current year, only the median emission level are shown in the country 
graphs.
country is on track to meet its 2020 pledge (as discussed in 
Chapter 2.3) and its INDC target. The figures do not attempt 
to comment on the ambition of either the 2020 pledges or 
the INDC targets. It is also important to note that the current 
policy trajectory scenarios, which attempt to reflect the 
most recent mitigation policies, differ from the baseline or 
“business as usual” scenarios employed by some countries, 
which typically assume that no new policies are adopted or 
implemented after a given cut-off year.
Figure 3.5 shows that the emissions from middle-income 
countries such as Mexico, Indonesia (only for conditional 
INDC), Brazil and South Korea are expected to peak before 
2025. Emissions of China and India are expected to peak by 
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Figure 3.7: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita of G20 countries with INDCs submitted by 
1 October for historic emissions (1990, 2010), current policy trajectory emissions (2020, 2025, 
2030), and INDC emissions (2025, 2030)
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2030 or later. These countries have relatively high emission 
intensities due to carbon intensive economies. Emissions 
from most high-income countries have already peaked. The 
EU28 peaked around 1980, the Russian Federation around 
1990, and in Canada, Japan, and the USA around 2005.
The emission levels as a result of INDCs show a decline in per 
capita emissions between 2010 and 2030, except for China, 
India and the Russian Federation (Figure 3.6)
All countries show a substantive reduction and convergence 
in emission intensity (emissions per GDP) by 2030 as a result 
of their INDCs (Figure 3.7). The largest reductions take place 
in countries with the highest emission intensities in 2010, 
such as Indonesia and China.
In addition, detailed findings for each of the above-mentioned 
countries are provided in Annex 1 to this report. For each 
of these countries, Annex 1 includes a brief description 
of the elements of the INDC that have been considered 
by the modelling groups. A discussion of the reasons for 
discrepancies between different data sources is included. 
Data is sourced from the global studies, the national studies 
and official government sources.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
A number of important policy implications can be drawn 
based on the assessment presented above. First, due to the 
steep rate at which global emissions must decline after 2020 
to be consistent with the 2°C scenario, the emissions gap 
grows rapidly over time. This underscores the importance 
of enhanced early action to reduce emissions. Secondly, 
bearing in mind the emissions gap that remains even under 
the most optimistic assumptions about the INDCs, countries 
should not assume that these proposed contributions will 
be sufficient to meet agreed global objectives. While an 
appropriate level of additional ambition would depend 
on equity considerations, in general, countries should 
expect that additional ambition will be necessary. Failure 
to anticipate this could result in technological lock-in and 
stranded assets. Third, the INDC process has proven to elicit 
greater ambition from countries relative to a current policy 
trajectory. Future calls for INDCs may therefore be successful 
in eliciting even greater ambition. Early calls to enhance 
ambition for the 2020 to 2030 timeframe can best address 
the need for enhanced early action.
In this context the IPCC AR5 (IPCC, 2014) highlighted that if 
GHG emissions are above 55 GtCO
2
e in 2030, challenges of 
transitioning to low emission levels in line with 2°C in the 
longer term will become particularly daunting (Figure 6.32 in 
Clarke et al., 2014). The challenges are much reduced if 2030 
Kyoto-GHG emissions are kept below 50 GtCO
2
e (Clarke et 
al., 2014), or even more so, to 42 GtCO
2
e in line with a least-
cost 2°C pathway after 2020. 
To sum up, this assessment of the aggregate effect of the 
INDCs on global total GHG emissions in 2025 and 2030 
essentially tells two stories. First, the INDCs do present a real 
increase in the levels of ambition compared to a projection 
of current policies; all global modelling analyses and 
scenarios based on country-specific data sources assessed, 
reached this conclusion. Secondly, however, the ambitions 
are far from sufficient, and the emissions gap in 2030 is very 
significant. Unless ambition is raised rapidly, the projected 
emission levels resulting from the INDCs are likely to lead to a 
path that at best will be consistent with an increase in global 
average temperature of below 3oC in 2100. If considering 
unconditional INDC levels only, the projected temperature 
increase is closer to below 3.5oC. Taking uncertainty ranges 
into account, the emission level estimates under full 
implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs 
become most consistent with long-term scenarios that limit 
global average temperature increase to below 3-3.5°C by the 
end of the century with >66 per cent chance.
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Opportunities for bridging the gap
Chapter 4
Lead author: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership)
Contributing author: John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)
4.1  Introduction 
The INDCs represent a real increase in the level of mitigation 
ambition compared to a continuation of current policies. 
However, as Chapter 3 illustrates, even with combined 
implementation of unconditional and conditional INDCs, 
the emissions gap in 2030 is estimated to be in the order of 
12 GtCO
2
e.
The central question is then if and how this emissions gap 
can be narrowed and potentially bridged?
This second part of the Emissions Gap Report explores 
some of the answers to this question. Assessing the most 
recent literature, it sets off by providing an overview of 
key issues and opportunities for narrowing and potentially 
bridging the emissions gap in 2030 in this chapter. These 
opportunities include:
• Establishing a dynamic framework under the Paris 
Agreement to drive continuous strengthening 
of mitigation ambition and ensure efficient 
implementation of the agreement
• Boosting pre-2020 mitigation action to reduce 
mitigation costs, avoid lock-in and maintain a 
possibility of staying below 1.5°C by 2100
• Introducing, replicating and scaling up good practice 
mitigation action, enabling countries to overachieve 
on their INDCs and bring about a transition to a low 
carbon economy
• Full integration of development and climate co-
benefits in policies, planning and action.
This is followed by 2 chapters providing in-depth assessment 
of opportunities to further tap into emission reduction 
potentials in one cross-cutting area, International 
Cooperative Initiatives (Chapter 5), and for one sector, 
forestry (Chapter 6). 
4.2  Ensuring coherence, synergy and 
complementarity between climate 
change, economic growth and sustainable 
development   
A deeper understanding and recognition of the 
interdependency between climate change, economic growth 
and sustainable development has emerged over the past 
decade. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recently 
adopted in New York by Heads of State of all member states 
of the United Nations (UN, 2015a) (see also Chapter 1) are 
an exemplification of this recognition. The SDG process 
explicitly recommends prioritizing coherence, co-benefits, 
and complementarity between a climate change agreement 
under the UNFCCC and the SDGs. 
The interrelationships between climate and development 
are demonstrated in the SDGs and the Fifth Assessment 
Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). Similarly linkages between economic 
growth, sustainable development and climate change are 
echoed across the recent literature (GGBP, 2014; Ansuategi 
et al., 2015; GCEC 2015a, 2015b; IEA, 2015a, 2015b). A 
briefing paper prepared for the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Summit in New York earlier this year states 
that “Progress towards many SDGs will be affected, 
overwhelmingly negatively, by climate change (for example 
food security, water scarcity and water related disasters, 
poverty and livelihoods, health, and the well-being of 
ocean and terrestrial ecosystems)” (UN, 2015a, p.2). At 
the same time, “[…] significant progress on many SDGs can 
contribute to tackling climate change (including sustainable 
energy, infrastructure and industrialization, sustainable 
consumption and production, sustainable agriculture and 
sustainable cities)” (UN, 2015a, p.2).  
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Box 4.1: Preparation of the INDC in Chile
The preparation of the INDC has involved high level political responsibility starting with a political mandate from the 
President implemented by the Council of Ministers for Sustainability and Climate Change. In order to get both political 
engagement and input for consideration, the draft INDC was submitted for public consultation over a period of 4 months 
with public briefings throughout the country. Proposals received went into a revision process for the draft INDC and 
final decision rested with the Council. Mitigation discussion was focused around two possible emission intensity targets 
for the country with different implications but neither of them was seen as damaging to the economy. So climate 
change policies were treated, in effect, as an integral part of overall national development.
Box 4.2: Preparation of the INDC in the Gambia
The INDC of the Gambia comprehensively addresses mitigation and adaptation and relevant means for implementation 
like finance, technology and capacity building. The INDC process has been founded in the context of the regular national 
development planning process. The national INDC preparation process has a strong focus on stakeholder engagement 
with sensitization workshops in each of the eight districts of the country and broad cross ministerial and institutional 
engagement in the actual preparation of the national submission. As a small LDC the Gambia has limited mitigation 
potential but has identified a number of areas like renewable energy, forestry and agriculture where actions can be 
implemented - some domestically, others requiring international financial and technological support.
Similarly, the recent IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report states 
with high confidence that climate change poses a threat 
to equitable and sustainable development (IPCC, 2014a). 
However, the report also finds that it is possible to pursue 
strategies and actions that will move towards climate-
resilient pathways for sustainable development, while 
simultaneously facilitating improved livelihoods, social 
and economic well-being and effective environmental 
management (IPCC, 2014a). 
The SDG Goal 13 “Take urgent action to combat climate 
change and its impacts” specifically acknowledges that 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is the primary international, intergovernmental 
forum for negotiating the global response to climate 
change (UN, 2015b), and the targets associated with the 
Goal are clearly aligned with the ambitions in the INDCs. 
From the assessment of the submitted INDCs it is evident 
that many countries have established national processes 
that are explicitly anchored in an understanding of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in the broader context of 
sustainable development planning at the national level (see 
Box 4.1 and 4.2).
4.3 A robust, effective and transparent 
follow-up and review framework under 
the Paris Agreement is vital to narrow the 
emissions gap
A robust, effective and transparent follow-up and review 
framework is critical to ensure the implementation of an 
ambitious global agreement on climate change. The SDG 
process has emphasized the importance of establishing a 
framework for periodic follow-up and review of progress 
towards implementation of the SDGs and mobilization of 
further action to accelerate implementation with a four-year 
interval (UN, 2015c).
A similar approach seems likely to feature in the Paris 
Agreement. As of 23 October 2015, the UNFCCC draft 
negotiating text includes mention of periodical global 
stocktakes of the implementation of the Paris Agreement 
guided by modalities to be adopted by a body under the new 
agreement at its first session1.
A dynamic approach of the Paris Agreement that enables 
countries to regularly review and strengthen their INDCs is 
consistently highlighted as essential to enhance mitigation 
ambition and narrow the emissions gap (GCEC, 2015a; 
IDDRI, 2015; IEA, 2015a; INDC Forum, 2015; Spencer et al., 
2015). In this way it has been stressed that the first round 
of INDCs should be seen as the basis for a ‘virtuous circle’ 
of rising ambition (IEA, 2015a), and as representing ‘floors 
rather than ceilings’ to national ambition over the coming 
years (GCEC, 2015a). 
In this context it is important to note that the social and 
political effects of the INDCs and the processes undertaken 
at national level transcend the aggregate effect they are 
estimated to have on total global GHG emission levels in 
2025 and 2030. The preparation of the INDCs, has in many 
countries incentivized exploration of linkages between 
development and climate outcomes, and can be seen as 
a step towards a transition to a low carbon economy. As 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 in Chapter 3 illustrate, in many cases 
the INDCs support a decoupling of economic growth and 
emissions growth, and reduce per capita emissions. 
The Paris Agreement can support these national transitions 
and provide the framework for mobilization of the enhanced 
mitigation effort that is required to align national efforts with 
the global mitigation ambition indicated by the 2oC pathways. 
1 Draft text available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_oct_2015/ap-
plication/pdf/ws_1_and_2.pdf [Accessed 6 November 2015].
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Establishing a robust, effective and transparent follow-up 
and review framework as part of the Paris Agreement will be 
critical in this context.
The following sections look into the opportunities for 
further enhancing mitigation action to narrow and 
potentially bridge the emissions gap, which would support 
the transition towards a low carbon economy and facilitate 
overachievement of the emission reductions put forward in 
the INDCs. 
4.4  Bridging the gap – realizing emission 
reduction potentials by 2020 and 2030 
4.4.1  The critical role of boosting pre-2020 
mitigation action 
The importance of increasing pre-2020 mitigation action was 
underscored in Chapter 2. Reducing emissions compared to the 
current policy trajectories before 2020 will not only improve 
the chances for achieving the stringent emission reductions 
that are required after 2020 to limit warming to below 2°C 
by 2100. It will also reduce the costs of emission reductions, 
avoid lock-in of carbon and energy intensive infrastructure, 
and lower the risk associated with substantial dependence on 
negative emissions beyond 2050 to limit global warming to 
2°C. In addition, as shown in Chapter 2, enhanced early action 
that goes beyond current policies would facilitate maintaining 
the option of limiting warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 (with a 
greater than 50 per cent chance). 
Previous Emissions Gap Reports (UNEP, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
showed estimates of the aggregate emission reduction 
potential by sector by 20202. This potential was based on 
studies that assumed earlier and more stringent mitigation 
action than indicated by the current policy trajectory. As we 
get closer to 2020, it is no longer possible to realize the full 
2020 emission reduction potential referred to in previous 
Emissions Gap Reports. One reason is that often there is a 
considerable time lag between the adoption of emission 
reducing policies and options, their implementation and the 
reaping of the associated emission reductions. In addition, 
failure to invest in best available technologies and options 
as early as possible constrains our ability, in the near-future, 
to reduce emissions in some sectors and cross-cutting 
areas, because of lock-in of higher-energy use and emission 
investments with long timeframes.
The size of the remaining emission reduction potential by 2020 
is difficult to assess, as few comprehensive updated studies 
are available. However, three recent technical reports by the 
UNFCCC (2014a, 2014b, 2015) highlight that significant emission 
reduction potential by 2020 remains. These reports focus on 
the thematic areas of renewable energy; energy efficiency; 
land use; urban environments; carbon dioxide capture, use 
and storage; and non-carbon dioxide GHG emissions. Another 
recent study finds that scaling up and replicating current 
good practices could, reduce global emissions by around 
2 Assessed in previous Emissions Gap Reports to be in the order of 17 ± 3 
GtCO
2
e, adopting a sectoral bottom-up approach, with marginal costs of up 
to US$50–100/tCO
2
e.
4.6 GtCO
2
e in 2020, if wide-spread and urgent action is undertaken 
(Fekete et al., 2015). 
4.4.2  Reaping emission reduction potentials  
by 2030 to narrow and potentially bridge 
the gap
Extensive emission reduction potential by 2030
Looking beyond 2020, a number of recent studies and reports, 
including by the IPCC and leading international institutions, 
identify a significant emissions reduction potential by 
2030 (IPCC, 2014b; IRENA, 2014; Fekete et al., 2015; GCEC, 
2015a; IDDRI, 2015; IEA, 2015a; JRC, 2015; OECD/IEA/
NEA/ITF, 2015). Acknowledging that the methodologies, 
assumptions, scope and coverage of measures vary across 
these studies, they all document that tapping into unused 
emission reduction potential could narrow the emissions 
gap in 2030 considerably. 
Specific examples are presented in Table 4.1 showing 
emission reduction opportunities by 2030 estimated by 
different studies, and how this potential relates to the gap 
assessment findings presented in Chapter 3. Only studies 
that allow comparison of emission reductions relative to 
the INDC case levels are included in the table. Several other 
recent studies show sizeable emission reduction potential 
in specific sectors or thematic areas, but cannot be directly 
compared to the 2030 baseline, current policy trajectory and 
INDC emission levels from Chapter 3 and are therefore not 
included in the table. 
Taken together, the studies shown in Table 4.1 indicate that 
global GHG emissions could be further reduced in 2030 by 
between 5-12 GtCO
2
e (range: 3-13) relative to the emissions 
level resulting from implementation of the unconditional 
INDCs, and between 5-10 GtCO
2
e (range: 1-11) relative to 
the emissions level associated with implementation of the 
conditional INDCs. Such reductions would significantly 
narrow the emissions gap in 2030, which as previously 
stated is estimated at 14 GtCO
2
e (range: 12-17) for the 
unconditional INDC case, and at 12 GtCO
2
e (range: 10-15), if 
both unconditional and conditional INDCs are implemented. 
Furthermore, the studies rely exclusively on implementation 
of proven technologies and policies.
There is considerable uncertainty associated with the 
emission reduction potential estimated in the studies 
included in Table 4.1. On the other hand, the studies do not 
cover all possible measures, thematic areas or sectors. The 
study by NCI, PBL and IIASA (Fekete et al., 2015), for example, 
excludes potential emission reductions in agriculture, parts 
of the transport and industrial sector, waste, and bunkers. 
Similarly, the IEA study only considers options for reducing 
energy-related CO
2
 emissions.  
In other words the total technical and economic emission 
reduction potential in 2030 could very well be larger 
than indicated in the table. Other sources like the Fourth 
Assessment Report, AR4, of the IPCC (2007) provided an 
estimate of total emission reduction potential in 2030 of 
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Table 4.1: Illustration of estimated emission reduction potentials by 2030 from various studies
Study Emission reduction 
compared to baseline
Emission reduction 
compared to current policy 
trajectory
Emission reduction compared 
to INDCs unconditional / 
conditional
GtCO2e by 2030 
Median (range)a
Emission reduction required to transition to 
20C pathways
23 (18-28) 18 (16-20) 14 (12-17) / 12 (10-15)
“Global mitigation scenario” (JRC, 2015) 19.5 14.5 11 / 8.5
Assumes a rapid intensification of policies across several world countries from 2015, leading to a peak in emissions as early as 2020. A 
progressive convergence of underlying carbon prices after 2030, depending on their per capita income, leads to an emissions profile by 2050 
that is compatible with the below 2°C target.
NewClimate Institute (NCI), PBL 
Netherlands, and International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
(Fekete et al., 2015)
18-20 13-15 9-12 / 7-10
Considers the global implications of scaling up and replicating current good practice across nine policy areas and actions: 1) Increase 
renewable share in electricity through country dependent policy mix; 2) Emission reductions from production of fossil fuels; 3) Promotion 
of industrial energy efficiency through country specific policy instruments; 4) HFC and other F-gas emission reductions; 5) Standards for 
efficiency of appliances and lighting; 6) Energy efficiency of the building envelope (heating/cooling); 7) Fuel efficiency/emission standards 
light duty vehicles; 8) Support Electric cars driven by renewable electricity; and 9) Emission reduction from deforestation.
The following sectors are not included: agriculture, parts of the transport and industrial sector, waste, and bunkers.
New Climate Economy (GCEC, 2015a) 17 (12-22)b 12 (7-17) 8 (3-13) / 6 (1-11)
Identifies 10 key areas of opportunity for stronger climate action: 1) Accelerate low-carbon development in the world’s cities; 2) Restore 
and protect agricultural and forest landscapes and increase agricultural productivity; 3) Invest at least US$1 trillion a year in clean energy by 
2030; 4) Raise energy efficiency standards to the global best; 5) Implement effective carbon pricing; 6) Ensure new infrastructure is climate-
smart; 7) Galvanize low-carbon innovation; 8) Drive low-carbon action through business and investor action; 9) Raise ambition to reduce 
international aviation and maritime emissions; and 10) Phase down the use of hydrofluorocarbons.
“Bridge Scenario” (IEA, 2015a, 2015b)c 16 11 5
Medium coverage.
Includes five energy-related measures: 1) Increasing energy efficiency in the industry, buildings and transport sectors; 2) Progressively 
reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants and banning their construction; 3) Increasing investment in renewable energy 
technologies in the power sector from US$270 billion in 2014 to US$400 billion in 2030; 4) Gradual phasing out of fossil-fuel subsidies to end-
users by 2030; and 5)Reducing methane emissions in oil and gas production. 
Notes: It is not possible to indicate technical and economic potential for specific levels of marginal cost based on the information provided in the studies.
a Median and range is indicated where possible. JRC (2015) and IEA (2015a, 2015b) do not provide uncertainty ranges. NCI, PBL, and IIASA (Fekete et al., 2015) provide a 
range indicating medians of two analyses, but no uncertainty ranges.
b The New Climate Economy study (GCEC, 2015a) has baseline emissions in 2030 of 69 GtCO
2
e and indicate a total emission reduction potential of 21 (range: 16-26) 
GtCO
2
e compared to this baseline level. In the Table, the 2030 baseline emissions of 65 GtCO
2
e estimated in Chapter 3 are used. Therefore, the total emission reduction 
potential of the New Climate Economy study has been adjusted by -4 GtCO
2
e to be comparable to the Emissions Gap Assessment.
C IEA (2015a, 2015b) only considers CO
2
 emissions. As the studies do not indicate the projected energy-related CO
2
 emission share of global GHG emissions in 2030, the 
emission reduction calculations in the table are approximate, based on the assumption that global energy-related CO
2
 emissions will also account for roughly two-thirds 
of global GHG emissions in 2030. This study does not distinguish between unconditional and conditional INDCs. Therefore, only one estimate for the emission reduction 
compared to INDC is included in the Table.
23 GtCO
2
e (range: 16-31)3, which is in the order of magnitude 
required to bridge the gap in 2030. An update of the total 
emission reduction potential in 2030 is not available in the 
Fifth Assessment Report, AR5, of the IPCC (2014a, 2014b). 
However, updates for key sectors in AR5 indicate that 
emission reduction potentials in 2030 remain in the same 
order of magnitude as in the AR4 (IPCC, 2007). 
For the industry sector overall, global mitigation potentials 
in 2030 of up to 8 GtCO
2
e are referenced in AR5 (IPCC, 
2014b). For the transport sector, the emission reduction 
potential is assessed to be higher than reported in the AR4, 
with projected energy efficiency and vehicle performance 
improvements ranging from 30-50 per cent in 2030 relative 
to 2010 (IPCC, 2014a). Similarly, for the building sector, the 
AR5 reports that mitigation or energy saving potentials often 
go beyond 30 per cent up to even 60 per cent of the baseline 
3 The IPCC (2007) estimated sectoral emission reduction potentials in GtCO
2
e 
by 2030 with marginal costs in the range of US$50–100/tCO
2
e as follows: 
Power sector [2.4–4.7]; Manufacturing industry [2.5–5.5]; Transportation 
[1.6–2.5]; Buildings [5.4–6.7]; Forestry [1.3–4.2]; Agriculture [2.3–6.4]; and 
Waste [0.4–1.0].
(IPCC, 2014b)4. Analyses have furthermore shown that “[…] 
technological improvement keeps replenishing the potential 
for efficiency improvement, so that the potential for cost-
effective energy efficiency improvement has not been 
diminishing in spite of continuously improving standards” 
(IPCC, 2014b). 
Finally, for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU), 
emission reduction potential of supply-side measures is 
estimated to be 7.2-11 GtCO
2
e in 2030 (IPCC, 2014b)5.
The studies assessed all emphasize the key importance of 
enhanced energy efficiency, with a particular emphasis on 
industry, buildings and transport. Expanded use of renewable 
energy technologies for power production combined with 
increased efficiency of fossil fuel-based power production is 
also considered key. Other key areas and sectors for enhanced 
mitigation action emphasized in the studies include forestry, 
agriculture and waste. These are all areas that have been 
4 Base years for the studies considered are generally between 2000 and 2010.
5 For mitigation efforts consistent with carbon prices up to US$100/tCO
2
e, of 
which about a third can be achieved at below US$20/tCO
2
e.
32 The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – Opportunities for bridging the gap
Box 4.3:  Summary of proven policies  for reducing GHG emissions and achieving 
development goals highlighted in previous UNEP emissions gap reports  
(source: UNEP 2012, 2013, 2014)
The 2012, 2013 and 2014 UNEP Emission Gap Reports identify policies in key areas that have proven successful in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in many different countries, while contributing to national development goals. Such 
policies have the potential to make a significant contribution to bridging the gap, if scaled up in terms of ambition and 
geographical coverage.
Energy
These policies are related to improvements in energy efficiency in various sectors:
• Building sector – Regulations for building energy performance or codes for new construction: especially with regards 
to energy efficiency in heating, cooling appliances and lighting. Most developed countries also need to pay attention 
to renovating existing buildings in an energy efficient manner
• Industry sector – Country- and subsector-specific approaches rather than standardized policies: due to the diverse 
nature of the industry sector target policies have proven most effective
• Transport sector – Mandatory fuel economy standards for road vehicles: principal means for slowing down the 
growing fossil fuel consumption. Often supplemented with measure such as labelling, taxes and incentives, while 
promoting more efficient transportation modes
• Appliance standards – Regulations that prescribe the energy performance of manufactured products
• Appliance labels – Energy-efficiency labels that are fixed to manufactured products to describe the products’ energy 
performance.
Agriculture
• Promotion of no-tillage practices
• Improved nutrient and water management in rice production
• Agroforestry: different agricultural management practices that all deliberately include woody perennials on farms 
and the landscape, and which promote a greater uptake of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by biomass and 
soils.
Buildings
Policies that lower energy use and therefore reduce carbon-dioxide and other emissions (see also under Energy):
• Building codes: regulatory instruments that set standards for specific technologies or energy performance levels and 
that can be applied to both new buildings and retrofits of existing buildings.
Transport
These policies reduce energy use and therefore reduce carbon dioxide and other emissions (see also under Energy):
• Transit-oriented development: the practice of mixing residential, commercial and recreational land uses to promote 
high-density neighbourhoods around public transit stations
• Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): key elements of bus rapid transit include frequent, high-capacity service; higher operating 
speeds than conventional buses; separated lanes; distinct stations with level boarding; and fare prepayment and 
unique branding
• Vehicle performance standards: establish minimum requirements based on fuel consumption or greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of distance travelled by certain vehicle classes.
The policies included above do not represent a comprehensive list. Moreover, some policies will be more appropriate 
and successful in reducing emissions in some countries than in others. Their success also depends on how stringently 
they are implemented.
assessed in earlier UNEP Emissions Gap Reports and where 
significant opportunities for bridging the gap have been 
highlighted through possibilities for replication, acceleration 
and scaling up proven good practices and policies. 
The importance of scaling up good practices  
and policies
There is immense potential for reducing emissions through 
world-wide replication and scaling up of good practices and 
policies as illustrated above. However, the emission reduction 
potentials shown in the previous sections can only be realized if 
strong, long-term and sector-specific policies are put in place at 
the global and national levels without delay.
Previous editions of the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2012, 2013, 
2014) have demonstrated how proven policies can be scaled 
up (both in ambition and geographical reach) across countries 
and regions taking national differences and circumstances into 
account. Box 4.3 summarizes key proven policies in different 
areas considered in earlier Emissions Gap Reports.
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Consideration of multiple benefits essential
Previous editions of the Emissions Gap Report have 
emphasized that in many, if not most, cases climate change 
mitigation is not the primary driver for action, but rather 
a significant co-benefit of sound sectoral and national 
development planning and policies. The previous Emissions 
Gap Reports offer examples of how ambitious policy 
instruments that lead to significant emission reductions can 
foster innovation and economic growth, bolster national 
energy security, improve public health and address other key 
developmental priorities. 
The feasibility of introducing, replicating or expanding 
ambitious regulatory measures, market- and price-based 
instruments, and command-and-control measures varies 
across thematic areas, sectors and countries (UNEP, 
2012; IPCC, 2014b). In order to build a strong case for 
enhanced action by policy makers and other stakeholders, 
it will be important to provide clear and convincing 
documentation of the wide range of benefits associated 
with the implementation of the policies and actions that 
can bring about the needed reductions of GHG emissions 
(UNEP, 2012). 
Numerous studies confirm that many actions that reduce 
GHG emissions are associated with considerable co-benefits 
(IPCC, 2014a; Parry, et al., 2014; WB, 2014; Fekete et al., 
2015; GCEC, 2015b; Höhne et al., 2015; UNFCCC, 2014a, 
2014b, 2015). Accounting for co-benefits reduces the 
average cost of emission reduction options and increases 
the total emission reduction potential associated with a net 
benefit. For energy efficiency options, inclusion of multiple 
benefits in some cases triples the overall benefit of these 
options, notably where they heavily reduce coal use (GCEC, 
2015b). Options associated with net costs, may also swing to 
net benefits when co-benefits are taken into account. This is, 
for example, the case for reduced deforestation, recycling of 
new waste, and offshore wind (GCEC, 2015b). 
Full integration of co-benefits in planning and decision-
making can thus have profound implications for climate and 
development action.
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5.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide an assessment based 
on published or readily available information of the possible 
contribution to global mitigation efforts especially by key 
International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs). In addition, the 
chapter looks into the role of other groups of non-state actors. 
In the context of climate mitigation, ICIs are considered to 
be cooperative efforts led by actors other than Parties to the 
UNFCCC, but many are undertaken in partnership with national 
governments whose agencies are very often critical to the 
realization of the ICIs’ emission reduction potential. Many ICIs 
have strong international partners – catalyzing both national 
and international actions and often providing opportunity for 
enhancing national ambition. 
Across this spectrum, ICIs cover a wide range of activities, and 
although it is a challenge to cover them comprehensively, 
an effort has been made to assess available information and 
prioritize initiatives according to their potential mitigation 
significance. The chapter starts by presenting the results of 
a number of recent studies regarding the potential emission 
reduction contribution of ICIs together with an assessment 
as to what extent ICI contributions can be considered as 
additional to those anticipated from the Cancun pledges. 
This is followed by an examination of the links between 
national level cooperative initiatives and the UNFCCC 
process, with examples from selected INDCs submitted 
during 2015. The chapter then presents a detailed overview 
of ICIs grouped into three categories, cities and regions, 
companies and sectors, which helps illustrate the innovative 
approaches adopted by many non-state actors and facilitate 
opportunities for identifying new types of partnerships that 
could contribute to addressing the mitigation challenge. 
A particular effort has been made to examine south-south 
initiatives that may have been under-represented in past 
reviews. The chapter focuses on actions on the ground 
rather than enabling measures, as the former are more 
quantifiable. Particular attention is given to private sector 
activities which, under favourable policy and legislative 
frameworks, strengthen technological innovation. 
5.2  Quantitative impact of ICIs on emission 
reductions
An earlier estimate of the possible emissions reduction 
impact of ICIs was reported in the Emissions Gap Report 2013 
(UNEP, 2013). This report stated a total expected impact of 
about 10 GtCO
2
e in 2020, based on a number of underlying 
studies (Blok et al., 2012; IEA, 2013; UNFCCC, 2013). 
A number of recent studies have estimated both the gross 
emission reduction potential of ICIs for 2020 and 2030, and, 
for 2020, attempted to calculate net impacts additional to 
what will be included in the 2020 pledge achievement. These 
include a study carried out for UNEP by Ecofys (UNEP, 2015), 
a study by Yale University (Hsu et al., 2015) and a study 
by the Netherlands’ Environmental Assessment Agency 
(Roelfsema et al., 2015). An overview of the results, broken 
down by sector is given in Table 5.4.
Although all studies have comparable methodologies 
(Mosteller and Hsu, 2015) and consider similar categories, 
there are marked differences in scope between the studies. 
UNEP (2015) started from all initiatives gathered on the 
Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP, 2015), and then selected the 
most significant ones for quantitative analysis. Commitments 
made at the New York Climate Summit in 2014 were not 
included because of their early stage of development. This 
summit sparked significant new engagement on climate action 
and a number of new ICI type commitments were presented 
(Climate Change Summary, 2014). Hsu et al. (2015) explicitly 
focus on these new commitments from the Climate Summit. 
Roelfsema et al. (2015) took a similar approach as the UNEP 
report, but the authors used a different baseline scenario. 
They also included major initiatives outside the UNFCCC 
framework (for example, those of national governments 
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under the Montreal Protocol). This is also the only study 
to project possible emission reduction contributions to 
2030, partly through extrapolation. Findings from a further 
study (CISL/Ecofys, 2015) have been also been included in 
the assessment, even if the coverage was more restricted. 
These differences in scope and coverage indicate that the 
total impact of non-state climate action could be larger than 
reported by each individual study, as they do not fully overlap. 
An overall conclusion of the assessment is that the impact 
of non-state climate commitments can be very significant, 
most likely in the range of 2.5-4 GtCO
2
e in 2020 (taking 
into account that not all initiatives are included in all 
assessments). This already accounts for an estimate of 
overlap between the various initiatives, in terms of actual 
actions, sectors, greenhouse gases and regions. 
It is difficult to estimate the overlap between these non-
state initiatives and national government pledges for 2020. 
Overlap between these varies from full overlap, for example 
for the Global Fuel Efficiency Initiative, to virtually no overlap, 
for example for the international marine and aviation sector 
(Roelfsema et al., 2015). For countries with economy-wide 
reduction pledges the overlap is hard to estimate, but likely 
to be larger, compared to the overlap for countries with very 
narrowly defined pledges limited to one or two particular 
sectors. Roelfsema et al. (2015) estimated the overlap for 
individual initiatives and country pledges and, by aggregating 
this to the global level, found a total of 70 per cent overlap 
between initiatives included and government pledges for the 
year 2020. In contrast, UNEP (2015) found a lower overlap of 
just 33 per cent at the maximum for the initiatives and country 
pledges included in their study. As shown in Table 5.1 below, 
these two key studies would suggest that the estimated range 
of emission reductions from ICIs net of the 2020 pledges is 
currently in the order of 0.75-2.2 GtCO
2
e in 2020.
Table 5.1: Quantitative emission reduction impact of initiatives in 2020, according to different studies (in MtCO
2
e). All emission 
reductions are compared to a business-as-usual or current policies scenario.1234567891011121314151617
Actors or sectors UNEP, 2015 University of 
Yale (Hsu et al., 
2015)
University of 
Cambridge (CISL/
Ecofys, 2015)
PBL (Roelfsema et al., 
2015)
Target year 2020 2020 2020 2020 2030
Sub-national Cities and municipalities 1 080 4541 6002 700
Regions 760
Companies 630 51-1003
10-304
8005 1 400
Sectors Energy efficiency 606 1 7507 60
Efficient cook stoves 120
Renewable energy 0.28
Transport 2009 500
Methane and other SLCP 90 50010 1 300
Fluorinated GHG 0.0-0.711 0 70012
Reduce deforestation 10013 33114 20-200 30015 700
Agriculture 300
Shipping and aviation 20016 500
Overlap between initiatives 200 200 300
Total expected 
impact
Midpoint 2 900 2 540 No total 17 2 500 5 500
Range 2 500-3 300
% overlap with 
national pledges
33 70
Impact of ICIs net 
of national pledges
1 700-2 200 750
1 Compact of Mayors.
2 CDP – Top 500 Companies and Cement Sustainability Initiatives.
3 Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBCSD).
4 WWF Climate Savers programme.
5 C40 and Covenant of Mayors.
6 En.lighten initiative.
7 Energy Efficiency Accelerator.
8 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Lighthouse Initiative.
9 Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI).
10 Global Methane Initiative and Zero Routine Flaring by 2030.
11 Refrigerants Naturally!
12 North American 2013 HFC Submission to the Montreal Protocol.
13 Tropical Forestry Alliance.
14 New York Declaration on Forests.
15 New York Declaration on Forests.
16 International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization.
17 No total given as study was not intended to be exhaustive.
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It is important to recognize that the emission reduction 
impact of the initiatives assessed here assumes that the 
actors live up to their commitments. It is currently difficult 
to assess whether international initiatives actually deliver. 
Most initiatives put forward voluntary commitments 
which makes it difficult to enforce accountability and 
compliance. For some initiatives this leads to a lack of robust 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) (IVM, 2015). 
In practice, actors may over- or under-deliver compared 
to their commitments (see section 5.4.2 on delivery by 
companies). Although the 2013 Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2013) quoted a non-state contribution of just under 
10 GtCO
2
e/yr by 2020, this represented an acknowledged 
overlap with national pledges that was not quantified. 
Beyond the possible direct mitigation contribution either as 
part of fulfilling government pledges or providing additional 
reductions, it is important to stress the possibilities for growth 
and acceleration of initiatives. A recent study (CISL/Ecofys, 
2015) illustrates in several areas that there is significant 
potential for scaling up initiatives. The development and 
engagement of ICIs are rapidly evolving within all the 
different categories, therefore the results presented in this 
section must be seen as a snapshot of where ICIs stand today. 
It would have been very interesting to assess the possible 
contribution from ICIs for 2030 and similarly, as with 
pledges, to examine how much of this contribution would 
be additional to the new INDCs. However, although PBL 
(Roelfsema et al., 2015) does offer an extrapolation of the 
total expected impact of ICIs in 2030 (midpoint estimate 
5.5 GtCO
2
e), it is not feasible at this point to consider 
questions of 2030 additionality in any meaningful way.
5.3  Non-state actors and the UNFCCC process
In view of the importance of cooperative initiatives (often 
led by non-state actors) in low carbon development, 
some UNFCCC Parties and observers have called for better 
representation of their role in the UNFCCC process (Chan 
and Paux, 2014). 
In December 2014 at the COP 20 in Lima, a new platform was 
launched to showcase climate mitigation initiatives as distinct 
from national pledges (NAZCA, 2015). The Non-State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) signifies a “[…] symbolic 
step towards considering subnational and non-state actors 
within the political sphere of the UNFCCC” (Hsu et al., 2015). 
The platform mainly promotes voluntary action and does not 
apply a standardised set of compliance, monitoring, reporting 
and verification rules. Although administered by the UNFCCC, 
data are primarily contributed by partner organisations and 
not collected by the UNFCCC itself.
The role of non-state actors has recently expanded due to the 
need to assist with INDC submissions of the UNFCCC Parties 
prior to COP 21 in Paris in December 2015. As pointed out 
by Edwards et al. (2015) “[…] the INDC design process offers 
an unprecedented opportunity to improve civil society and 
business participation in climate change policymaking”.
Where some developing countries have lacked capacity, 
non-state actors have been able to assist. Both national and 
international NGOs have provided know how in connection 
with preparation of INDCs for different countries (for 
example, climateanalytics.org, energies2050.org).
Domestic non-state actors have also contributed to the 
national debate on INDCs. In Brazil, Observatório do Clima, 
a Brazilian coalition comprising more than 30 NGOs, has 
estimated annual GHG emissions estimates for Brazil since 
2013. Even before the INDC process, the organization had 
already participated in domestic consultations led by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Senegal, a non-governmental 
organization, Enda Energie, participated in the sectoral and 
national reports validation workshops and contributed to the 
preparation of scenarios used as the basis for the INDC18.
The contribution of non-state actors to climate mitigation 
actions will continue following the submission of INDCs. They 
can be instrumental not only in facilitating the achievement 
of the emission reduction targets, but also in monitoring, 
reporting and verification of actions at national level 
(Dodwell et al., 2015).
Some INDCs acknowledge the contribution of non-state 
actors. Mexico states that multiple stakeholders have been 
consulted during the INDC preparation, including NGOs 
specializing in adaptation. Interestingly, few INDCs have 
highlighted the role of non-state initiatives in mitigation. 
An exception is China, which plans to “[…] conduct low-
carbon cities (towns) pilots as well as low-carbon industrial 
parks, low-carbon communities, low-carbon business and 
low-carbon transport pilots” (UNFCCC, 2015). Indonesia 
mentions “[…] active participation of the private sector, 
small and medium enterprises, civil society organizations, 
local communities and the most vulnerable groups […]” in 
sustainable forest management (UNFCCC, 2015).
5.4 Summary of Initiatives
This section presents a review of the recent literature on 
ICIs with a main focus on initiatives that have substantial 
mitigation potential. Various reports (Hale and Roger, 
2014; Hsu et al., 2015; Roelfsema et al., 2015; Roger et al., 
2015; UNEP, 2015) provide an overview of what has been 
announced or implemented by subnational governments, 
such as cities, municipalities and regions, company initiatives 
and initiatives with a specific sectoral focus. Descriptions of 
initiatives can be found on the Climate Initiatives Platform 
(CIP, 2015) and the NAZCA portal (NAZCA, 2015). Monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) arrangements for the 
various initiatives is also assessed, as this is a key element 
in providing transparency and ensuring credibility. The ICIs 
considered are grouped into three categories, cities and 
regions, companies and sectors.
5.4.1 Cities and regions initiatives
Subnational governments can act on climate change 
mitigation in many ways. Sub-national jurisdictions, such 
as state or regional governments, have even attempted to 
18 Direct communication with the NGO’s representative.
37The Emissions Gap Report 2015 – International cooperative initiatives
compensate for the lack of political will at the national level 
(Somanathan et al., 2014).
There are many ICIs in which several cities and regions 
cooperate; for example, UNEP’s recent report on subnational 
actors lists twenty one initiatives of this type (UNEP, 2015). 
A few started in the 1990s19, while the majority started in 
the period 2005-201220 and some were announced during 
the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit in September 
201421. Initiatives focus on the following roles:
• Encouraging or facilitating emission reductions at 
the city and regional level, via knowledge sharing, 
capacity building and technical support for project 
planning and implementation
• Identifying partnerships and supporting local 
communities to become climate resilient
• Representing common city-level interests to influence 
policymakers at other levels
• Helping implement climate plans and low-carbon and 
climate-resilient economic development projects
• Achieving transparency and accountability by 
encouraging best practice in GHG emission reporting
• Helping overcome financial barriers and attract 
investors and accelerate additional capital flows into 
cities for low carbon projects.
The overview identifies those cities and regions initiatives with 
members who have committed to GHG emission reductions. 
In most cases they have (or plan to have) inventories or 
registries to report both their goals and their past and current 
GHG emissions, with the aim of promoting transparency and 
accountability. The following initiatives fall into this category: 
C40, carbonn (including Mexico City Pact and WWF Earth Hour 
City Challenge), Covenant of Mayors, Climate Group’s States 
and Regions, Compact of Mayors and Compact of States and 
Regions (see Table 5.2). There is an overlap in membership 
between some of these various initiatives.
Monitoring, reporting and verification 
The Covenant of Mayors provides European local 
governments with guidance on how to develop a 
Sustainable Energy Action Plan (SEAP). Once this is adopted, 
implementation towards the goal is monitored. As of July 
2015, about 460 monitoring reports were available from 
2 882 adopted SEAPs. C40 cities reporting via the CDP22 
are asked to report using the primary protocol standard or 
methodology to calculate GHG emissions (for example, 2006 
IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, 
Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Inventories (GPC) (WRI, C40 and ICLEI, 2014)). 
19 Including Climate Alliance, Energy Cities, ICLEI - Local Governments for Sus-
tainability.
20 Including C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), U.S. Conference of May-
ors’ Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA), World Mayors Council on Climate 
Change (WMCCC), Connected Urban Development, Transition Network, The 
Climate Registry, Covenant of Mayors, EUROCITIES Declaration on Climate 
Change, carbonn Climate Registry (cCR), Mexico City Pact, R20, WWF Earth 
Hour City Challenge (EHCC), The Clean Revolution.
21 Including City Creditworthiness Partnership, Compact of Mayors, Compact of 
States and Regions, District Energy Accelerator, The Cities Climate Finance 
Leadership Alliance.
22 CDP (formerly Carbon Disclosure Project) is an organization focussed on 
monitoring GHG emission performance and climate action engagement for 
companies and other actors.
Cities participating in the Compact of Mayors are requested to 
use the Global Protocol for Community-scale GHG emissions 
(GPC) and they are also required within 3 years to submit a 
climate action plan which includes an implementation and 
monitoring plan. 
The cities and regions initiatives generally have designated 
registries (see Table 5.2). In the case of the newer initiatives 
such as the Compact of Cities and Compact of States and 
Regions, signatories have the choice of reporting to the 
carbonn Climate Registry or CDP. In addition to reporting 
on GHG emissions, signatories are requested to advise 
which GHG protocol and emissions factors were applied. 
The Compact of Mayors requires a complete updated 
inventory every three years23. Annual reports or summaries 
are published by the initiatives or the reporting platform. 
These include the total planned emission reductions and 
often the base year of emissions, without specifying the 
current progress towards the emission reduction targets. 
Such information is currently only publicly available for a 
limited number of cities such as those under the Covenant 
of Mayors.
The cities that disclose their information to CDP also 
provide information on whether or not their GHG emissions 
inventory has been verified by a third party. While the SEAPs 
that are submitted to the Covenant of Mayor are subject to 
verification by the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre, the monitoring progress reports available for certain 
cities on the website do not indicate that they are third 
party verified. Participating authorities to the CDP States 
and Regions platform will be asked to report whether data 
sources have been verified. 
It is evident from the assessment of cities and regions 
initiatives that there are a number of different approaches 
to especially monitoring and reporting and generally limited 
independent verification. Recent development indicates that 
the initiatives are gradually building the necessary processes 
and moving towards more uniform approaches.
23 The year of the inventory should not be more than three years prior to the 
reporting year – that is, in 2017 inventories must be dated between 2014 and 
2016. Over time, the Compact would like cities to update their inventories on 
a more frequent / annual basis. 
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5.4.2  Companies initiatives
Another set of ICIs engage private sector companies in 
mitigation activities. A total of 30 such initiatives are 
currently listed on the Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP, 
2015). Many of these initiatives act more as convening 
platforms for exchange of best practice and advocacy than 
engaging in direct commitments. But some have objectives 
that indirectly lead to emission reduction, for example, those 
aiming to re-direct investment to clean energy. 
An overview of companies’ initiatives that focus on direct 
GHG emission reduction is provided in Table 5.3. One 
common characteristic, of the initiatives with considerable 
potential for emission reductions (UNEP, 2015), is the 
requirement for participating companies to set their own 
emission reduction commitments. The most recent climate 
initiative assessed in this chapter, the Science Based Target 
Initiative which was launched in 2014, requests participating 
companies to set targets that are compatible with a global 
2°C goal (CDP, WRI and WWF, 2014). 
There is a trend towards more collaboration between 
different kinds of partners. Most private sector companies’ 
initiatives have up to 50 member companies, while others 
like the Caring for Climate Initiative has over 380 signatories.
Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Among companies initiatives, members of the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI) use the Cement CO
2
 and Energy 
Protocol, while others reporting via CDP routinely use The 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and 
Reporting Standard. The Caring for Climate companies 
are recommended to use CDP’s reporting process on an 
annual basis. Other alternatives are the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) guidelines and the Global Compact Advanced 
Communication on Progress (COP).
Almost all companies of the Business Environmental 
Leadership Council (BELC), the majority of WWF Climate 
Savers and CSI26 companies, and half of the participating 
companies of Ultra-Low CO
2
 Steelmaking (ULCOS) initiative 
self-report to CDP by means of a questionnaire. The 
information related to supply chain or climate change 
reported to CDP as part of their corporate disclosure can 
be viewed by registered users. The company can choose 
via the CDP Platform, whether their disclosure is available 
to registered users and whether their submission is scored. 
The Caring for Climate companies should annually report 
by means of a Communication on Progress-Climate (COP-
Climate), which is available via the initiative’s website27. 
26 CSI companies can also report their information to a voluntary and indepen-
dently-managed database of CO
2
 and energy performance information of 
the global cement industry called Getting the Numbers Right (GNR). Annual 
summary information is published. The database covers over 930 individual 
facilities including non-CSI.
27 Failure to prepare a publicly available COP-Climate report will result in a 
change of status (to “non-communicating”) and eventually in the delisting of 
a signatory from Caring for Climate. 
Annual reports or summaries are published by the various 
initiatives or reporting platforms, covering total planned 
emission reductions and often the base year of emissions, 
without specifying the current progress towards the 
emission reduction targets. 
The companies that disclose their information to the CDP, 
report whether their information on GHG emissions has 
been verified, whether assurance is still underway or 
whether no third party verification took place. The annual 
reports of Caring for Climate are self-assessed. The overall 
picture on MRV for company initiatives is, therefore, quite 
similar to that for cities and regions though with variation 
in approach and limited evidence of verification at present.
Progress towards goals
An important question is to what extent companies are on 
track to reach their goals. According to their Progress Report 
(Caring for Climate, 2014), which lists both large companies 
and SMEs, a subsample of 33 large companies with high 
quality data for 2012 and 2013 demonstrated a decrease 
in GHG emission levels of around 13 per cent against 2007 
levels. However, the CDP Carbon Action Report 2014 (CDP, 
2014) suggests that more than half of the companies in its 
sample did not set absolute targets and a quarter of absolute 
targets ended in the reporting year. The report notes that 70 
per cent of the correctly set absolute targets by companies 
“[…] will not be achieved in a business-as-usual scenario and 
further action will be required” (CDP, 2014, p.12).
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Table 5.4: Overview of sector initiatives
Sector Sector initiative Objectives and targets 
Renewable 
energy
RE 100 Ambition to attain 100% renewable energy by 100 leading businesses.
European Industrial 
Renewable Energy Initiative
Initiative for European businesses – PV to supply 12% of EU power by 2020; wind to 
provide 34% of EU power by 2030.
Africa Clean Energy Initiative Investment in renewable energy through Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) – US$250 million in loans and guarantees in Africa by 2020.
CSP Alliance: USA The CSP Alliance comprises solar thermal electric power developers and suppliers who 
advocate for the increasing acceptance, adoption and implementation of solar thermal 
electric technology and thermal energy storage.
Energy 
efficiency
Sustainable Energy for All 
- Global Energy Efficiency 
Accelerator
By 2030, aiming to contribute to the target of doubling the global rate of improvement 
in energy efficiency – driving action by public and private leaders at all levels.
Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Major oil companies and governments of oil-producing countries have committed to 
end routine gas flaring at oil production sites by 2030.
Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition
Partnership engaging both countries and non-state actors to reduce short-lived climate 
pollutants including methane, black carbon and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
Coalition for Energy Savings Coalition representing 400 associations, 150 companies in 30 countries in Europe 
(aiming for 40% energy savings in 2030 compared to 1990 levels).
Industrial 
processes
Carbon Disclosure Project Improving the management of environmental risk by putting information on climate 
change, water and forest-risk at the core of business, investment and policy decision 
making.
Cement Sustainability 
Initiative
Global effort by 25 leading cement producers (accounting for over 30% of global 
production) to pursue sustainable operations in over 100 countries.
Global Methane Initiative A multilateral partnership (14 countries) aiming to reduce global methane emissions 
and to advance the abatement, recovery and use of methane as a valuable clean 
energy source.
Industrial Energy Efficiency 
Coalition
Alliance of private sector companies seeking to promote continuous energy efficiency 
improvements in industrial processes in the USA.
Low carbon 
transport
International Civil Aviation 
Organisation
Targeting 1.5% fuel use efficiency per year until 2020 and 2% thereafter.
Bus Rapid Transit systems 
(BRTs)
Informal coalition of 64 BRTs in over 40 countries.
Land 
restoration and 
reforestation
Bonn Challenge Targeting restoration of 150 million ha of forests by 2020.
20x20 Initiative Targeting restoration of over 20 million ha of degraded land in Latin America by 2020. 
Eight private impact investors have pledged US$670 million.
Marine energy Marine Energy Council Unites technology developers, academia, consultants, suppliers and service providers 
representing the wave, tidal, ocean current and riverine sectors focussing attention on 
opportunities in marine energy.
5.4.3 Sector initiatives
Sector initiatives are grouped around renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, industrial processes, low carbon transport, 
land restoration and reforestation, and marine energy. 
There is a clear likelihood of overlap between the sector 
initiatives and the other categories (cities and regions, and 
companies), but recent estimates indicate this overlap to 
be relatively small – less than 10 per cent – in the region 
of 0.21 GtCO
2
e/yr by 2020 on a total impact range of 
2.5-3.3 GtCO
2
e/yr by 2020 (UNEP, 2015). Table 5.4 identifies 
principal sector-led initiatives.
5.5  The private sector and innovation  
in mitigation 
Looking beyond ICIs, the private sector is engaged in a wide 
range of climate activities that have the potential to reduce 
carbon intensity in many economies (Vergara et al., 2015). 
Acknowledging the critical role of favourable policy and 
regulatory frameworks, the private sector is instrumental for 
innovation, as innovation stems from technology advances, 
often through new economic and financial opportunities, 
and market-based risk-taking undertaken by the private 
sector. Selected examples include:
• Renewable energy, which has seen annual 
investments grow between 2004-2014 by 500 per 
cent from US$45 billion to US$270 billion (FS UNEP 
Centre, 2015) partially as a result of significant 
reductions in capital and operation and maintenance 
costs. For example, PV utility-size costs have been 
consistently falling at 22 per cent per year since 1976 
(Seba, 2014). Capital costs for wind energy have also 
seen substantial decreases (IRENA, 2015). This pace of 
change is already affecting how new capacity is being 
planned and has the potential to bring substantive 
additional changes in the power generation market 
in the near future 
• Deployment of distributed power, which has the ability 
to shift modes of generation and transmission from 
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centralized solutions with large grids to local systems 
with only distribution grids, resulting in lower overall 
costs in many developing countries, in particular for 
rural and isolated communities
• Electric power storage, which has seen an average 
reduction in production costs of 14 per cent per year 
during the period 2007-2014 and may be at a tipping 
point for mass production (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015)
• Electric vehicle technologies, which are projected to 
potentially disrupt the use of fossil fuels in transport 
and may represent one of the largest available energy 
efficiency measures (Vergara et al., 2015), and
• The application of land restoration practices, which 
can significantly impact accumulation of carbon sinks.
Most, if not all, of these measures are also associated with 
significant co-benefits, for example through improvements 
in energy security, reductions in emissions of harmful 
airborne pollutants, increased food security, and recovery 
of soil and water quality (IPCC, 2014; Vergara et al., 2015).
Together these developments improve the outlook for 
substantial reductions in global carbon emissions, in some 
cases at an unexpected pace, bringing new market solutions 
into play – working hand in hand with enabling policy from 
government and behaviour change initiatives in civil society. 
In the broader picture of raising ambition and closing the 
gap, these recent developments indicate that acceleration is 
possible with the right incentives, and action on the ground 
may eventually surpass formal commitments.
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Mitigation potential from forest-
related activities and incentives 
for enhanced action in developing 
countries
Chapter 6
Lead authors: Lera Miles (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre), Denis Jean Sonwa (Center for International Forestry Research)
Contributing authors: Riyong Kim Bakkegaard (UNEP DTU Partnership), Blaise Bodin (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre), Re-
becca Mant (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre), Lisen Runsten (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre), Maria Sanz 
Sanchez (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), Kimberly Todd (United Nations Development Programme), Francesco 
Tubiello (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), Arief Wijaya (Centre for International Forestry Research / Thuenen 
Institute Hamburg)
6.1 Introduction
Forest-related mitigation activities in both developing and 
developed countries represent important opportunities for 
climate change mitigation, and enhanced action on these 
activities could contribute significantly to narrowing the 
emissions gap. The IPCC AR5 (Smith et al., 2014) highlights 
that 12 per cent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(in the period 2000-2009) come from forests and other 
land use change. Forests hold large carbon stores within 
their living biomass (above and below ground), in dead 
organic matter (litter/dead wood) and in soil. Enhanced 
mitigation action could involve enhancing carbon stocks in 
new or existing forests, changes to forest management, and 
increased reforestation and afforestation. 
This chapter starts by providing a global overview of existing 
statements regarding intended forest-related mitigation 
actions by countries, including in their INDCs. This is followed 
by a review of the range of available forest-related mitigation 
options. International multi-stakeholder partnerships 
such as the New York Declaration on Forests and the Bonn 
Challenge on forest landscape restoration have focused 
on ambitious global objectives for the sector. Over the 
last ten years, there has also been considerable effort and 
progress under the UNFCCC in negotiating the set of policy 
approaches and interventions known as REDD+ (reducing 
GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
‘plus’ conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks), which is considered a key option under the UNFCCC 
for facilitating specific cost-effective contribution to climate 
change mitigation in developing countries (Eliasch, 2008; 
UNFCCC, 2009). 
Reflecting the political interest in REDD+, the chapter has 
a special focus on assessing the potential contribution of 
carbon dioxide emissions reductions and sequestration from 
forest-related activities in developing countries to bridging 
the emissions gap in 2030; and the role REDD+ can play as a 
key instrument to realize these reductions.
6.2 Global overview of forest-related 
mitigation engagement
Countries are already committing to substantial efforts 
towards forest-related mitigation. To date a total of 109 
countries (counting the EU as one), including 94 developing 
countries1, have made statements regarding their willingness 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, or to enhance forest carbon stocks. Figure 6.1 
provides a global overview of these national statements2 
that are made in a range of different texts and fora including:
• Contributions under UNFCCC:  
m Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs), conditional or unconditional (see Box 6.1): 
Several countries include quantitative information 
on anticipated forest-related activities and LULUCF. 
Of the 82 developing countries that submitted their 
INDC by 1 October 2015 and included forest-related 
contributions, the majority aim to undertake 
actions to reduce forest-related emissions and 
to enhance forest carbon stocks. Fifteen Annex I 
countries included forest-related contributions in 
their INDC of which eight specify these activities, 
which include reducing forest-related emissions, 
enhancing forest carbon stock or both
1 For analytical purposes, this chapter requires a list of developing countries. 
There is no standard UN list, but the UNFCCC states that most of the Con-
vention’s ‘non-Annex I’ Parties are developing, so this set is here used as an 
approximation (as in the former REDD+ Partnership’s Voluntary REDD+ Da-
tabase). In contrast, Annex I Parties are all industrialized or have economies 
in transition. http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php, see 
also http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/
items/1031.php
2 Underlying data can be found in Annex C, which is available online.
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Box 6.1: Forest-related mitigation in INDCs
Countries that have submitted INDCs describe their forest-related activities in a variety of different ways (see also 
Chapter 3). Some countries mention that the forest sector is relevant, but do not provide any quantification. Some specify 
conditional and unconditional contributions without indicating how these are attributed to forests. Some examples of 
the types of statements in the INDCs are:
• Democratic Republic of Congo: the INDC presents a 17 per cent emissions reduction contribution entirely conditional 
on finance, and achieved through agriculture, forestry and energy sectors. Forestry activities will focus mainly on 
afforestation and reforestation 
• Ethiopia: the INDC presents a quantified target for mitigation in the forestry sector of 130 MtCO
2
 through protecting 
and re-establishing forests and increasing carbon stocks, fully conditional on international support 
• Brazil: the INDC presents an unconditional economy-wide emissions reduction for 2025. Specifically in the forest 
sector, implementation and permanence of REDD+ activities require the provision, on a continuous basis, of adequate 
and predictable results-based payments in accordance with the relevant COP decisions. 
Figure 6.1: National statements of intention to undertake forest-related mitigation activities
Speciﬁes activities for forest-related emission reductions (ER)
No national statement of intention to undertake forest-related
mitigation activities in the sources consulted
Speciﬁes activities for enhancement of forest carbon stocks (EN)
Speciﬁes activities for both forest-related ER and EN
Includes forests in scope but does not specify forest-related activities
m Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs): Several countries include quantitative 
information on anticipated forest-related 
mitigation activities, in hectares or in carbon 
terms (UNFCCC, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c)
• Bilateral arrangements: Donors (including Germany 
and Norway) have agreements with Brazil, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Liberia and Peru to 
provide funding conditional upon demonstrated 
success in contributing to mitigation through REDD+ 
(‘results-based payments’). Other donors have made 
or are negotiating similar bilateral agreements
• Carbon Fund: Proposals for reductions as documented 
in ER-PINs (FCPF, 2015)
• International multi-stakeholder partnerships: The 
New York Declaration on Forests and Bonn Challenge 
commitments on forest landscape restoration (Bonn 
Challenge, 2015).
Of the 79 developing country Parties and five Annex I 
countries that have declared their intention to enhance 
forest carbon stocks in any of the sources listed above, 
36 have quantified the area intended for restoration/
afforestation/reforestation, amounting to a total of over 
141 million hectares (ha).
As indicated in Chapter 3, analysis of the emission reduction 
contribution of LULUCF in INDCs estimates an approximate 
contribution of 1.6 GtCO
2
 (of which 0.5 GtCO
2
 comes from 
Annex I countries) from full implementation of unconditional 
INDCs, increasing to 1.9 GtCO
2
 (range: -0.1-4.3) under full 
implementation of both unconditional and conditional 
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INDCs. The forest-related mitigation potential under the 
INDCs will be less than this, as forestry comprises a subset 
of LULUCF activities described in the INDCs. The following 
sections put these numbers into a broader context of forest-
related mitigation opportunities and potentials.
6.3 Forest-related mitigation opportunities
Forest-related mitigation opportunities include maintaining 
or increasing forest areas and carbon density through 
reducing deforestation and degradation, afforestation or 
reforestation, or forest management to increase stand- and 
landscape-level carbon density (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Best practice policies to curb deforestation were reviewed 
in the 2012 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2012). This report 
highlighted four distinct policy categories, including:
• Establishing new protected areas
• Using command-and-control measures (enacting, 
enforcing and monitoring of regulations on conversion 
of forest, may include investment in existing protected 
areas to prevent incursion (Scharlemann et al., 2010))
• Using economic instruments (taxes, subsidies, 
payments for ecosystem services), and
• Creating policies affecting drivers and contexts that 
currently promote deforestation (sectoral policies, 
institutional frameworks, governance structures and 
agricultural subsidy reform). 
Addressing the drivers of deforestation is critical. 
On-the-ground measures to reduce pressure on forests include 
sustainable intensification of agriculture to improve yields on 
existing land, and alternative livelihoods development for 
communities dependent on deforestation. Designating new 
protected areas, indigenous lands and community-managed 
forests can be effective in preventing deforestation in situ3 
and avoiding its displacement to other areas. However, forest-
related mitigation approaches are generally found to be more 
effective if they also address the direct and indirect drivers of 
land-use change (Ewers and Rodrigues, 2008). Combinations 
of policies and measures that work at the landscape scale to 
reduce the drivers of deforestation, whilst identifying and 
protecting the most valued forests, are most likely to yield 
multiple benefits (New Climate Economy, 2015). 
Reducing degradation and promoting enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks can also benefit from policies ranging 
from incentives for best practice to actions to address 
drivers (for example, fire and unsustainable harvesting). 
Sustainable forest management can reduce emissions 
from forest degradation through specific policies and 
measures, including adoption of reduced-impact logging 
in areas designated as production forest; prevention of 
illegal logging; planting of woodlots for poles or charcoal; 
promotion of more sustainable extraction and efficient 
use of fuelwood and charcoal; and support to community 
forestry and development of systems to limit the spread of 
anthropogenic fires such as those used in agriculture. 
3 Though around nine per cent of all deforestation emissions in the humid 
tropics between 2000 and 2005 resulted from forest cleared from within pro-
tected areas (Scharlemann et al., 2010).
Enhancing carbon stocks may involve afforestation or 
reforestation, with approaches ranging from assisted 
natural regeneration to tree planting. In areas of disturbed 
forest, carbon stocks may be enhanced by controlling 
the degradation drivers covered above and by direct 
interventions, for example, through enrichment planting 
(Paquette et al., 2009) or rewetting of drained peatland 
forest (Jaenicke et al., 2010). Enhancing carbon stocks is one 
goal among many in the process known as forest landscape 
restoration, which aims to regain ecological integrity and 
enhance human well-being in deforested or degraded 
forest landscapes to meet present and future needs, whilst 
accommodating multiple uses over time (Maginnis et al., 
2012). Forest landscape restoration may involve planting 
trees on farms, woodlots or agroforestry systems, or 
establishing new areas of forests to restore and recreate 
the structure, function and composition of an original forest 
ecosystem, or both (Lamb and Gilmour, 2003). 
Conserving, restoring and sustainably managing forests offers 
numerous benefits other than carbon storage, strengthening 
the case for prioritizing forest-related mitigation options. 
Forests provide essential ecosystem goods and services, such 
as water quality and regulation (providing more consistent 
flows of clean water for drinking and agriculture), erosion 
control (preventing sedimentation of hydropower dams, 
and protecting other lands downstream), forest products 
(directly supporting livelihoods, for example through timber, 
fuelwood, foods, medicine and fibre) and cultural services 
(supporting cultural traditions and tourism) (Shvidenko et 
al., 2005). Hence, well-chosen and implemented forest-
related mitigation activities can contribute to many other 
domestic and international policy objectives, including those 
defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Targets 
(CBD, 2010), the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 
13 on urgent climate action and Goal 15 including to halt 
deforestation by 2020) (UNGA, 2015), the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN, 2008), the UNCCD 
10-year strategic plan and framework (UNCCD, 2007) and 
the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests 
(UNGA, 2007). Synergies between adaptation and mitigation 
also exist in many cases and can, for example, be achieved 
through ecosystem-based adaptation (Rizvi et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, forest-related mitigation opportunities are 
integral to landscape-level mitigation approaches, and 
complement actions to reduce emissions from agricultural 
land4 and from non-forested peatlands (Smith et al., 2014).
The variety of forest-related mitigation opportunities 
presented here demonstrates the potential for broad 
participation by countries in forest-related mitigation 
according to their national circumstances. Drivers of land-
use change, potential for restoration, and climate impacts on 
forest ecology among many other factors will differ between 
countries and regions, and determine the appropriate forest-
related mitigation activities. 
4 Responsible for a similar quantity of annual GHG emissions, based on CO
2
 
only from deforestation and forest degradation (Table 6.1) compared to 
all greenhouse gases from agricultural land in 2005 (Smith et al., 2014, 
Figure 11.4). 
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6.4 Emission reduction potential of forest-
related mitigation activities
The previous sections provided a global overview of countries’ 
intentions regarding forest-related mitigation activities and 
illustrated the wide range of areas in which such activities 
can be undertaken. In addition, the estimated LULUCF 
mitigation contribution in the INDCs was highlighted. While 
acknowledging the importance of reducing forest-related 
emissions in all countries, the political interest and emphasis 
given to REDD+ as a key instrument to realizing forest-based 
emission reductions reflects the critical role of developing 
countries in reducing emissions from deforestation. 
This section assesses the total potential contribution to 
bridging the emissions gap in 2030 that could be brought 
about by forest-related emission reductions in developing 
countries. More specifically, the section assesses the 
technical potential for reducing emissions through forest-
related activities in developing countries based on a 
review of the published literature. The technical potential 
represents the full biophysical potential of a mitigation 
option without accounting for economic or other constraints 
(as defined in Smith et al., 2014, p. 847). It represents a halt 
of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
including on peatland, and universal ‘wide-scale’ forest 
restoration on available and suitable areas. This represents 
an upper technical maximum and is estimated to be around 
9 GtCO
2
 in 2030 (range: 6.7-11.9) (Table 6.1). 
Achieving the technical mitigation potential of the forest 
sector is limited by operational and socio-economic factors. 
Factors that can place increased demands on forest land 
include limited capacity to increase production in agriculture, 
national objectives for food self-sufficiency, infrastructure 
development, and wood product requirements. Demands 
can be reduced by factors such as restoring degraded lands 
to agricultural production, changing dietary preferences 
or reducing waste. Hence, country goals for forest-related 
emission reductions and enhancement of carbon stocks 
need to take into account potential competition with other 
land uses.
6.4.1 Technical mitigation potential of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions
A wide range of estimates of global CO
2
 emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation exist (Ciais et al., 
2013; Smith et al., 2014). The range reflects uncertainty in 
data sources, use of different methodologies to estimate 
emissions, and differences in the land use change processes 
included, the range of emission sources included and the 
land-cover definitions adopted (Houghton et al., 2012). For 
example, the forest definitions used in international analyses 
are frequently based on those used by FAO’s Global Forest 
Resources Assessment (forest area >0.5 ha, tree height >5 m 
and canopy cover >10 per cent, or trees able to reach these 
thresholds in situ, not predominantly under agricultural 
or urban use) (IPCC, 2006; FAO, 2010a). However, national 
forest definitions vary widely in terms of thresholds for 
canopy cover and tree height, and land uses included 
(Sasaki and Putz, 2009), meaning that vegetation types such 
as savannas, agroforestry systems, and mangroves may or 
may not be addressed by forest policies, depending on the 
country. Differences in definition, not only of land cover 
types but also land-use change processes, influence both 
the overall estimated mitigation potential and whether 
certain emissions result from deforestation or from forest 
degradation (Romijn et al., 2013).
To estimate the technical mitigation potential of reducing 
deforestation and degradation and enhancing forest 
management in 2030 (second and third columns of Table 
6.1), recent emissions given by published studies (referenced 
below the table) are used to approximate future emissions, 
assuming no further forest-related mitigation action. The 
business-as-usual scenarios in Clarke et al. (2014) suggest 
that total emissions from AFOLU (agriculture, forestry 
and other land use) may remain stable or decline, as they 
assume a slowing of population growth and increased 
efficiencies of food production that will contribute to 
reducing deforestation. Emissions from forest degradation 
in non-Annex I countries have declined marginally from 
1.1 GtCO
2
/yr in 2001-2010 to 1 GtCO
2
/yr in 2011-2015, 
but the relative emissions from degradation compared 
to deforestation have increased from a quarter to a third 
(Federici et al., 2015). Indeed, in scenarios that consider 
increased reliance on biofuels for energy generation and 
climate mitigation, demand for agricultural land continues 
to grow. Bottom-up assessments of drivers also suggest 
that pressures will increase (Kissinger et al., 2012). For 
example, emissions from deforestation in the Congo basin 
are expected to increase in the future, with average annual 
deforested area between 2020 and 2030 varying amongst 
policy scenarios from 0.4 to 1.3 million ha (Megevand, 2013). 
Hence, the technical mitigation potential from reduced 
deforestation and forest degradation and enhanced forest 
management are estimated at 5.2 GtCO
2
/yr (range: 2.1-6.3), 
and may be a relatively conservative approximation of total 
potential, assuming that emissions from these sources are 
likely to continue at present levels or increase.
In the two decades up to 2010, tropical deforestation 
emissions have been found to represent around 98 per 
cent of reported deforestation emissions from non-Annex I 
countries5. Therefore tropical deforestation derived from 
published studies (Harris et al., 2012; Achard et al., 2014) 
has been used to approximate the technical potential 
for reduced deforestation in developing countries, which 
amounts to between 1.7-4.7 GtCO
2
/yr, with a mean of 
3.4 GtCO
2
/yr (Table 6.1).
Forest degradation in non-Annex I countries, including the 
effects of selective logging, fire or drought, and fuelwood 
harvest, accounts for around 1 GtCO
2
/yr (between 2011-2015 
(Federici et al., 2015)), which is very similar to the results found 
by Grace et al. (2014) for 2000-2012 of a mean of 1 GtCO
2
/yr 
(range: 0.3-1.7). In addition, emissions from drainage and fire 
in forested or deforested peatlands in Southeast Asia were 
estimated at a mean of 0.8 GtCO
2
/yr (drainage in 2006, fire 
1998-2009 (Smith et al., 2014, Box 11.1)). Therefore the total 
5 Percentage calculated from FAO (2010b) Global Forest Resources Assessment 
2010. Global Tables: Table 11 Trends in carbon stock in living forest biomass 
1990-2010. Available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2010/en/
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Table 6.1: Technical potential for forest related mitigation activities for developing countries (GtCO
2
 in 2030, median (range)).
Reduced deforestation
Reduced degradation 
and forest management
Afforestation and 
reforestation
Totals
Regions Technical (tropics)a,b
Technical (degradation, 
tropics)c,d
Technical (non-Annex I 
countries)e,f
Technical
Africa 0.6 (0.2-0.8) 0.5 (0.2-0.9) 1.6 2.7 (1.9-3.3)
Latin America and 
Caribbean
1.9 (1.2-2.5) 0.1 (0-0.2) 1 3 (2.3-3.7)
Asia-Pacific 1 (0.4-1.4) 0.3 (0.1-0.6) 1.2 2.5 (1.7-3.1)
Peatland degradation - 0.8 - 0.8
Totals 3.5 (1.8-4.7) 1.7 (0.3-1.7) 3.8 9 (6.7-11.9)
Notes to Table 6.1:
a Achard et al. (2014), Table 2: annual carbon losses from gross loss of tropical forest cover (>30% cover) and other wooded land (<30% cover) for 2000-2010. Three 
estimates from Achard study (Ecozone/IPCC, max and min Saatchi). Tropical regions: Central and South America, Africa, Southeast Asia.
b Harris et al. (2012), Table 1: WHRC and Winrock team’s estimates of gross carbon emissions from tropical deforestation, 2000-2005. Tropical regions: Sub-saharan Africa, 
Latin America, South and Southeast Asia. Only forest biomass carbon stocks. 
c Grace et al. (2014), Table 5: estimated annual degradation flux from tropical degradation, 2000-2012. Tropical regions: Africa, America, Asia.  
d Total technical potential for degradation includes peatland degradation. Emissions from drainage (in 2006 according to Hooijer et al., 2010 in Smith et al., 2014) and fire 
in forested or deforested peatlands in Southeast Asia (lower estimate for 1998-2009, Box 11.1 in Smith et al., 2014).
e Afforestation and reforestation, including any expansion of forest area (see section 6.3).
f Calculated for this chapter as: area of wide-scale restoration potential WRI (2011) in different FAO ecological zones (FAO, 2012) for non-Annex I countries in UNEP region 
codes (excluding Europe and West Asia), multiplied by net annual CO
2
 uptake based on IPCC (2006) [annual net above + below-ground biomass growth, for natural forest 
in each ecological zone]/ [biomass to carbon conversion factor = 0.47] * [carbon to CO
2
 conversion factor = 3.67]. This figure is greater than the maximum estimate of 
3.4 GtCO
2
 for the similar area of 350 million hectares at 2030 by Wolosin (2014); however that analysis was not restricted to non-Annex I countries and averages over 
restoration scenarios that include a large proportion of mosaic restoration and improved secondary and naturally regenerated forest, of which will result in a lower 
average biomass growth per hectare. Use of the IPCC biomass growth figures for plantation forest would yield a still higher estimate. Single source, no range.
technical potential of reducing degradation and enhancing 
forest management would equal 1.8 GtCO
2
/yr.
6.4.2 Technical mitigation potential of enhanced 
carbon sequestration 
As noted, increased sequestration, or enhanced removals, 
of carbon can result from increasing forest area, or through 
enhancing sequestration in existing forest (for example, 
rehabilitating degraded forest). When tree density increases, 
carbon is removed from the atmosphere by the increasing 
plant biomass, and soil carbon stocks are protected from 
erosion and may also increase.
Reforestation can take place at a variety of scales, from 
increasing tree cover in small areas within a mosaic of other 
land uses (so called ‘mosaic restoration’) to restoring larger 
areas (‘wide-scale’ restoration, see Glossary). The estimated 
global potential for ‘wide-scale’ restoration of closed-canopy 
forest is up to half a billion ha, excluding areas in intensive 
use (WRI, 2011)6. An additional 1.5 billion ha globally may 
have the potential for mosaic restoration (WRI, 2011). 
Mosaic restoration may be easier to undertake as it allows a 
greater range of land uses, whilst restoring areas to closed-
canopy forest is likely to remove more CO
2
 per unit of area. 
Depending on ecosystem type, and whether the result is a 
natural forest or a plantation, areas converted to forest are 
estimated to remove between about 1 and 35 tCO
2
 per ha 
per year in above- and below-ground biomass (from default 
data in IPCC (2006)7). If natural forest were simultaneously 
restored over the 351 million ha with potential for wide-scale 
6 In (WRI, 2011) closed-canopy forest has a canopy density greater than 
45 per cent.
7 In (IPCC, 2006, Tables 4.4 and 4.12) ecosystems from boreal tundra woodland 
to tropical plantation.
restoration in non-Annex I countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific 
and Latin America and the Caribbean regions, calculated 
from WRI (2011), this could equate to 3.8 GtCO
2
/yr while the 
forest was re-growing.
Standing, secondary and planted forests also contribute 
to the global ‘terrestrial carbon sink’, absorbing CO
2
 from 
the atmosphere. The forest carbon sink is estimated 
to be large and vary widely, from a global value of 
3.4 ± 1 GtCO
2
/yr (for the period 2001-2010 (Federici 
et al., 2015)), to estimates for tropical sinks alone of 
6.8 GtCO
2
/yr (for the period 2005-2010 (Grace et al., 
2014)). The IPCC states with high confidence that increased 
atmospheric CO
2
 will lead to increased terrestrial carbon 
uptake (Ciais et al., 2013), and a recent review suggests 
that the largest increase has been in woody biomass within 
savanna (included in some national forest definitions) and 
non-forest ecosystems (Liu et al., 2015). Carbon sink figures 
for existing forests are not included in the technical potential 
for reduced deforestation given here, as a result of the 
uncertainty surrounding how carbon sinks and their capacity 
to absorb CO
2
 will change in the changing climate (Bellassen 
and Luyssaert, 2014). 
6.4.3 Economic mitigation potential of forest-
related mitigation
A number of recent studies estimate the global economic 
mitigation potential in 2030 of various forest-related 
activities given economic and land-use constraints, at 
different levels of costs and for different regions of the world. 
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Box 6.2: The REDD+ activities
While the five REDD+ activities are listed in UNFCCC decision text, it is useful to further define these to understand how 
REDD+ can contribute to forest-related mitigation. Noting that countries will have their own definitions, this chapter 
adopts:
a) Reducing emissions from deforestation – reducing emissions resulting from conversion of forest to other land 
uses
b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation – reducing emissions resulting from activities in forest areas that 
do not result in conversion of forest
c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks – the retention of existing forest carbon stocks. This activity can only make 
a contribution to mitigation if the carbon stock would otherwise be lost, so it is difficult to estimate mitigation 
potential separately from (a) or (b). The rationale for inclusion of this activity was to provide conservation 
incentives for those countries with limited deforestation or stable forest cover
d) Sustainable management of forest – though this could include the whole set of REDD+ forest activities, it 
is defined more narrowly here as the sustainable management of forest including for timber or fuelwood 
production (maintaining constant or increasing levels of carbon stocks over multiple harvest cycles) (Miles and 
Dickson, 2010). This contributes to reduced emissions from forest degradation, and rehabilitation of carbon 
stocks in degraded forest
e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks – both the restoration of carbon stocks in degraded forest, and through 
expansion of forest cover.
They offer a very large range of estimates of global mitigation 
potential at different cost levels, ranging from 0-1.5 GtCO
2
e 
for costs <US$20/tCO
2
e, to mitigation potentials of 
0.1-9.5 GtCO
2
e for costs <US$50/tCO
2
e, and ranging from 
0-13.8 GtCO
2
e for costs <US$100/tCO
2
e (Smith et al., 2014). 
Differences among models reviewed include the cost levels 
used, the economic assumptions, model approach (bottom-
up or top-down), and the mitigation options considered. 
The economic mitigation potential for developing countries 
is not provided separately. However, it is highlighted that 
for developing countries the most cost-effective mitigation 
options in forestry are reducing deforestation, sustainable 
forest management and afforestation (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Regional breakdowns show that reduced deforestation 
dominates as the most cost-effective forestry option for Latin 
America and Middle East and Africa regions, whereas forest 
management dominates the Asia region (Smith et al., 2014).
In general, the economic mitigation potential will be smaller 
than the technical potential. Furthermore, estimates of 
economic mitigation potential do not consider policy 
incentives and socio-cultural and institutional barriers to 
implementation of forest-related mitigation activities (Smith 
et al., 2014), which further affect in either direction the 
extent to which emission reduction potentials are realized. 
Real-world examples of how the results of full-scale 
realisation of forest mitigation policies might compare 
to these economic mitigation potentials are limited. 
Nevertheless, Brazil’s success in reducing deforestation by 
82 per cent in the Brazilian Amazon between 2004-2014 
(INPE, 2015) results from a mix of policies that included 
expansion of protected areas, supply chain interventions, 
and positive incentives for landholders (Nepstad et al., 
2014) as well as exogenous economic factors such as falling 
commodity prices (Assunção et al., 2015). This emphasizes 
the role of socio-cultural, institutional and policy-related 
contexts for realising forest-related emission reductions. 
Nonetheless, the previous sections have indicated that 
there is significant potential to further reduce forest-related 
emissions, both compared to current practices and to the 
contributions indicated in the submitted INDCs. The last 
section of this chapter focuses on REDD+ as a key option 
under the UNFCCC for further enhancing forest-related 
mitigation in developing countries.
6.5 REDD+ as a key instrument to realize 
forest-related emission reductions in 
developing countries
The immediate and relatively large impact of preserving 
carbon through reducing deforestation and degradation, as 
well as the cost-effectiveness of this land use option compared 
to other mitigation measures (Golub et al., 2010; Smith et al., 
2014) has driven the momentum behind development of the 
REDD+ mechanism. Originally recognizing the contribution 
of “reducing emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries” (‘RED’) (UNFCCC, 2005), the scope was expanded 
in 2007 to include emissions from degradation and became 
a component of enhanced action on mitigation (‘REDD’) 
(UNFCCC, 2007). In 2009 REDD+ was further expanded to 
include “conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks” (‘REDD+’) (UNFCCC, 2009) and now represents a 
specific suite of forest-related mitigation activities in the 
developing world (see Box 6.2) that countries can implement 
voluntarily to contribute to the global mitigation effort. Since 
2005, the REDD+ framework has evolved under the UNFCCC, 
adapting to improved understanding of issues regarding 
potential impacts, methodological accounting, safeguards, 
and financing (Smith et al., 2014). 
At COP 16 in Cancun in 2010, a phased approach to REDD+ 
was decided “[…] beginning with the development of 
national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, 
and capacity-building, followed by the implementation of 
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national policies and measures and national strategies or 
action plans that could involve further capacity-building, 
technology development and transfer and results-based 
demonstration activities, and evolving into results-based 
actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified” 
(UNFCCC, 20108). This was to provide a progressive pathway 
to full-scale REDD+ implementation, taking into account the 
differing capacities of countries.
Moreover, interventions at the national level are needed 
to overcome internal displacement of pressures from one 
area to the next. For this to happen, nationally coordinated 
cross-sectoral strategies are required, and should be based 
on an analysis of the drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation, and barriers to the sustainable management of 
forest and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. National, 
and often, subnational institutions need to be mandated, 
resourced and have the capacity to implement these 
strategies. Safeguards need to be promoted and supported 
- to protect or enhance the many social and environmental 
values of forest, to respect the knowledge and rights of 
indigenous peoples and member of local communities, and 
to enable the full and effective participation of relevant 
stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local 
communities. A robust and transparent national forest 
monitoring system is also required, enabling consistency 
in data and information to support the implementation of 
REDD+ activities (UN-REDD Programme, 2013). 
Each of these pre-requisites to successful implementation 
is reflected in a series of decisions made under the 2013 
Warsaw Framework on REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2013), which 
made significant progress on deciding on the coordination 
of financing, transparency and safeguards, development 
of national forest monitoring systems, verification at the 
international level, institutional arrangements to receive 
results-based finance, and action on drivers of deforestation 
(UNFCCC, 20139). To access results-based payments for 
REDD+ activities, actions need to be fully measured, reported 
and verified. To this end, countries need to have in place:
• A national strategy or action plan,
• A national forest monitoring system (or interim 
subnational system),
• A safeguards information system and a summary of 
information on how the REDD+ safeguards have been 
addressed and respected, and
• A forest reference emission level or forest reference 
level (or interim subnational reference level).
The contribution of REDD+ to meeting the potential for 
forest-related mitigation is partly contingent on available 
resources, first to put these requirements in place and 
to develop enabling policy frameworks and institutional 
capacity to implement them (sometimes referred to as 
‘REDD+ readiness’), and later to supply the financing that 
8 Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2010).
9 Decision 9-15/ CP. 19 (UNFCCC, 2013).
creates positive incentives for enhanced results-based 
action on mitigation by developing countries10. 
The series of decisions made under the 2013 Warsaw 
Framework on REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2013) has been accompanied 
by an ongoing and diverse set of early action REDD+ activities 
and other multilateral, bilateral or country driven initiatives 
being implemented that contribute to REDD+ readiness or 
complement the goals of REDD+ (for example, conservation 
and sustainable forest management). 
Despite the complexities that have slowed REDD+ 
implementation on the ground (Sills et al., 2014), REDD+ 
is seen as a unique approach to better integrate the forest 
sector in the broader climate change and sustainable 
development plans of developing countries. Indeed, support 
to REDD+ readiness actions offers national benefits to 
many countries, including the development of national 
forest monitoring systems, understanding of drivers of 
deforestation, the strengthening of policies, laws and 
regulations relevant to the UNFCCC’s REDD+ safeguards, 
the adoption of wider stakeholder engagement in decision-
making, and development of better data and information 
on the distribution of forest carbon stocks, biodiversity and 
ecosystem services (Lee and Pistorius, 2015). It involves 
implementing policies and measures that contribute 
substantially to climate change mitigation, are based on 
positive incentives for action, and can deliver additional 
co-benefits. Hence, REDD+ continues to receive political 
support from many developed and developing countries.
Some major constraints on the potential for REDD+ 
implementation include the speed at which policies can 
be put in place and governance improvements can be 
implemented, as well as competition with other land uses 
(food security with a growing global population). In principle, 
national strategies and action plans should take account of 
these constraints when determining the scale of ambition for 
REDD+. The availability of finance to cover the readiness and 
upfront costs of REDD+, whether domestic or international, 
will also be a determining factor (Streck, 2012). 
Many countries have included forest-related mitigation 
contributions within their INDCs, which can contribute to 
setting the stage for large-scale implementation of REDD+ 
in the coming years. Together with an awareness of the 
challenges facing implementation and building on the 
existing momentum in this sector, forest-related mitigation 
activities represent significant opportunities to narrow the 
emissions gap and facilitate the transition to a low-emission 
pathway consistent with limiting global average temperature 
increase to below 20C in 2100 with >66 per cent chance.
10 “Results-based finance may come from a wide variety of sources, pub-
lic and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” 
(UNFCCC, 2013).
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Country-specific findings
This Annex presents detailed country-level findings for 
13 of the G20 countries that had submitted their INDCs 
by 1 October 2015. The EU is considered as one (EU28). 
Accounting for around three quarters of global GHG 
emissions, the G20 has the largest effect on the aggregate, 
global findings of this assessment. 
For each country, a brief description of the INDC elements 
considered by the modelling groups is provided. Reasons for 
Annex 1
discrepancies between different data sources are discussed. 
Data are sourced from global studies (if available), national 
studies, and official government sources. It should be noted 
that the current policy trajectory emissions are based only 
on the CAT (2015) and PBL (2015), as well as official and 
national studies. Other studies do not provide current 
policy trajectory emission projections. 
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Figure A1.1: GHG emissions of Australia under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy 
trajectory case 
The official study is: Australian Government (2015). Noted, CROADS, IEA (adjusted) and NIES are excluded as the results of 
these studies are presented at a regional level, only cover limited countries
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Australia intends to reduce GHG emissions by 26–28 per 
cent from 2005 levels including land use, land use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) by 2030. Australia’s target covers 
all sectors (energy, industrial processes and product use, 
agriculture, LULUCF, and waste) and gases (CO
2
, CH
4
, 
N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs, SF
6
 and NF
3
).
The four modelling groups which estimated the INDC scenario 
in 2030 all agree on the impact of Australia’s INDC on its 
emissions in 2030. As an official estimate is not available in 
Australia’s INDC itself, an alternative official country-specific 
data source was used (Australian Government, 2015). This 
source provided the ‘official estimate’ in the Figure below. 
All models demonstrate a significant difference between 
current policy trajectories and the INDC trajectory in 2030. 
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Brazil
The Brazilian INDC establishes an absolute target relative to 
2005, reducing GHG emissions by 37 per cent in 2025 and 
indicating further reductions by 43 per cent in 2030. These 
percentage reductions are relative to reported emissions of 
2.1 GtCO
2
e in 2005, corresponding respectively to emission 
levels of 1.3 GtCO
2
e in 2025 and 1.2 GtCO
2
e in 2030, using 
IPCC AR5 GWP-100. Brazil´s INDC is economy-wide, covers 
all IPCC sectors and six gases (CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and 
sF
6
), and is unconditional. Actions to achieve the targets focus 
mainly on the forest sector and on increasing the share of 
biofuels and renewable electricity in the Brazilian energy mix.
Modelling groups estimate higher historical emission 
levels than official estimates, but do roughly agree with 
the projection of the current policy trajectory for 2020. 
Modelling group estimates for emission levels in 2025 and 
2030 are similar to national estimates as they also used 
official INDC projections.
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Figure A1.2: GHG emissions of Brazil under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy trajectory case
The official study is: INDC Brazil (UNFCCC, 2015)
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Canada
Canada proposes an economy-wide target to reduce GHG 
emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels in 2030. Canada´s 
INDC is said to include all sectors and GHG gases. However, 
there are some uncertainties on the treatment of LULUCF. 
Although the country declares its target to include all ipCC 
sectors (excluding emissions from natural disturbances), the 
LULUCF sector does not appear to be included in the base 
year (based on the information presented in the INDC). For 
that reason, it is possible that the LULUCF sector will be 
treated separately from the other sectors. 
The modelling groups largely agree on the impact of Canada’s 
INDC on its emissions. Projections of Canada’s future 
emissions under current policies, however, vary widely. 
Figure A1.3: GHG emissions of Canada under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current trajectory policy case
The official and national studies are: UNFCCC inventories for historic data/6th National Communication for projections and 
the first Biennial Report of Canada (Government of Canada 2014a) and Government of Canada (2014b)
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China
China’s INDC includes an intention to peak CO
2
 emissions 
around 2030, making best efforts to peak earlier, to reduce 
the carbon intensity of GDP by 60-65 per cent from 2005 
levels by 2030, to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption to around 20 per cent by 2030, 
and to increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion 
cubic metres from 2005 levels by 2030. Although China’s 
INDC is framed in terms of CO
2
, the discussion text also 
implies action on other gases. China’s INDC also includes a 
comprehensive list of actions. The GHG targets cover CO
2,
 
but the sectors to which the targets apply are not specified.
The studies assessed show a wide range of potential 
impacts of China’s INDC on national emissions (varying from 
12.8-14 GtCO
2
e by 2030), with higher estimates (LSE, 
CROADS, Climate Advisers), arising, inter alia, from different 
assumptions on GDP growth rate, different base year data 
(varying from 9.1-11.3 GtCO
2
e) and different estimates on 
emissions other than CO
2
 emissions from the energy sector 
(and cement), etc. The higher estimates of LSE, CROADS and 
Climate Advisers are confined to the INDC intensity target 
calculations only.
An official estimate is not available, but two national estimates 
for CO
2
 emissions from the energy sector (and cement) 
are available from NCSC (Sha et al., 2015) and updated 
calculations from Energy Reserarch Institute (ERI) (Jiang et 
al., 2013). Three studies (CAT, 2015; IEA, 2014, 2015; PBL, 
2015) that estimated both China’s current policy trajectory 
and the INDC scenario, demonstrate a further reduction from 
current policy trajectories to the INDC in 2030. 
Only NCSC’s estimate adjusts for the possible effect of 
including energy statistics from the 2014 economic census, 
which leads to a much higher estimate for China’s CO
2
 
emission in 2030 (around 1 GtCO
2
e higher than the pre-
adjustment estimate) (Sha et al., 2015).
Figure A1.4: GHG emissions of China under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy trajectory case 
The national studies are: NCSC (Sha, et al., 2015) and ERI (updated calculations based on Jiang et al. (2013)). Noted that 
the higher estimates of LSE, CROADS and Climate Advisers for China on INDC 2030 did not provide current policy trajectory 
estimates. Three studies (CAT, 2015; IEA, 2014, 2015; PBL, 2015) that estimated both China’s current policy trajectory and 
the INDC scenario, demonstrate a further reduction from current policy trajectories to the INDC in 2030. China
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European Union
The EU proposes a binding target of at least 40 per cent 
domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 
1990. It includes all sectors and gases. The INDC also states 
a policy on including LULUCF in the 2030 GHG mitigation 
framework – to be established as soon as technical conditions 
allow and in any case before 2020.
While the modelling groups largely agree on the impact of 
the EU’s INDC on its emissions, the Climate Action Tracker 
estimates a higher level of emissions in 2030 due to its 
accounting assumptions regarding LULUCF. CAT (2015) 
assumes that LULUCF accounting rules may lead to credits 
for 2030 of the order of 1-4 per cent of 1990 emissions. All 
other studies assume a net-net approach. 
Figure A1.5: GHG emissions of the European Union under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy 
trajectory case
The official and national studies are: UNFCCC inventories for historic data/6th National Communication for projections 
(UNFCCC National Reports, 2015) and EEA (2015)
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India
India’s INDC for the period 2021 to 2030 included the 
following intentions: “[…] to put forward and further 
propagate a healthy and sustainable way of living based 
on traditions and values of conservation and moderation; 
to adopt a climate friendly and a cleaner path than the 
one followed hitherto by others at corresponding level of 
economic development; to reduce the emissions intensity 
of its GDP by 33 to 35 per cent by 2030 from 2005 level; 
to achieve about 40 per cent cumulative electric power 
installed capacity from non-fossil fuel based energy 
resources by 2030 with the help of transfer of technology 
and low cost international finance including from Green 
Climate Fund (GCF); to create an additional carbon sink of 
2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO
2 
equivalent through additional 
forest and tree cover by 2030” (UNFCCC, 2015). The sectors 
and gases covered by the intensity target are not specified.
The studies assessed show a wide range of potential 
mitigation impacts of India’s INDC on national emissions, 
varying from 3.7-4.8 GtCO
2
e by 2030 for the conditional 
INDCs (assuming a full implementation of the INDC, including 
the non-fossil fuel target), and varying from 3.7-6.5 GtCO
2
e by 
2030 for the unconditional INDCs (assuming current policies, 
or only accounting for the intensity target). The wide ranges 
are caused mainly by different assumptions regarding GDP 
growth rate, different base year data, and interpretation 
of the conditionality of the INDCs. The higher estimates of 
LSE and the national study stem from a focus on the INDC 
intensity target calculations only, and do not consider other 
INDC elements, such as the non-fossil energy target.
An official estimate of emissions under the INDC is not 
available. National estimates for CO
2
 emissions from the 
energy sector (and cement) are available from Dubash et al. 
(2015), which are not included here. From Damassa et al. 
(2015, forthcoming), there are national ‘all GHG’ projections 
including land-use for India based on a relatively large 
range of GDP assumptions (6.3-7.4 per cent average GDP 
growth for the period 2005-2030), resulting in emissions of 
5.7-7.5 GtCO
2
e in 2030.
Figure A1.6: GHG emissions of India under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy trajectory case
The official and national studies are: INDC India (UNFCCC, 2015) and Damassa et al. (2015, forthcoming)
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Indonesia
Indonesia’s INDC states that the country “[…] has committed 
to reduce unconditionally 26 per cent of its greenhouse gases 
against the business as usual scenario by the year 2020. 
Indonesia is committed to reducing emissions by 29  per cent 
compared to the business as usual (BAU) scenario by 2030”. 
Furthermore, “Indonesia’s target should encourage support 
from international cooperation, which is expected to help 
Indonesia to increase its contribution up to 41 per cent 
reduction in emissions by 2030” (UNFCCC, 2015). Indonesia 
defines its baseline emissions as 2 881 GtCO
2
e in 2030. The 
INDC covers all sectors and CO
2
, CH
4
, and N
2
O.
Studies diverge on Indonesia’s emissions in all cases, due in 
part to different assumptions regarding land use emissions, 
for which data are highly uncertain (for example, den Elzen 
et al., 2015). 
Figure A1.7: GHG emission of Indonesia under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy 
trajectory case
Official sources include: INDC Indonesia (UNFCCC, 2015)
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Japan
Japan’s INDC proposes to reduce GHG emissions by 
26 per cent by 2030 compared to 2013 levels, equivalent to 
a 25.4 per cent reduction against 2005 levels. All sectors and 
all GHGs (CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs, SF
6
 and NF
3
) are covered 
(UNFCCC, 2015). 
According to the official estimate that has been included in 
the INDC document, Japan’s INDC would equate to emissions 
levels of about 1 042 Gt CO
2
 in 2030. The modelling groups 
largely agree on the impact of Japan’s INDC on its emissions. 
Figure A1.8: GHG emissions of Japan under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy trajectory case
The official and national studies are: INDC Japan (UNFCCC, 2015), IDDRI (2015), Damassa et al. (2015, forthcoming) and 
Kuramochi (2014)
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Mexico
Mexico aims to reduce its GHG emissions by 22 per cent 
(unconditional) and by 36 per cent (conditional) from BAU 
by 2030. Mexico’s INDC provides the resulting 2030 emission 
levels in MtCO2e. The target covers all sectors (energy, 
industrial processes and product use, agriculture, LULUCF, 
and waste) and six greenhouse gases (CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, 
pFCs and sF
6
).
The studies assessed adopted the official estimate of 2030 
emissions from the INDC, and therefore agree on this 
figure. The 2020 pledge presented here is measured from a 
different baseline than that presented in the INDC (Fransen 
et al., 2015).
Figure A1.9: GHG emissions of Mexico under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy trajectory case
The official study is: INDC of Mexico (UNFCCC, 2015), and national studies are: Government of Mexico (2012) and 
SEMARNAT (2013)
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Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea put forward an economy-wide target 
to reduce its GHG emissions by 37 per cent from business-
as-usual (BAU) by 2030. The Republic of Korea intends 
to achieve a 25.7 per cent emissions reduction from BAU 
domestically. The INDC covers energy, industrial processes 
and product use, agriculture and waste, and states that “[…] 
a decision will be made at a later stage on whether to include 
greenhouse gas emissions and sinks of the land sector as 
well as the method for doing so” (UNFCCC, 2015). The target 
applies to five sectors (energy, industrial processes and 
product use, agriculture, LULUCF and waste) and six gases 
(CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
).
The Republic of Korea provides an official estimate in its 
INDC document, which would equate to emission levels of 
about 535.9 MtCO
2
e in 2030. Modelling groups agree on 
the emission levels in 2030 since they use the emission level 
taken from the INDC document. The Climate Action Tracker 
(CAT, 2015) provides a higher estimate indicating the levels 
of intended domestic reductions. 
Figure A1.10: GHG emissions of the Republic of Korea under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current 
policy trajectory case
The official and national study is: UNFCCC National Reports (2015)
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Russian Federation
The INDC of the Russian Federation states that “Limiting 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases in Russia to 70-75% of 
1990 levels by the year 2030 might be a long-term indicator, 
subject to the maximum possible account of absorbing 
capacity of forests”. This implies reducing emissions by 25-
30 per cent below the 1990 level (UNFCCC, 2015). It is an 
economy-wide target and includes all greenhouse gases. 
Study estimates diverge significantly on future emission 
trends under the current policy trajectory and under the 
INDC. This is due primarily to different assumptions on 
accounting of LULUCF emissions. 
Figure A1.11: GHG emissions of the Russian Federation under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current 
policy trajectory case
The official studies are: UNFCCC inventories for historic data/6th National Communication for current policy projections 
(UNFCCC National Reports, 2015). For INDC: reductions from INDC submission applied to base year 1990 (UNFCCC, 2015)
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South Africa
South Africa proposes that the form of its mitigation INDC 
is a peak, plateau and decline GHG emissions trajectory 
range. South Africa’s emissions by 2025 and 2030 will be 
in a range between 398 and 614 MtCO
2
e. It includes all 
sectors and gases. No quantification of any unconditional 
share of mitigation is offered. Uncertainties are noted in 
relation to AFOLU emissions and trace gases, with the 
intention of reducing uncertainty over time and moving 
to a comprehensive accounting approach for land-based 
emissions and removals. South Africa proposes innovative 
methodologies for adaptation, both impacts and investments 
required, also noting that methodologies can be improved. 
Given that the INDC states emission ranges in absolute units 
(MtCO
2
e), modelling groups have greater certainty on the 
impact of South Africa’s INDC. There is reference to more 
than one mitigation potential analysis, which has provided 
estimates of what mitigation can be implemented, the most 
recent being in 2014.
Figure A1.12: GHG emissions of the South Africa under the 2020 pledge, INDC and current policy 
trajectory case
The official and national studies are INDC of South Africa (UNFCCC, 2015) and the Mitigation Report (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2014)
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United States of America
The USA intends to reduce net GHG emissions by 26–28 per 
cent from 2005 by 2025, including LULUCF. The target covers 
all IPCC sectors and seven greenhouse gases.
The modelling groups largely agree on the impact of the 
USA’s INDC on its emissions. 
Figure A1.13: GHG emissions of the United States of America under the 2020 pledge, INDC and 
current policy trajectory case
The official studies are: UNFCCC inventories for historic data, 6th National Communication for current policy projections (UNFCCC 
National Reports, 2015). For INDC: INDC submission (UNFCCC, 2015). The analysis in this report uses the ‘with measures’ 
scenario from the 6th National Communication. The US indicates that its current trajectory is better represented by the ‘with 
additional measures’ scenario. The national studies are: Belenky (2015) and Hausker et al. (2015). Current policies only from 
Belenky (2015). 2030 INDC estimate only from Hausker et al. (2015)
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